

## EDITORIAL

In 1998 the journalist Simon Winchester published what is to date the only best-seller in the history of linguistics. Its title in the UK, where it was published by Penguin, was *The Surgeon of Crowthorne: A Tale of Murder, Madness and the Oxford English Dictionary*. It was simultaneously published by Harper Collins in the United States as *The Professor and the Madman: A Tale of Murder, Insanity and the Making of the Oxford English Dictionary*. Many members of the Society have read it, and it is an entertaining book, telling the story of how one of the most productive contributors to the *New English Dictionary*, Dr W.C. Minor, was eventually tracked down by the Dictionary's editor, James Murray, to Broadmoor Criminal Lunatic Asylum (now called Broadmoor Hospital), where he was serving a life-sentence for murder. Winchester's book has not only been a success in Anglophone countries, but has clearly aroused interest in other parts of the world too. I have been put in mind of it just now on seeing a lengthy article in the Norwegian tabloid newspaper, *Dagbladet*, accompanying the publication of the Norwegian translation: *Professoren og galningen: en beretning om drap, vanvidd og Oxford English Dictionary* (trans. Isak Rogde; Cappelen, 2003). What is noteworthy here is the way in which the history of linguistics is told, both by Winchester and the *Dagbladet* journalist, Sverre Gunnar Haga.

The central element of the story as told is Minor's history of mental illness. The British version of the book only refers to this in the subtitle, but Harper Collins evidently decided that this was the selling point and promoted it to the main title. The title of the *Dagbladet* article is 'The Work of a Madman' ('En gal manns verk'), and the opening sentence is 'Han var drapsmann og schizofren' ('He was a murderer and a schizophrenic'). The topos of Minor's mental state dominates Haga's newspaper article throughout. Haga has interviewed Winchester and even reports him as saying that 'there is no doubt that schizophrenics are suited to lexicographical work', not a characterisation that all lexicographers will welcome. However this case of what is essentially the historiography of linguistics being manipulated into a tabloid story about a mad genius is instructive in two ways.

Firstly, "mainstream" historiography of linguistics is full of examples of non-essential details about the scholars involved or the circumstances surrounding the production of a particular grammar or dictionary being elevated to the extent that they serve to cloud our understanding of the history of linguistics. Johan Storm, for example, is described time after time in the literature as having a brilliant ear for phonetics and as being a key influence on Henry Sweet and Eduard Sievers. These fossilised facts tell us nothing about the linguistic work he carried out and distil him down into two small biographical details. We need therefore to have a critical eye for such formulas

in the historiographical literature. Secondly, historiography is above all storytelling, and, while we can learn a lot from finding out how historians write history, we can certainly also benefit from finding out how journalists tell stories.

When the book first came out Luc Bresson bought the film rights, but has so far done nothing with them. The rights have now been taken over by Mel Gibson. It is half a century since the film *My Fair Lady* came out, so it is high time the history of linguistics made it onto the silver screen again!

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## “Native Speaker”

The recently published second edition of *The Native Speaker* by my colleague Alan Davies (Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 2003) points out that nothing is generally known about the origins of that problematic term. The logical problem with it, of course, is that in the literal sense no one is a “native” speaker of any language, and the practical problem is that the ideal it represents poses a barrier for second-language learners that many people see as discriminatory.

Among the questions concerning *native speaker* that Davies says prompted his book are these: ‘Why is it that as a notion it appears to have come into prominence so recently? When was the first use of the term? I cannot find anything earlier than Bloomfield’s *Language* (1933 [p. 43])’ (Davies 2003: ix). These questions are apt and intriguing ones, even if it is the case that *native speaker* was an established term well before 1933. My hope is that this note will bring forth information from other HSS members who are knowledgeable about the history of the term.

The *OED Online* does not offer any information about the term, though it does make clear that *native language* and *my native English* date back to the 16th century (though it is not entirely clear from the 1509 example that the meaning is the usual modern one):

1509 HAWES *Past. Pleas.* XXXIV. (Percy Soc.) 111 In my natyf language I wyl not opres More of her werke. 1593 SHAKES. *Rich. II*, I. iii. 160 The Language I haue learn’d these forty yeares (My natiue English) now I must forgo. [...] 1638 SIR T. HERBERT *Trav.* (ed. 2) 37 They have a native language of their owne, but the Persian tongue is understood by most.

It is reasonable to suppose that *native speaker* developed by transference from *native language*, on the analogy of the relationship of the words *language* and *speaker* themselves, and that this transference occurred specifically in English, given the difficulty of translating *native speaker* into even closely related European languages.

Searches I have conducted on the Making of America and JSTOR Archives have turned up seven occurrences from 19th-century journals. The oldest, dating from an 1855 article, does not have the meaning we associate with the term today:

We meet with native speakers, the reporter telling us that on the subject of the Honolulu Reef Bill, “Mr Kaumaca was eloquent;” that Messrs. Kalama and Maika very earnestly advocated the bill;” that “Mr. Kamaipelekane read for the first time a bill,” etc. (p. 550 of Anon., “A

Honolulu Newspaper”, *Littell’s Living Age*, no. 562 (3 March 1855), 549-551, reprinted from *Chambers’ Journal*; irregular punctuation *sic*)

The reference is to Hawaiian ‘natives’ speaking in the local legislature — in English, rather than in their ‘native language’. The second occurrence, a decade and a half later, is more ambiguous. It comes from an article by Lewis Henry Morgan (1818–1881), a giant of 19th-century American anthropology, and again it has to do with natives speaking in a sort of legislature, the Amerindian tribal council. But this time it is specifically their native language that is focussed on:

Any person familiar with the articulation of Indian languages can form a very correct opinion of their development when heard from the lips of native speakers in council. (p. 47 of Lewis H. Morgan, “Indian Migrations”, *North American Review*, vol. 110, issue 226 (Jan. 1870), 33-82)

The *North American Review* contained articles and reviews of a specialised linguistic nature, but intended for a general audience. In its next volume but one appears the first instance I have found of *native speaker* with the familiar modern meaning:

Our th surd (in thin) is as near to an f as a t is near to a p; no native speaker of English feels that they are very near to each other; but sounds which a man is unable to produce are apt to be hazy and indistinct to his ear. (p. 449 of anonymous review of *Methodische Grammatik der griechischen Sprache*, pt. 1, 1st fascicle, by Rudolf Westphal (Jena, 1870), *North American Review*, vol. 112, issue 231 (Apr. 1871), 441-455)

These occurrences from 1870 and 1871, and all the remaining 19th-century examples I have found, are from American journals. As will be seen further on, however, British examples appear right from the outset of the 20th century, so it is not clear whether *native speaker* represents an American innovation, or whether it is an accident of what publications are represented in the data base.

The 1871 occurrence is the first clear case in which *native speaker* does not have the connotation of *native* which the *OED* describes thus: ‘In mod. use *spec.* with connotation of non-European’. American English may have been in the vanguard in dropping this connotation, since, among all the occurrences of *native speaker* I have examined up through 1915, those in British publications inevitably refer to “natives” of some non-European locale, while those in American publications can refer to Europeans or non-Europeans. However, with such a small sample of occurrences it might again just be an accident of which areas happen to be under discussion.

My search turned up one further example of *native speaker* from the 1870s:

In conclusion, the speaker urged that, as the best native speakers of Latin differed among themselves in theory and practice, but labored harmoniously and to the end to come nearer to the ideal pronunciation, so there is no ground for discouragement or for detraction if those who would restore the ancient pronunciation still differ in many points, and perhaps in all points fall below the true standard. (p. 26 of report on "Certain Differences among the Ancient Romans in the Pronunciation of their Language" by Professor Tracy Peck of Cornell University, Eighth Annual Session of the American Philological Association, New York, 19 July 1876. *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, Vol. 7 (1876), 3-52)

In 1880 comes the first use of the term by a prominent linguist, William Dwight Whitney (1827-1894):

As a human being, he is capable of acquiring any human language; naturally the possessor of none, he may become by education the possessor of one as well as another; toward any given one he stands in a relation not perceptibly different from that of every other human being. To maintain this is by no means to deny that there are differences in the mental endowments of races, and in the grade of perfection of languages; but these differences are not greater than those of endowment in the individuals of a single race, or of the resources of the same language as commanded by different native speakers. (p. 31 of Whitney's "Logical Consistency in Views of Language", *American Journal of Philology*, vol. 1, no. 3 (1880), 327-343)

(It is possible that Whitney also wrote the anonymous 1871 review of Westphal cited above.) I do not have access to electronic versions of Whitney's *Language and the Study of Language* (1867) or *Life and Growth of Language* (1875), but have looked through those sections of the latter in which *native speaker* would seem most likely to occur, and have not found it. Interestingly, Whitney (1875) contains the phrases "*mother-tongue*" (pp. 8, 22, 24, 34), "*native speech*" (p. 8) and "*native*" *language* (p. 25), but all with the "scare quotes" indicated here, which suggests that he was concerned lest the phrases be taken too literally by members of the wide audience he was aiming the book at. The *OED* gives Whitney (1875) as the earliest citation of another apparently innovative phrase-type using *speaker*, in which the word is preceded by the name of a particular language.

**1875** W. D. WHITNEY *Life & Growth of Lang.* iv. 72 The difficulty is one which English-speakers can hardly realize. **1899** *Daily News* 2 Oct. 6/4 A population of industrial English-speakers;..a population of pastoral Dutch-speakers.

The two last 19th-century occurrences of *native speaker* I have found are as follows:

It does not seem probable that so highly developed a language as the Arabic should content itself /{450} with three vowel-sounds. On the other hand, the scheme is consistent and corresponds to what comparison of dialects shows to have been the primitive system. It is perhaps better to suppose that a change of pronunciation had begun when the vowel-signs were adopted, but that the differences were too slight to arrest the attention of native speakers. (pp. 449-450 of C. H. Toy, 'The Semitic Vowel a', *American Journal of Philology*, vol. 2, no. 8. (1881), 446-457)

The chief object of our modern language courses is, as has been said, the ability to read French and German; but to do this reading intelligently, the student must know more than the definitions of the words he sees; he must be able to imagine the phrases coming from the lips of a Frenchman or a German — he must know how they sound to a native hearer, and how they put themselves together in the mind of a native speaker. (p. 59 of C.H. Grandgent, 'Synopsis of French and German Instruction', School Document No. 14, Boston High Schools, 1890, quoted in anon. 'Brief Mention', *Modern Language Notes*, 6.2 (Feb. 1891), 58-63)

The last citation, by the distinguished American philologist Charles Hall Grandgent (1862–1939) is multiply interesting, not least because alongside *native speaker* it contains what is no doubt the first occurrence of *native hearer*.

As noted earlier, right from the turn of the century instances crop up in British journals, starting with one from Archibald Henry Sayce (1845–1933):

He [de Gregorio] also contributes [...] an elaborate essay on the structure of the African language generally known as the Ewe. This he has studied from the lips of native speakers, the result being a monograph of the first importance to the students of African philology. (A.H. Sayce, rev. of *Studi glottologici italiani*, ed. by Giacomo de Gregorio, vol. 2 (Turin: Loescher, 1901), *Classical Review*, vol. 15, no. 7. (Oct. 1901), p. 373)

Every word of the Kamilaroi in this vocabulary, as well as every Thurawal word, has been taken down by myself alone, from the lips of the native speakers. (p. 275 of R.H. Mathews, 'Languages of the Kamilaroi and Other Aboriginal Tribes of New South Wales', *Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*, vol. 33. (Jul.-Dec.1903), 259-283)

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HENRY SWEET SOCIETY BULLETIN

I reiterate that the purpose of this note has not been to offer any kind of definitive study, but to serve as a request to anyone with further knowledge or access to broader databases to share such information as they may have.

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## **The First, or One of the First, Treatments of Grammaticalisation in Britain**

**G**rammaticalisation is a very popular topic in linguistics at the moment, and has been since the early 1990s, after its popularity started to increase during the 1980s. However, Britain has not usually taken a front position in the debates surrounding this phenomenon in recent years.

The term *grammaticalisation* appears to have been first used with a similar meaning to that which it has today, by Antoine Meillet, in the early twentieth century (Meillet 1912). I have tried to study some of the British work in relevant areas of linguistics (i.e. comparative linguistics, historical linguistics, and origin of language debates) to see if there was also a similar concept in Britain around the turn of the last century. Moving backwards in time the first linguist with similar treatments that I have come across is Henry Sweet (1845-1912) whose comments on this phenomenon I would like to bring to light in this brief paper.

Henry Sweet distinguished between what he called *full words* and *form words*, in other words *content words* and *function words*, respectively. And the most interesting thing about his work, from a modern grammaticalisation perspective, is the fact that he appears to have a concept of what grammaticalisationists nowadays would call a *cline* from an autonomous content lexeme to the more grammatical / functional elements in language, such as function words, derivations and inflections. Derivations and inflections were in his eyes formally the same, however inflections also bore a strong parallel to *form words* (i.e. *function words*) which it seems he did not see in derivations (Sweet 1900 [1930]: 44).

For this brief paper I have only had the chance to look at three of Sweet's publications, and as I hope to make clear below, I have found parallels to grammaticalisation in two of them, but not in the second part of *A New English Grammar* where Sweet concentrates on syntax (Sweet 1898 [1948]). In the other two publications: *A New English Grammar, part one* (1892) and *The History of Language* (1900 [1930]) I have found references to grammaticalisation in the sense of a development of *full words* (i.e. *content words*) into *form words* (i.e. *function words*), and moreover to the development of new inflections and derivations through agglutination.

It is interesting to see that, unlike most other linguists during the nineteenth century (e.g. Bopp 1820, Gabelentz 1891)<sup>1</sup>, it was not inflections that were of most interest to Sweet, but function words. Understandable perhaps if we consider the lack of inflections in present day English and their decrease over the years.

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<sup>1</sup> Franz Bopp (1791-1867)  
Georg von der Gabelentz (1840-1893)



Sweet (1892) discusses the development of particles from nouns and adjectives and *link verbs* (roughly meaning auxiliary verbs and copula verbs) from *phenomenon words*, which is what he calls (full) verbs, for instance he sees the verb *be* as originating in a sense of 'growth' (Sweet 1892: 183,199-200). A few years later (Sweet 1900 [1930]) he treats the subject even more thoroughly. He remarks on the development of prepositions out of verbs, nouns and adjectives, but also the definite article from a demonstrative pronoun and once again the full verbs developing into *link verbs* - and he observes that this last change can be carried further into 'mere grammatical devices' (Sweet 1900 [1930]: 43, 53, 55-56, 89). The fact that he spells out that full verbs can develop first into *link verbs* and then further into 'mere grammatical devices' also makes it very clear that Sweet had a sense of the cline of development that grammaticalisationists today often appeal to in their work, sometimes divided into two different clines as in Hopper and Traugott (1993):

The Cline of Grammaticality:

content item > grammatical word > clitic > inflectional affix

The Cline of Lexicality:

a basket *full* (of eggs...) > a *cupful* (of water) > *hopeful*  
(Hopper and Traugott 1993: 7)

Furthermore, this is not the only time when Sweet mentions something resembling the modern *cline*. He also says:

It may happen that an inflectional element, instead of becoming more and more a part of its stem till at last, perhaps, it disappears altogether, may pursue the opposite course of development, and even regain something of the formal independence of the free particle or full-word of which it is the descendant. This has happened with the genitive ending in English. (Sweet 1900 [1930]: 46)

The quotation above shows that Sweet had a sense of the whole *cline* that Hopper and Traugott used, although with the difference that he combined Hopper and Traugott's two clines (*cline of grammaticality* and *cline of lexicality*) into one:

*full word* > *grammatical word* > *compound* > *derivation / inflection* > *zero*  
Figure 1: One of Sweet's views of the development of grammatical items.

Several times Sweet mentions that autonomous words can develop into function words - and he claims that this was a generally acknowledged process of change at the end of the nineteenth century, in other words taking no credit for having discovered this himself but instead emphasising that it is generally accepted - a comment which is important for us today in the study of the history of grammaticalisation.

One of the earliest and most energetic opponents of this view was our countryman Horne Took [sic], whose *Diversions of Purley*, first published about 1770, is an attempt to show that even prepositions and conjunctions once had a definite independent meaning, and are simply worn-down forms of full-words - a view which is now generally accepted. (Sweet 1900 [1930]: 43)

It is also interesting to see that Sweet stresses that this was not always the accepted view. Earlier scholars are said to have thought that *form words* (i.e. *function words*) were arbitrary inventions, developed explicitly for that purpose. It is a shame that Sweet does not mention by name any of the linguists who were part of the 'older school', which he claimed had been abandoned by the turn of the century. Nor does he say how long people had dismissed the older ideas (Sweet 1900 [1930]: 43).

Another point of interest in Sweet's work is the fact that he claims that the cline can be reversed! The issue of reversibility has been very big among grammaticalisationists in the last few years. So big that at both conferences on *New Reflections on Grammaticalization* (NRG) (1999, 2002) a large number of the papers dealt with this issue, and at least at NRG 2 (2002) this was the main issue. The reversed or opposite movement is often called *degrammaticalisation* nowadays, and has by many been dismissed as impossible since the definition of grammaticalisation has been seen to imply that there can only be one direction to this change. This way of approaching the issue makes the unidirectionality hypothesis a tautology and impossible to test (cf. Janda 2001, Lindström 2002), which is a major concern especially for people working on reconstructions where the unidirectionality hypothesis is of great help. It also makes it necessary, or at least desirable that we try to find out whether this phenomenon has always been seen as unidirectional.

Sweet's statement that the cline can be reversed fits very well with Norde's definition of *degrammaticalisation* (2002: 47-48):

In general, degrammaticalization may be defined as the type of grammatical change which results in a shift from right to left on the cline of grammaticality, e.g. the shift from affix to clitic [...] or the shift from clitic to grammatical word (see e.g. Campbell 1991). It should be noted that different clines have been suggested in other works (e.g. one in which derivational suffixes are included as well), and hence there may be more kinds of degrammaticalization [...]

We could therefore see this as evidence that Sweet did not think that this kind of change was unidirectional. It is therefore also very possible that others at the time held the same view, especially seeing as Sweet does not take any credit for proposing anything new in his treatment of the origin of grammatical forms.

Further evidence that Sweet definitely did not believe in the strong unidirectionality hypothesis whereby all grammatical items stem from lexical

items, is the fact that he noted that grammatical markers could originate not only in lexical items but also, for instance, in phonological changes:

In the corresponding English plural *feet*, the old *-i* after causing a similar mutation (p. 22) of the preceding vowel was at last dropped entirely, so that the inflection is now marked by vowel-change only. The 'gradation' of our strong verbs by which we distinguish such forms as *sing*, *sang*, *sung*, is a striking instance of how sound-changes which were originally accidental - in this case the result of the stress falling on different syllables in different inflections of the verb - have come to have a definite grammatical inflectional function. (Sweet 1900 [1930]: 45, cf. also p. 106)

The change he discusses in the quotation above, whereby a former purely phonological change is attributed grammatical function, resembles what grammaticalisationists nowadays variously call *exaptation*, *regrammaticalisation* and *functional renewal*, the first term possibly being the most common (cf. Brinton and Stein 1995, Greenberg 1991, Lass 1990, Vincent 1995).

So far I have mainly treated Sweet's discussion of the development of grammatical words. When it comes to grammatical endings it is interesting to see that Sweet's views appear a bit old fashioned. Like Bopp (1820) and many other linguists since the beginning of the nineteenth century, Sweet believed that the personal endings of verbs stemmed from personal pronouns. However, this view had been dismissed by many other linguists by this time, other alternatives such as the *adaptation* of nominal endings being suggested as other possible sources of these endings, as treated by Archibald Henry Sayce (1845-1933) among others (1884). Sweet, however, does not even remark on the fact that this is no longer the accepted view but that it has been rejected by some scholars. He admits that we do not know much about the origin of Indo-European inflections, but makes it sound as though the personal endings are the only ones that we do know where they stem from!

Although we still know very little of the origin of the Aryan inflections, we know that the personal inflections of the verb are simply personal pronouns that have lost their independence. (Sweet 1900 [1930]: 50, cf. also 1892: 199)

He also believes that the personal endings of verbs in other languages, e.g. Finnish, may stem from pronouns (Sweet 1900 [1930]: 116).

Some of his other examples are still accepted among linguists working on grammaticalisation. For instance, he mentions the paradigm example of the French future which is very often mentioned in treatments of grammaticalisation even now. And he also mentions the Scandinavian passive, which is believed to stem from an affixed reflexive pronoun *sik* (or *seR* (Wessén 1968 [1995]: 42)):

We can see the development of inflection out of independent words which have lost their formal independence in such forms as the French future *parlerai* from Late Latin *parabolare habeo* 'I have to speak,' and the modern Scandinavian passive formed by adding *-s* to the corresponding active forms, the *s* being a shortened form of Icelandic *-sk*, as in *būask* 'prepare oneself,' whence the borrowed English *to busk*, the *-sk* again being only a shortening of *sik* 'oneself'. (Sweet 1900 [1930]: 44)

And as is still common perhaps especially in treatments of some non-Indo-European languages he also notes that case endings can stem from postpositions, pronouns, demonstratives, particles and nouns, for instance (Sweet 1900 [1930]: 107-108, 110-111).

An important part of Sweet's treatment of the origin of grammatical forms is his distinction between what we today might see as a clitic as opposed to an affix. He makes the important distinction that for something to be treated as an inflection or derivation it must be *isolated* from the linguistic items that it originally stems from (see e.g. Sweet 1892:182, 197-198, 1900 [1930]: 42):

Mere obscuration without isolation is not enough to constitute a derivative or inflection. Thus the (l) in (hijl) = *he will*, does not constitute an inflection, because it is added indifferently to all words, and because we can change the unemphatic (hijl) into the emphatic (hijwil), and so break up the connection between the two words and restore the original full form of the (l). (Sweet 1892: 197)

In present-day studies of grammaticalisation, cliticisation is usually seen as a stage in the process of grammaticalisation, but linguists today would also not usually see a clitic as being on the same level of grammaticalisation as an inflection, which is why we have recently had discussions of the genitive-*s* in English and Swedish having developed from an inflectional suffix into something less grammatical in the form of a clitic, as a possible example of degrammaticalisation (see e.g. Norde 1997, 1998, 2001, 2002).

Like many linguists between 1870 and 1900 Sweet discusses the development of both grammatical inflections, derivations and more autonomous grammatical items, such as conjunctions, auxiliaries etc. However, unlike many other linguists at the time, e.g., Archibald Henry Sayce (1845-1933) and Esaias (Henrik Wilhelm) Tegnér the younger (1843-1928), he did not only treat the two separately, but he also brought them together in a discussion which resembles the cline that is often drawn up today which makes it seem as though Henry Sweet in fact had a concept which incorporated all of the changes that we today see as grammaticalisation (cf. Lindström 2003a, 2003b).

Still, Sweet does not include the whole movement from autonomous lexical item to inflection, derivation or zero under a distinct term comparable to *grammaticalisation* in our current usage of that term. Instead he only occasionally talks of *agglutination* or *composition* for the change into an inflection or derivation, and he can talk of full words such as full verbs *sinking* into auxiliary or copula uses (Sweet 1900 [1930]: 43), but with no definite term for the latter type of change. It therefore seems as though the realisation that the two types of changes could possibly be seen as parts of one wider, superordinate type of change was quite new, and no term had yet been seen as suitable, or perhaps linguists including Henry Sweet had not yet seen any particular need for one.

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## L'analyse linguistique de l'expérience – Martinet and Condillac.

One of the most ancient discussions concerns the relationships between language and thought and between language and experience in the widest sense. One traditional viewpoint is that the totality of experience is ordered and rendered comprehensible and expressible by means of language. It has often been contended, further, that rational thought is not possible without the intermediary of language. In such approaches, language is seen as the means for structuring thought. As Aristotle says in *On Interpretation* (Ross 1928: §16a), 'spoken words are the symbols of mental experience'. There is, further, a tradition of identifying linguistic expression with thought or even with the structure of reality. Hjelmslev, on the other hand, has maintained that language is simultaneously the intermediary which structures both the substance – vocal or written – through the expression form and the meaning substance, or purport, through the content form. In such views, language is a form which must be distinguished from, and is presupposed by, instantiations of verbal behaviour in what Saussure calls 'parole'. Furthermore, it can be seen as a means for the analysis of experience, so that experience can be communicated in temporal or linear sequences using discrete meaningful units (signs). This modern sense of 'linguistic form' clearly has its roots in the Kantian notion of 'form of the understanding' without any commitment to his conception of an unchanging or necessary nature of forms. Equally clearly, Kant's view and Saussure's version of linguistic form hark back to the Aristotelian view that the soul is the form of the body and the body is the matter of the soul. The idea of language as an intermediary semiotic system whose function is to order thought or, more widely, human experience is central to the teaching of thinkers such as Bühler (1934), Bergson (1944), Cassirer (1968), Sebeok (1986), and of functionalists such as Martinet (1960) and Mulder (1989). It seems to be implicit also in the work of Pike (1967). As we shall see below, Condillac also stated very clearly the idea that language can be seen as a means of analysing ideas, as Lefèvre (1966: 77) says in his study of Condillac. As we might expect, Saussure (1916: 155) is also very clear on the matter when he speaks of "la langue comme pensée organisée dans la matière phonique". He goes on (pp. 155-157):

Psychologiquement, abstraction faite de son expression par les mots, notre pensée n'est qu'une masse amorphe et indistincte. Philosophes et linguistes se sont toujours accordés à reconnaître que, sans le secours des signes, nous serions incapables de distinguer deux idées d'une façon claire et constante [...] Le rôle caractéristique de la langue vis-à-vis de la pensée n'est pas de créer un moyen phonique matériel pour l'expression des idées, mais de servir d'intermédiaire entre la pensée et le son, dans des conditions telles que leur union aboutit nécessairement à des

délimitations réciproques d'unités. La pensée, chaotique de sa nature, est forcée de se préciser en se décomposant [...] La linguistique travaille donc sur le terrain limitrophe où les éléments des deux ordres se combinent: *cette combinaison produit une forme, et non une substance.*

It is unclear whether Condillac was one of the philosophers Saussure had in mind in this section of his Course, but again his pronouncements were very similar on many points to those of Saussure, as we shall see. What is certain is that Hjelmslev, while disagreeing with some of Saussure's arguments took the idea of a linguistic system of signs as an intermediary form between the substances of thought and sound as the starting point for his Glossematics. It is the 'solidarity' of the planes of expression and content, which constitutes linguistic form for him (Hjelmslev 1953: ch. 13). There is clearly a long tradition of seeing languages as being for the analysis of thought, experience and/or external reality. Equally clearly, a major difference in thinking exists over whether language is seen as an intermediary, different from thought and experience, as Saussure and Hjelmslev have it, or identical with thought and perhaps reality, as Condillac and others have it.

In this long-maintained tradition, there is an intimate connection of language and reasoning or logic. For the ancients, the two were connected in 'logos'. In ancient times, as is well known, the Aristotelian categories were a confusion of linguistic and logical ideas. It can be argued that the categories are a universalisation of some of the grammatical qualities of ancient Greek. Benveniste, for example, has closely investigated the Aristotelian categories and concludes (1966: 70), 'pour autant que les catégories d'Aristote sont reconnues valables pour la pensée, elles se révèlent comme la transposition des catégories de langue'. Benveniste notes the considerable variation in linguistic categories and structures in a variety of languages and arrives at a more modern position, namely that:

aucun type de langue ne peut pas à lui-même et à lui seul ni favoriser ni empêcher l'activité de l'esprit. L'essor de la pensée est lié bien plus étroitement aux capacités des hommes, aux conditions générales de la culture, à l'organisation de la société, qu'à la nature particulière de la langue. Mais la possibilité de la pensée est liée à la faculté de langage, car la langue est une structure informée de signification, et penser, c'est manier les signes de la langue. (1966: 74)

Clearly, and not surprisingly, Benveniste was of the Saussurean school, although his final remark here suggests an identification of linguistic expression and thought. We shall see, however, that the idea of thought as the manipulation of linguistic signs was central to the linguistic ideas of Condillac.

In medieval times logical and linguistic analysis of the proposition were clearly confused and that confusion persisted through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the works of Arnauld and Lancelot, for example. Nevertheless, there was a constant theme of the analysis of experience in the



mind being performed by means of language. The progress in syntax in the medieval period, noted by Delbrück (1904: 23), consisted to a large extent in the analysis of the proposition into subject and predicate, an analysis which was confused with the analysis of the experience or reality. Later Arnauld and Lancelot (1714: 1-2) continue the theme of the linguistic analysis of thought with little regard for any distinction between linguistic and logical issues:

Comme nous avons dessein d'expliquer ici les diverses remarques que les hommes ont faites sur leurs jugemens, & que ces jugemens sont des propositions qui sont composées de diverses parties; il faut commencer par l'explication de ces parties, qui sont principalement les Noms, les Pronoms & les Verbes. Il est peu important d'examiner si c'est à la Grammaire ou à la Logique d'en traiter [...] On peut dire en général sur ce sujet, que les mots sont des sons distincts & articulés, dont les hommes ont fait des signes pour marquer ce qui se passe dans leur esprit.

(Actually, Aristotle did a little better in remarking that a prayer, for example, is not a proposition and that logic is only concerned with statements which can be either true or false. He thus distinguished, as many subsequent logicians failed to do, different categories of speech act, although his concern with logic certainly led to a preoccupation with propositional meaning and truth. (Ross 1928: §17a).)

It was recognised that human experience was a mass of simultaneous information which required order and that order came from language. As Condillac says, 'l'art de décomposer nos pensées n'est que l'art de rendre successives les idées et les opérations qui sont simultanées' and 'toutes les langues ont des règles communes: toutes ont des mots de différentes espèces: toutes ont des signes pour marquer les rapports des mots', and further 'si toutes les idées, qui composent une pensée, sont simultanées dans l'esprit, elles sont successives dans le discours: ce sont donc les langues qui nous fournissent les moyens d'analyser nos pensées' (*Grammaire, Oeuvres* 1, pp 42-3).

In the modern period, it is the late André Martinet who gave most attention to this ancient idea and who developed it in the light of modern linguistic notions. It is unclear whether Martinet was directly influenced by Condillac in his discussion of 'l'analyse linguistique de l'expérience', although a number of the ideas are strikingly similar.

The idea of such an analysis proceeds from an awareness of the confused mass of simultaneous perceptions. In his *Poetries and Sciences*, I.A. Richards quotes the following lines from Yeats's *The Tower* (p. 20):

O chestnut tree, great rooted blossomer,  
Are you the leaf, the blossom or the bole?  
O body swayed to music, O brightening glance,  
How can we know the dancer from the dance?

Yeats expresses very clearly the ideas that, in reality as perceived, the chestnut tree is a single totality and not a construction of connected parts, and that the dancer and the dance are one experience. The dance cannot exist without the performer and the performer is not a dancer without the dance. Nevertheless, the answers to Yeats's questions are straightforward. The parts of the tree are recognised by means of our linguistic resources, which allow us to identify and name them. We identify the dancer and the dance, and separate them through the naming of the recurrent individual performer, who also does many other things, and the recurrent performance, which can be done by many performers. In short, we perform a linguistic analysis of the experience. By convention, the action of dancing is differentiated from other actions. Similarly, the different parts of the tree are distinguished by means of linguistic conventions, which could differ from speech community to community.

*Martinet's 'analyse de l'expérience'*

Martinet built the linguistic analysis of experience into his definition of language. As a functionalist Martinet considered languages and all of the units, relations and systems in them to be purposive entities. The purpose, for Martinet, is to convey multi-faceted experience as messages in articulated successions of signs, such that an additional level of economy is provided by a second articulation into differential units. His definition (1970: 20) is:

Une langue est un instrument de communication selon lequel l'expérience humaine s'analyse, différemment dans chaque communauté, en unités douées d'un contenu sémantique et d'une expression phonique, les monèmes; cette expression phonique s'articule à son tour en unités distinctives et successives, les phonèmes, en nombre déterminé dans chaque langue, dont la nature et les rapports mutuels diffèrent eux aussi d'une langue à une autre.

The important point in this definition from our point of view is the idea, repeatedly insisted on in Martinet's works, of languages as means for the analysis of experience by means of a succession (articulation into) signs (monemes being minimum signs). Martinet's frequently used example is that of the experience of a headache, which can be conveyed *non-linguistically* by means of groans or pained expressions and *linguistically* by means of a succession of signs which analyse the experience into the experiencer, the nature of the experience, the relationship of the two and the time of the event – *I have a headache* – in a succession and using conventional naming and grammatical relationships varying from language to language: *j'ai mal à la tête*, *me duele la cabeza*, etc. It is particularly important for Martinet to emphasise that, while languages agree in their overall "design features", each language constitutes a different and conventional linguistic analysis of experience. As he says (1970: 18):

Si les langues s'accordent toutes pour pratiquer la double articulation, toutes diffèrent sur la façon dont les usagers de chacune d'elles analysent les données de l'expérience et sur la manière dont ils mettent à profit les possibilités offertes par les organes de la parole. En d'autres termes, chaque langue articule à sa façon aussi bien les énoncés que les signifiants.

The linguistic analysis of experience is neither a scientific nor a logical analysis of experience. It cannot be taken to be identical either with the logical structure of thought or with the structure of external reality. As Martinet says (1975: 98):

On s'accorde assez généralement aujourd'hui pour placer en tête la fonction de communication. Les résistances en la matière viendraient de ceux qui, très sensibles à la tradition idéaliste, mettent en valeur l'importance de la langue chez l'individu dans l'élaboration du cadre de ses connaissances présenté comme sa pensée. Tout, en fait, semble indiquer que la pensée a besoin, pour progresser de façon cohérente et constructive, du cadre de la langue, cadre qui s'est formé au cours des siècles sous la pression des besoins de la communication. C'est la nécessité ou l'habitude de communiquer qui force l'homme à ordonner ses pensées. La linéarité de la parole, imposée à l'homme par son choix de la forme vocale de communication, a probablement joué un rôle décisif pour contraindre l'homme à analyser son expérience avec une certaine précision.

The linguistic analysis of experience can be seen either as a matter of *langue*, linguistic system whose purpose is to permit and regulate communication, or as a matter of *parole*, particular instances of the application of the linguistic system in conjunction with a wide range of other considerations (prioritisation, linguistic context, context of situation, etc.) to convey specific messages. According to Martinet (1970: 24/5), 'Il est indispensable de distinguer soigneusement entre, d'une part, les faits linguistiques de tous ordres tels qu'ils apparaissent dans les énoncés, d'autre part, les faits linguistiques conçus comme appartenant à un répertoire dont dispose la personne qui cherche à communiquer', where the former is *parole* and the latter is *langue*.

While Martinet's earlier work in *Éléments de linguistique générale* emphasised the issue of the articulation into monemes for the conventional naming of aspects of experience with, for example, conventionally imposed distinctions such as that between *fleuve* and *rivière* in French or *beras* and *nasi* in Malay (cooked as opposed to uncooked rice), his later work addresses the conventionality of syntactic relations in combining monemes into complexes. As he says (1975: 143):

Un des problèmes fondamentaux de la communication linguistique va être de suggérer ou d'indiquer dans l'énoncé les rapports qui existent, dans notre expérience entre ces différents éléments. C'est précisément l'examen des moyens qu'emploient les langues pour marquer ces rapports qu'on appelle la syntaxe.

Martinet's syntactic work, as is well known, centres around the determination of the communicative function of syntactic relations. He frequently illustrated the conventionality of the syntactic arrangement of monemes for communicative purposes with such examples as *He swam across the river* compared with *Il a traversé la rivière à la nage*. Another frequently made point was that (1975: 22):

to the host of possible relationships between the elements of experience there corresponds, in a given language, a limited number of relations. The relationships between the top and the tree in *the top of the tree*, the son and the butcher in *the son of the butcher*, and the rose and the color in *the color of the rose* are physically different, and it is conceivable that a language should express these relationships differently.

Grammatical relationships have a conventionally determined range of indeterminacy in expressing the real world relations of experience. There is no necessary connection between real-world relations and the linguistic relations which express them. It has been pointed out more recently that the linguistic analysis of experience implies looking at the experience to be communicated in at least two ways in order that they should be connected by means of the grammatical relation or relation between a simple sign and a significant paratactic feature such as intonation and that a minimum of two meaningful elements is found in all linguistic communication (Rastall 1994: 83 – 90; 2000: 254). Thus, in *Go!* we find a minimum sign, *go*, with an emphatic intonation indicating an imperative, and in *Deborah Bull is dancing* we identify and name the dancer and her activity as well as connect the two pieces of information in such a way as to create a complex message. In fact, *is dancing* also involves a double point of view naming and connecting the present ongoing nature of the activity (*is...ing*) and the type of activity.

When we turn to Condillac, we find that some of his pronouncements are strikingly similar to those of Martinet as far as the idea of regarding language as an analysis of thought (not experience) is concerned. This is not to suggest any direct link, although there may, of course, be the kind of background awareness stemming from scholarly experience, which inevitably influences us all in ways which we may be unaware of. Furthermore, as will be obvious from the above, there are important differences in the nature and development of the idea of linguistic analysis by Martinet and Condillac.

*Condillac's Views*

Condillac developed, and wrote on, a wide range of linguistic ideas. His most notable concerns were the origin of language and the development of an empiricist account of language development in the individual. As a follower and exponent of Locke, Condillac rejected the innatism of rationalist approaches. He thus found it necessary to give an account of how language came about and how individuals acquired it. This led him into speculation on language acquisition, the nature and development of language from 'primitive' stages, the question of a 'perfect' language and the 'decay' of languages. Those aspects of Condillac's thought have been amply discussed. Knight (1968: 144–175) provides a thorough and clear account. She points out (1968: 152) that according to Condillac:

when he [man] had words to stand for things, he could manipulate chains of associated ideas [...] and this capacity opened the door to fully developed reason.

The questions of language and reason, in other words, could not – for Condillac as for so many others – be dissociated. What differentiated Condillac was that for him language was not the product of an innate reason, but an analytical tool to achieve rationality. In this Condillac differed from the Port-Royal grammarians. As Harnois (1929: 2) points out, for Condillac language provides 'la dérivation de nos idées et l'accroissement successif de nos connaissances'. That is, language, for Condillac, has a developmental role in the growth of thought, and language, far from being the expression of thought, was the means of its clarification. As Harnois again points out (1929: 47-8), according to Condillac:

Il ne faut pas dire que le discours est analytique parce que la pensée est elle-même analytique: mais le discours, parce qu'il est analytique nécessairement, permet de décomposer analytiquement la pensée.

One must note, however, that Condillac vacillated on this point. He also says, 'la décomposition d'une pensée présuppose l'existence de cette pensée. Il seroit absurde de dire que je ne commence à juger et à raisonner que lorsque je commence à pouvoir me représenter successivement ce que je sais [...]' (*Grammaire, Oeuvres* 1, p. 42). It is likely that Condillac saw such thought as simply inchoate or inaccessible without linguistic expression.

Condillac's prime motivation, then, was to answer philosophical, and not linguistic, problems, but he did so from the point of view of analysis. We need analysis, in his view, in order to understand language and reason, but our analytical capacity comes from the analytical power that language provides. As Knight observes, 'Language, in Condillac's view, developed and took on grammatical structure as an analytic method' (1968: 163). As Condillac says:

[l'analyse] ne consiste qu'à composer et décomposer nos idées pour en faire différentes comparaisons, et pour découvrir, par ce moyen, les rapports qu'elles ont entre elles, et les nouvelles idées qu'elles peuvent produire (*Essai, Oeuvres 1*, p. 109).

And elsewhere:

Ainsi décomposer une pensée, comme une sensation, ou se représenter successivement les parties dont elle est composée, c'est la même chose; et, par conséquent, l'art de décomposer nos pensées n'est que l'art de rendre successives les idées et les opérations qui sont simultanées (*Grammaire, Oeuvres 1*, p. 42).

He compares the analysis of a machine with linguistic analysis:

En effet, que je veuille connoître une machine, je la décomposerai pour en étudier séparément chaque partie. Quand j'aurai de chacune une idée exacte, et que je pourrai les remettre dans le même ordre où elles étoient, alors je concevrai parfaitement cette machine, parce que je l'aurai décomposée et recomposée. Qu'est-ce donc que concevoir cette machine? C'est avoir une pensée qui est composée d'autant d'idées qu'il y a de parties dans cette machine même, d'idées qui les représentent chacune exactement, et qui sont disposées dans le même ordre. (*Logique, Oeuvres 2* pp 27-8)

Condillac's position here is an equation of linguistic analysis and thought and, in that respect, he resembles the early Wittgenstein. Maynial (1903:19) points out:

Pour lui [Condillac], la grammaire n'est que la première partie de l'art de penser. Le langage n'est pas seulement un moyen de communiquer nos sentiments, au sens le plus large du mot: c'est une méthode analytique qui nous conduit d'idée en idée, de jugement en jugement, de connaissance en connaissance [...] l'analyse de la pensée est toute faite dans le discours; elle l'est avec plus ou moins de précision, suivant que les langues sont plus ou moins parfaits, et que ceux qui les parlent ont l'esprit plus ou moins justes [...].

For Condillac language allows an infinite process of decomposition and recomposition of ideas. Ideas ('jugemens'), according to Condillac, arise either through the perceptions – our conscious awareness of the world around us through the senses – or through our linguistic analysis and expression of selected portions of our experience:

Un jugement comme perception, et un jugement comme affirmation, ne sont [...] qu'une même opération de l'esprit; et ils ne diffèrent que parce que le premier se borne à faire considérer un rapport dans la perception qu'on en a, et que le second le fait considérer dans les idées que l'on compare. (*Grammaire, Oeuvres 1*, p. 46)

The immediacy and enormous totality of shifting perceptions require linguistic analysis both through the naming of aspects of thought by means of artificial (nowadays we would say "conventional") signs:

Or d'où nous vient le pouvoir d'affirmer ou de considérer un rapport dans les idées que nous comparons, plutôt que dans la perception que nous en avons? De l'usage des signes artificiels. (*Grammaire, Oeuvres 1*, p. 46)

and it also implies means for the combination of thoughts:

Pour faire cette décomposition [de la pensée], vous avez distribué avec ordre les mots qui sont les signes de vos idées. Dans chaque mot vous avez considéré chaque idée séparément; et dans deux mots que vous avez reprochés, vous avez observé le rapport que deux idées ont l'une à l'autre. (*Grammaire, Oeuvres 1*, p. 47)

And elsewhere:

pour avoir des idées sur lesquelles nous puissions réfléchir, nous avons besoin d'imaginer des signes qui servent de lien aux différentes collections d'idées simples, et que nos notions ne sont exactes qu'autant que nous avons inventé avec ordre les signes qui doivent les fixer. (*Essai*, *Oeuvres 1*, p. 183)

The latter implies a well-developed grammatical structure. While Condillac's point of departure differed from that of the Port-Royal grammarians, his account of grammar was not very different. As Knight rightly says:

Condillac's analysis of grammar and the evolution of language beyond the primitive was simply another version of the conventional rationalist theory: man's acquisition of language precisely paralleled his acquisition of reason. (1968: 163)

#### *On Condillac*

Condillac's interest in language was clearly not that of a linguist, but that of a philosopher. As Maynial says (1903: 320):

les idées grammaticales de Condillac sont assez peu celles d'un grammairien. Dans son dédain pour ce qu'il appelle le matériel du discours, il a construit *a priori* une philosophie du langage [...] Au lieu de se plier au génie de la langue qu'il enseigne [dans sa *Grammaire*], il l'a asservi à la logique [...].

In this Condillac is in harmony with the intellectual spirit of the period. As Cassirer (1951: 12) says:

eighteenth century thought sees analysis rather as the necessary and indispensable instrument of all thinking in general.

However, the thought of the period is characterised by an acceptance that reason and empirical observation must be combined in the development of a human perspective on reality, rather than in an attempt to penetrate the divine order by rational deduction alone (which characterised the preceding century (see Cassirer 1951: 13)). As Cassirer puts it (1951: 44/5), in the eighteenth century the search for natural law was achieved through reason, but:

To find this law, we must not project our own ideas and imaginings into nature; we must rather follow nature's own course and determine it by observation and experiment, by measurement and calculation. But our basic standards for measurement are not to be derived from sense data alone. They originate in those universal functions of comparing and counting, of combining and differentiating, which constitute the nature of the intellect.

What Condillac does not do, of course, is to treat linguistic phenomena as matters for scientific observation and theorising in the way that physical or chemical phenomena would have been. That impartial observation of speech with a view to its precise description using clear methods of analysis had to wait for the later development of linguistics. Martinet was, of course, very explicit on the point (1970: 6). For Condillac, as Maynial (1903: 320) says, 'langage et méthode analytique sont deux termes synonymes'. Condillac did not realise that language itself could be in need of observation and analysis and he accepted the traditional accounts of it. As Harnois points out (1929: 89-90), for Condillac:

le langage en général n'est pas un objet de science. On examinait par la pensée, la faculté abstraite d'exprimer cette pensée [...] et on ne sortait pas de la logique [...] Conséquence directe, le XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle, ne posant pas d'objet, ne pouvait essayer d'en déterminer la nature [...]

and earlier Harnois (1929: 30) points out that Condillac's real interest was not in language. For Condillac:



Ce qui a de la valeur ce sont nos idées et nos jugements. Mais, comme ces derniers ne prennent d'existence et de réalité que par l'intermédiaire du langage, en cela le langage mérite d'être étudié.

Nevertheless, Condillac's view of language as analysis has clear similarities with the idea of 'l'analyse linguistique de l'expérience' extensively discussed by Martinet.

Condillac did not, of course, distinguish *langue* from *parole* and his views are primarily concerned with 'l'analyse du discours', i.e. he was principally concerned with what we would now think of as *parole*. However, his views imply the existence of a linguistic system (*langue*) by means of which discursal analysis could take place. Such a system, though barely hinted at by Condillac, would be a system for analysis in a similar sense to that of Martinet. In *langue* or *parole*, the linguistic analysis would require linguistic signs and grammatical means for their composition into complexes. Complex utterances would allow a conventional way of analysing the inchoate mass of perceptions and thought. Condillac, even though he was exclusively concerned with the propositional content of discourse and ignored other speech functions (as Harnois points out (1929: 48)), very explicitly stated the function of language of converting the simultaneity and totality of thought for communicational purposes into a succession of grammatically related signs.

les langues ne se perfectionnent qu'autant qu'elles analysent; au lieu d'offrir à la fois des masses confuses, elles présentent les idées successivement, elles les distribuent avec ordre [...] (*Grammaire, Oeuvres 1*, p. 45)

– which is reminiscent of Saussure here.

Condillac was well aware of the fact that the totality, or simultaneity, of thought or perception could be conveyed linguistically only by means of a succession of signs in discourse through naming elements of thought and by combining signs into complexes. Such a form of analysis comes very close to Martinet's sense of 'l'analyse linguistique de l'expérience' for the purpose of linguistic expression in a sequence and that languages are systems for the linguistic analysis of experience:

Ce sont les langues qui nous fournissent les moyens de décomposer la pensée. Si toutes les idées, qui composent une pensée, sont simultanées dans l'esprit, elles sont successives dans le discours: ce sont donc les langues qui nous fournissent les moyens d'analyser nos pensées. (*Grammaire, Oeuvres 1*, p. 44)

Condillac, as a good empiricist and like Martinet, rejected the idea that linguistic expression was necessarily a mirror of reality. It followed for him that great care had to be taken in linguistic expression in order to express

rationally satisfying analyses. Condillac was, therefore, concerned with finding a clear and precise linguistic expression of ideas and that led him into a critique of expression and errors in logic:

il n'y a rien de moins exact que l'emploi que nous faisons ordinairement des mots. (*Essai, Oeuvres 1*, p. 462)

In that respect, he represented a continuation of the traditional confusion between linguistic expression and right, or clear, thinking, which persists to this day. On the other hand, one might regard Condillac more positively, in this respect, as a precursor of the later Wittgenstein's language analysis or, paradoxically, of the opposed attempts by logicians to develop logical systems to show the "ideal" forms of linguistic systems (in his *Logique*, for example). Condillac's critique of language use was essentially a criticism of human frailty, which could be overcome either through the careful analysis of ideas and their expression or, better, through scientific understanding and its expression in mathematical or formal expression.

#### *Concluding Remarks*

Condillac, as noted above, was not a linguist as we would now understand the term and his ideas differed from those of modern European functionalists following the direction of Martinet or Benveniste. Some of the main differences in the analytical points of view of Condillac and more recent thinkers have already been mentioned. He was concerned mainly with philosophical issues. Linguistic matters were of secondary importance to him. In particular, he was concerned with the analysis of thought rather than the communication of experience. That led to a concern with logic and rational thinking rather than with the means of communication. Language was just a tool for Condillac, and his representation of it does not differ from that of his precursors, although he viewed its functioning differently. The traditional approach did not proceed from observation of speech, but involves a universal system of categorisation, which pays little attention to the linguistic specificity emphasised by Martinet. Nevertheless, Condillac did show signs of awareness of the diversity of linguistic means. He points out:

Cependant les langues sont différentes, soit parce qu'elles n'emploient pas les mêmes mots pour rendre les mêmes idées, soit parce qu'elles se servent de signes différens pour marquer les mêmes rapports. En français, par exemple, on dit le livre de Pierre; et en latin, liber Petri. (*Grammaire Oeuvres 1*, p. 44)

This is not dissimilar to Martinet's example, *of*, above.

There is no evidence of a direct connection between Martinet and Condillac, although the similarities in thought and approach are striking. No doubt they share a common background and common concern with the

linguistic means by which we convey our experience. There is further the shared view of language as central to the creation, or clarification, of thought, which is the doctrine of 'l'analyse linguistique de l'expérience'.

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Special Colloquium of *Igirisu Kokugaku Kyokai*  
(The English Philological Society of Japan)

Hotel Tokyo Garden Palace, Tokyo, Japan  
December 2002

Conference Report and Note on the History of the Society

A special colloquium of the English Philological Society of Japan was held on 15 December 2002.<sup>1</sup> The keynote speaker was David Cram (Jesus College, Oxford University), who was visiting Japan in connection with his collaborative research with our colleague Masataka Miyawaki (Senshu University). The meeting was attended by 14 participants, mostly young scholars and graduate students of English philology.

The English Philological Society of Japan - *Igirisu Kokugaku Kyokai* - was initially founded in 1992 as *Eigo Gogen Gakkai* (The Japan Association for English Etymological Studies), under the guidance of Shoichi Watanabe (Prof. emer. of Sophia University, Tokyo), for the purpose of extending the intellectual curiosity of his disciples. His own motto, which we have collectively adopted, is that, following Eratosthenes's example, scholars should be "alpha" in their specialized areas, but also try to be "beta" in the related neighboring fields; in other words, we should not narrow the scope of our interests, but attempt rather to keep developing a wider perspective in our studies and research activities.

Since its foundation, the membership, however small, has shown a sustained commitment to the activities of the society. We hold regular meetings for reading texts in Old English, German, and Latin, and organize lectures, colloquia, annual meetings, and symposia. What is more important, we publish a quarterly journal *ASTERISK* (issued monthly since 1996). Since its inception in 1992, with as few as 11 members, the society has been very productive in publishing articles primarily on the history of English philology and historical English studies. Almost all of the "founding members" have now finished their doctoral course and conduct lectures on English linguistics and literature in positions of full professorship in colleges and universities all over Japan.

Our academic interests cover the following five fields: 1) English Etymology; 2) Old and Middle English Studies; 3) Historiography of English Studies; 4) History of Linguistics; and 5) Comparative Cultural Studies between Japan and the West. Among other objectives, we aim to inherit and cherish the tradition of *Philologie* as established and fostered by Karl Schneider, the first honorary president of our society, and his disciples including Watanabe. We also promote the study of *Kokugaku* - the National

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<sup>1</sup> I would like to thank David Cram for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this report.

Study - of England and Japan, which Watanabe defines as 'an intellectual activity to elucidate a nation's history, language, religion, and so forth by means of studying its literature from olden times exegetically as well as philologically'. (For further information on the society, please visit our homepage at [www.philologia.jp](http://www.philologia.jp)).

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The Special Colloquium was opened with 'Welcoming Remarks' by Watanabe (President). In the first session, two papers were presented. The first one was Miyawaki's on 'John Wallis as Etymologist'. He began the paper with an overview of Wallis's *Grammatica Linguae Anglicanae*. Then he discussed the outline of the chapter 'On Etymology'. Of particular interest was Wallis's theory of the sound symbolism in English words. Miyawaki drew a good number of examples from Wallis's *Grammatica* of the initial segments (or consonant clusters): str-, st-, thr-, wr-, br-, cr- shr-, gr-, sw-, sm-, cl-, sp-, sl-, sp-, sk-, scr-, and the final segments: -ash, -ush, -ing, -ink, -ingle, -inkle, -angle, -umble, -amble, imbl, and gave Wallis's concise and lucid explanation of the symbolic meaning of each combination of sounds. Since Miyawaki's lecture was well-organized and full of appropriate examples and convincing interpretations, we were well persuaded that Wallis is still worth our close attention in the sphere of English etymology.

Hiroyuki Eto (Nagano College) spoke next, on the 'Influence of 19<sup>th</sup>-Century Historical Linguistics on English Philology of Japan in its Early Stage'. His paper dealt with the Western influence on Japanese scholarship in the attitude or philosophy of language study. He focused on the two leading English philologists of early 20<sup>th</sup>-century Japan: Sanki Ichikawa and Ituki Hosoe. By scrutinizing their philosophy of grammar and grammar writing, Eto came to the conclusion that Ichikawa and Hosoe are greatly influenced by the 19<sup>th</sup>- and early 20<sup>th</sup>-century historical-comparative grammarians in methodology as well as in the fundamental application of historical survey. The influence is conspicuous in the following respects that are peculiar to science in 19<sup>th</sup>-century Europe: 1) describing as many linguistic phenomena as possible (descriptive, not prescriptive); 2) explaining and interpreting individual grammatical phenomena by means of historical, comparative, and psycholinguistic methods; and 3) trying to establish the principles of grammar.

These two presentations were followed by the second session - 'Special Lecture and Discussion' - by David Cram, whose topic was: 'Linguistic Eschatology: Babel, Pentecost and Babylon in Seventeenth-Century Thought'. He opened his lecture by mentioning the considerations about 'first and last things' in the 17<sup>th</sup>-century debate about the nature of language. He exegetically and philologically analyzed 1) the treatment of Babel in John Wilkins, 2) interpretations of the gift of tongues in the Bible commentaries of John Tillotson, Matthew Henry, John Lightfoot, and Richard Baxter, which present the phenomenon as xenolalia rather than glossolalia, and 3) the attitudes toward language of George Fox, an eschatologically inclined non-conformist thinker.

As a conclusion, Cram argued 1) that Wilkins's argumentation about language change and diversity shifted from supernatural origin to natural causes, 2) that Fox changed his attitude from the cacophony of natural languages to the divine inner word, and 3) that Fox's linguistic eschatology, based more strongly on Apocalypse than on Pentecost, made him hostile to language engineering as much as to universal learning.

Cram's lecture on the writings of Wilkins and Fox on Babel and Pentecost within an eschatological framework was an encouragement that we should pay more attention to the existence of 1) common assumptions about the nature of "speaking in tongues" held by thinkers with diametrically opposed eschatological views, 2) the embattled nature of the term "natural language" and 3) other positions in the larger 17<sup>th</sup>-century academic landscape. Watanabe commented that this might be the first time in Japan that a paper had been delivered on such an appealing theme: Linguistic Eschatology.

After the formal session, which lasted for more than two hours, we moved to a café and had further more informal talk about the study of linguistics over a cup of tea. A central theme which emerged in this discussion was the importance of interdisciplinary viewpoints in studying the history of language studies. As a conclusion to the fruitful exchange of ideas both during and following this special meeting, it was agreed by all that we should continue to cultivate and foster the three-way academic link for the history of English studies between Tokyo (the home of the Society), Oxford (where Watanabe had studied with E.J. Dobson) and Münster (our spiritual *Heimat*, where Karl Schneider worked and, more recently, the seat of Nodus Publikationen).

We are sincerely grateful to Dr Cram for accepting our invitation and promoting an inspiring and productive conference. We do hope that he enjoyed the inter-cultural experience of his visit to the county of the rising sun, and we would like to extend a similar welcome to any member of the HSS, and indeed to students of HoL throughout the world.

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**David Cram and Jaap Maat, eds.**

*George Dalgarno on Universal Language. The Art of Signs (1661), The Deaf and Dumb Man's Tutor (1680), and the Unpublished Papers.*

Oxford: OUP, 2001. xii+456 pp.; index and fold-out facsimile table.

ISBN 0-19-823732-4.

After they quarrelled, the Aberdeenshire schoolmaster never mentioned the Bishop of Chester by name in print.<sup>1</sup> The Aberdonian was George Dalgarno, who had arrived in Oxford in 1657, 'in somewhat straightened circumstances', but with 'a lively intellect whose acuteness has been whetted by poverty', as the Polish nobleman Faustus Morstyn described him to the London-based intelligencer Samuel Hartlib. Dalgarno was soon engaged by Morstyn to learn and relay back to Morstyn and his friends a system of shorthand advertised by an itinerant tachygrapher, probably Jeremiah Rich. Morstyn then claimed, in the same letter to Hartlib, that he had subsequently declared to Dalgarno that such a system as Rich's, based as it was on non-phonetic notation, could in theory be adapted to stand as a shorthand for all languages at once, thereby transforming itself from shorthand to 'real character'. It was at this point that Dalgarno met the future Bishop of Chester, the famous John Wilkins, at that time the Warden of Wadham.

Morstyn, though, was a little belated in his claim for primacy or originality. The idea of such a character and, more ambitiously, of an entirely new 'philosophical' language had been mooted throughout the seventeenth century; there is a famous letter from Descartes to Mersenne on the subject, dating from 1629, and in 1605 Francis Bacon had suggested 'better inquiry' into real characters and *notae*.<sup>2</sup> The first such scheme to reach print in English, Francis Lodwick's *A Common Writing* of 1647, was a decade old as Morstyn and Dalgarno were pondering their proposed evolution of shorthand, and seven years after Lodwick's rudimentary real character, a translation of an anonymous French work, published in London in 1654 as *Le Chemin Abregé*, even suggested, as has recently been discovered, that such systems were feasible, but otiose. John Evelyn excerpted from the work in his commonplace book, and this may have been the beginning of what David Cram has elsewhere termed the 'radical' tendency in universal language-planning: the recognition by men such as the mathematicians John Wallis and Seth Ward that artificial languages,

<sup>1</sup> My understanding of this area has profited from conversations with David Cram and Rhodri Lewis. Sources unreferenced in the text can be supposed to be noted in Cram and Maat's edition.

<sup>2</sup> Descartes, *Epistolae, partim ab auctore Latino sermone conscriptae, partim ex Gallico translatae*. 3 vols. (Amsterdam: Daniel Elzevir, 1668), 1.354; Francis Bacon, *The Advancement of Learning* (London: Henrie Tomes, 1605), sgs. Pp3r-4r (2.16.2-3 in modern editions).



though possible, were neither as philosophically radical nor as practicable as many of the language-planners were claiming.<sup>3</sup> Lodwick himself prepared a critique of Dalgarno's early system, noting that Dalgarno's parsing of language into verbs, adjectives, substantives and particles was 'much in the same manner as I intended', but he also suggested certain modifications to the organisation and notation of Dalgarno's scheme, and also proposed a means of vocalising the character. Nevertheless, the older theorist was basically enthusiastic - Lodwick remained indefatigably confident about the possibility of universal language throughout his long life - and, along with many prominent academic figures, publicly supported Dalgarno's efforts.<sup>4</sup>

Dalgarno mentioned neither Morstyn nor Lodwick in the rather confessional autobiographical treatise he wrote towards the end of his life, lost until David Cram rediscovered it in Christ Church library, Oxford, and here edited for the first time. Dalgarno ascribes the origin of his scheme to the concurrence of his experiments in shorthand with his study of Hebrew grammar, suggesting to him a central-character-with-suffix/affix method of shorthand, partially modelled on the Biblical language, which Dalgarno considered vestigially reflective of Adam's initial linguistic brilliance when he named the animals. Such suffix/affix accidentals, though, proved confusing, as shorthand radicals are literal, expressing unique things or notions, while prepositional marks are 'real', expressing grammatical categories. This led Dalgarno to decide that the 'radix' around which prepositional marks were to be based must itself be 'real', if real accidentals were to be employed. And so to his first scheme, a system based on a large collection of radical words, whose order and position were to be memorised by means of some spectacular not-quite-nonsense verse. Quoth the Aberdeenshire Protestant:

*Thou eternally fabulous papist, all thy images are gone to hell in a mortar*  
*F[or] thy ship was so pumped with water, that the waves brake al the planks of her side*

So the manipulator of his character would remember the italicised radicals, and also, by extension, a parallel list of antonyms, not all of which were strictly so: thus the partners for the above dozen are 'Tyme, history, protestant, idol, heaven, pistol'; 'boate, bellowes, aire, cloud, board, midst'. (One wonders

<sup>3</sup> Rhodri Lewis, 'John Evelyn, the Early Royal Society and Artificial Language Projection: a New Source', *Notes and Queries*, forthcoming; BL Add. MS 78330, fol. 83v (Evelyn); David Cram, 'Universal language, specious arithmetic and the alphabet of simple notions', *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft* 4 (1994): 213-33.

<sup>4</sup> Sloane 932, fol. 13r-15v, 13r; see also Robert Hooke, *The Diary of Robert Hooke M.A., M.D., F.R.S 1672-80* ed. H.W. Robinson and W. Adams (London: Taylor and Francis, 1935), incompletely edited from Guildhall MS 1758; also R.T. Gunther ed., *Early Science in Oxford*, 15 vols. (Oxford: privately printed, 1923-67), 10.69-265, edited from BL Sloane 4024 (Diary for Nov 1688-Mar 1690, Dec 1692-Aug 1693), passim for Lodwick.

whether the opposition 'papist'/'protestant' really does inhere as a translinguistic truth.)

And so to the future bishop of Chester. Dalgarno's proposals were bound to attract attention, and whose more likely to be caught than that of John Wilkins, who had himself proposed a real character as early as 1641 - Wilkins, fulcrum of English experimentalism, brother-in-law to Oliver Cromwell, destined after the Restoration to co-found the Royal Society, serve as one of its first secretaries, and finally to ascend the see of Chester. He was also clubbable to a fault. A man of influence and energy, he soon had Dalgarno dining regularly at Wadham, where they collaborated on philosophical language. But things did not work out, and although, on the evidence of Dalgarno's letters to the mathematician John Pell, scholars have long known that the two men fell out, the discovery of Dalgarno's autobiography considerably sharpens the focus of this fascinating dispute, and also provides us with a primary document detailing the social anxieties and frustrations of a poor Scot rather at the mercy of academic fashion. To fall out with Wilkins could only jeopardise the subsequent reception of Dalgarno's proposals, and despite his insistence that the two men remained amicable, Dalgarno thereafter could not bring himself, even in the privacy of a manuscript autobiography, to mention Wilkins by name. Wilkins, likewise, talked merely of 'another person' when in 1668 he came to publish his massive *Essay towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language*, a work which all but eclipsed Dalgarno's far slimmer Latin octavo of 1661. Dalgarno's admission that after their breach 'I saw a necessity of betaking myself to another province' reads, sadly, like a man who had been dropped by the great Wilkins, and unfairly so.

What was their quarrel? Dalgarno, as Cram and Maat explain in their excellently pitched introduction, had envisaged his language as based on a manageable class of radicals, arranged with an eye to mnemonics, and then used to generate, by combination, more complex terms. Wilkins, in contrast, wanted to arrange his terms based on Aristotelian predicamental ideas. For Dalgarno, this was disastrous from a mnemotechnical point of view, and what was the point in a language impossible to learn? For Wilkins, classification was all, and mnemonics threatened to get in the way of a genuinely 'philosophical' project. Nevertheless, it was Wilkins who was the naive one, as the 'philosophy' of such a language can only be as good as the classifications on which it is based. And so in 1670 Wilkins would have blushed to have heard John Ray, who had translated Wilkins's *Essay* into Latin and aided him with his botanical tables, grumbling to Martin Lister in their private correspondence about how he was 'not free to follow nature, but forced to bow and strain things to serve a design according to the exigency of the character'.<sup>5</sup> This, of course, was roughly the complaint Wilkins had made to Dalgarno about a dozen years previously. So Wilkins and Dalgarno parted company, but when Dalgarno finally published his major work, the *Ars Signorum* of 1661, he

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<sup>5</sup> *The Correspondence of John Ray*, ed. Edwin Lankester (London: Printed for the Ray Society, 1848), 55.

had performed a *volte-face*, adopting a predicamental order after all. But his scheme did not meet with the kind of approval his earlier broadsheets had imagined: 'Artem Miram!' gasped at his designs, to which Dalgarno would nod, 'Magis Veram!' Instead, not too many people read his Latin work, though it does appear in the library catalogues of men such as Hooke, Lodwick and Archbishop Tillotson; and, crucially, Leibniz used it as a base text for his own researches into universal language.<sup>6</sup> Cram and Maat also note its hostile reception by Roger Daniel in his preface to the 1662 London edition of Comenius's *Janua Linguarum*. Sighting a competitor - why learn Latin with Comenius if you can learn the *Art of Signs* with Dalgarno? - Daniel lambasted his opponent mercilessly and rather witlessly, although he did take the trouble to formulate an insult in Dalgarnish: Dalgarno, he said, was 'n̄pkim sofa' - the greatest ass. The mathematician John Wallis, who left some money to Dalgarno's widow in his will, must have had a greater proficiency in the language, as he wrote in a Bodleian Library copy of the *Ars Signorum* a translation into English of Dalgarno's Epistle to 'Shod CAROLOI', Charles II. But nevertheless it does seem that Dalgarno's language was only ever used once in print by someone other than Dalgarno, and then only to insult its creator. That is rather sad.

Cram and Maat produce virtually an *opera omnia* of Dalgarno, including his two printed works, the five broadsheets detailing his first, pre-Restoration scheme, three unpublished papers, and Dalgarno's letters to Hartlib, Pell and others. The unpublished papers comprise Dalgarno's autobiography, some remarks on the nomenclature of prosody, and a tract Cram and Maat title 'On Interpretation', perhaps Dalgarno's most involved discussion of the theory of naming and its Adamic origin, in which he negotiates the difficult route between ascribing the gift of names to a supernatural gift given in Eden (the scholastic concept of the *donum supernaturale*), or solely to natural origins. Dalgarno is keen to stress that the first language in Eden 'was truly and properly a natural Language', but that nevertheless there is no 'Language of Nature', such as 'some opiniastres' posit. Here Dalgarno is clearly trying hard to reject on the one hand the idea that language is a divine gift, because it would not then be 'a faculty proper to humane nature'; and on the other the equally dangerous idea that divine language, if it be natural, remains written across nature in legible characters for the initiate to read, a view Seth Ward, discussing universal language in 1654, had scornfully attributed to 'Cabalists and Rosycrucians'.<sup>7</sup> For Dalgarno, language is *both* natural *and* arbitrary, and he secures this by theological recourse to 'the strength and excellency' of unfallen Adam's natural faculties. This language was nonetheless 'arbitrary', though 'Adams degenerated posterity' have lost the ability to reconstruct it. In this way Dalgarno both wins for all languages the status of being comprised of

<sup>6</sup> Edward Millington, *Bibliotheca Hookiana* (London, 1603), 24; Sloane 859 [Lodwick's later library catalogue], fol. 16v; John Tillotson, *Bibliotheca Tillotsoniana* (London, 1695), 52; Cram and Maat note Leibniz and his copy on pp. 64-5 of their edition.

<sup>7</sup> Seth Ward, *Vindiciae Academicarum* (London, 1654), 22.

arbitrary signs, and yet retains a Biblicist way of thinking, insisting that even if we found a dictionary and grammar of the Adamic language, we would not be able to understand it. This comment about an Adamic dictionary and grammar, especially when placed alongside a later remark in 'On Interpretation' about 'preadamites', and, earlier, another on 'a late french Author' who supposed 'a shower of men to fall from the clouds', demonstrates that Dalgarno, though he nowhere explicitly mentions this, had been reading and strongly disagreeing with the notorious and heretical *Prae-Adamitae* of the Frenchman Isaac La Peyrère (Amsterdam 1655, English translation 1656), which had proposed the polygenetic origin of man long before the creation of Adam and consequently the inherent multiplicity of human language, irreducible to an ultimate parent language such as Hebrew.<sup>8</sup> This is an important but hitherto unnoticed piece of Dalgarno's reading, because La Peyrère was also being read by - once again - Francis Lodwick, who owned, rather remarkably, both the Latin and English versions of the book. The difference is that Lodwick read with enthusiasm and applause. Lodwick's manuscripts, still unpublished, reveal that he held the converse of Dalgarno's view on language origin, embracing both pre-Adamism and its polylinguistic consequences, and questioning whether Adam's language was in any way epistemologically special.<sup>9</sup> In this way, 'On Interpretation' reveals Dalgarno first distancing himself from Wilkins, who had stated in the *Essay* that language was '*con-created* with our first Parents' (otherwise how could Adam and Eve have understood God's voice? Wilkins argued).<sup>10</sup> But 'On Interpretation' also shows Dalgarno rejecting the Charybdis represented by La Peyrère's attack on the conventional Biblical framework for language origin, as Dalgarno still required the insurance that Adam's ur-Hebrew was the product of a man fresh from the hand of God, 'with such a degree of knowledge that never any of his posterity can arrive at or so much as comprehend what the extent of his knowledge was'. Perhaps students of universal language may now turn their attentions to this fascinating site of disagreement between the three major universal linguists. Needless to say, Dalgarno does not mention his principal targets in 'On Interpretation', but it is fair to say that this document represents his carving out of a position between the linguistic assumptions of his two great collaborators-turned-competitors, John Wilkins on the one side, and Francis Lodwick on the other.

Cram and Maat also supply a long, carefully structured introduction situating Dalgarno in both his historical and theoretical context, and pitched quite rightly at the informed but inexpert reader. Perhaps one would have liked to hear a little more about the social and religious context of Dalgarno, who was also a preacher. Although Cram and Maat briefly note the importance of

<sup>8</sup> Richard H. Popkin, *Isaac La Peyrère (1596-1676): His Life, Work and Influence*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1987.

<sup>9</sup> Sloane 859, fols. 12r, 23r for La Peyrère; for a union of Lodwick's linguistic and pre-Adamite beliefs see e.g. Sloane 913, fols. 91v-88v ('1 Concerning the Originall of Mankind'); Sloane 2903, fols. 156r-7v ('Certain Queries'), especially Query 22.

<sup>10</sup> John Wilkins, *An Essay towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language* (London, 1668), 2.

biblical tradition for the language-planners, more attention might have been given to the fact that each of the major language-planners - Wilkins, Lodwick and Dalgarno - held distinctive and distinct theological views, and such views inflected their linguistic attitudes. The major piece of this edition, of course, is the *Ars Signorum*, printed on facing Latin/English pages. Their translation, the most immediate advantage of this edition, is superb; Cram and Maat have clearly thought about the generals as well as the specifics of translation. On its own, it is a major aid for students of this period, as few scholars these days rejoice at a 130-odd page treatise written in often rather technical Latin. The only disappointment of the edition is the omission of Dalgarno's manuscript tract attacking the Copernican hypothesis - clearly a swipe at Wilkins, who had made his name popularising the new astronomy in his publications of 1638 and 1640 - and reaffirming a veneration for Aristotelianism: 'Galileo's Simplicius Peripateticus is not so great a fool and ass as he would make him'. This, along with extensive notes on various experiments touching the spring of the air, and an account of John Wallis's ideas on the mechanical explanation for the behaviour of thermometers, comprises the remainder of the Christ Church manuscript containing the autobiographical treatise.<sup>11</sup> Given the fundamental importance of Aristotle (particularly *On Interpretation* and *On Categories*) to early modern linguistics in general and to the universal linguists in particular, this is a shame. Indeed, the sight of a constructor of a new, philosophical language lambasting overcredulous and underpersuasive rejections of Aristotle is of itself an important corrective for those who see universal languages simply as new and exciting ventures rather than as new and exciting permutations of a still-pervasive Aristotelianism.

Indeed, this edition, along with the recent Thoemmes reprint of Wilkins's *Essay*, should allow us to reopen the discussion on what kind of languages those of Wilkins and Dalgarno aspired to be, and what kind of languages they actually were. For despite their local disagreements with Aristotle, both Wilkins and Dalgarno nevertheless, as we have seen, employed a predicamental order as the structural basis of their languages. This rather begs the question of the epistemological status of such an order, heavily dependent as it is on the original Aristotelian predicamental order. Dalgarno, as Cram and Maat show, manipulated his own predicamental order for polemical purposes. Thomas Hobbes had dangerously pruned the top of the tree of the Christianised Aristotelian predicaments, replacing 'Substance' with 'Body', divided into 'Body' and 'Not-Body, or Accident', itself a polemical wrench, denying as it did the possibility of incorporeal being. Dalgarno, in line with Ward's exposé of the atheistical implications of Hobbes's adjustments, reintegrated into his predicamental order divisions capable of describing angels and souls as spiritual rather than material things, and introduced various other

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<sup>11</sup> Christ Church MS 162 ('Liber Manuscriptus Georgij Dalgarno Scoti ab ejus uidua D. G. Traditur Maio. 1698'), fols. 1r-12r on experimental matters (see fol. 12r for Wallis); fols. 105v-94v (reversed) incipit 'That there is both a diurnal and annual motion, either in the Heaven, or Earth, nothing can be more certain'. The quote is from fol. 101v.

similarly-minded modifications. But what does all this fine-tuning mean? Certainly, many held that words used in such discussions really did mirror the essence of reality. As the grammarian and iatrochemist Basset Jhones opened his 1659 textbook:

IN the first place I offer those words which serve to express the Essence or Existence of the Universe; whether in its innumerable parts or whole bulk, actions or passions; as properly called words of Being; In regard they are both the denominators of entity, and also the *basis* of motion; even as Matter is of Form.<sup>12</sup>

In contrast, at about the same time John Wilkins, as Dalgarno reports in his autobiography, declared that 'the formes of things, if there were any such, are unknown to us'. Rather surprisingly, given Samuel Hartlib's oft-noted Baconianism, in as early as 1639 he wrote in his diary of a proposed new orthography:

His Orthographia requires mighty Credulous Men. For hee supposes a world of things and takes them for granted. An accurat Philosopher or a Sceptic will never admit of them. Such a booke will bee very acceptable to students who are inured to beleeve all things from their cradle.<sup>13</sup>

It is against this varied background that the status of Dalgarno's and Wilkins's languages must be gauged. Wilkins's dogged revisions of a language that was constructed out of more problems than it solved, bespeaks a man who, despite his reported scepticism concerning our access to ultimate forms, operated still with some kind of trust in the epistemological purchase of his scheme, and died, as Aubrey recalled in his life of Wilkins, still worrying about his 'darling'. Dalgarno, vacillatory, with respect on the one hand for traditional Aristotelianism and the power of the predicamental approach, and a keen sense on the other of the necessity for mnemonical ease in language learning, provides arguably a more complicated and certainly more documented case than Wilkins and his *Essay*. Indeed, long after the death of Wilkins, Dalgarno was still discussing his ideas on language in his late treatise *Didascalocophus* (1680), an important work on the teaching of deaf-mutes, also containing an early essay on phonotactics and on 'Cheirology', or sign-language, a term which Dalgarno lifts unacknowledged from John Bulwer's well-known *Chirologia* of 1644. Again, Dalgarno seems oddly incapable of mentioning predecessors in the field. In addition to Bulwer, as Cram and Maat note, the work of - the row between - William Holder and John Wallis, the latter a personal friend of Dalgarno, likewise goes unremarked.

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<sup>12</sup> Basset Jhones, *Herm'aeologium, or an essay at the rationality of the art of speaking* (London, 1659), 1. Ariel Hessayon is preparing the forthcoming *DNB* article on Jhones.

<sup>13</sup> *The Hartlib Papers*, ed. Judith Crawford *et al.*, 2 CD-ROMS (Michigan: Ann Arbor, 1995), 30/4/24B.

So, as this brief survey suggests, the universal linguists not only differed from one another, but, in Dalgarno's case, even seemingly changed direction entirely - although Dalgarno, to be fair, does address in the autobiography, however laconically, his sudden switch to predicamental structure. Let us hope then, that this edition, as it should, rekindles interest not only in universal language but also in the larger social contexts of the language-planners, especially their variegated religious backgrounds. Men like Wilkins, Dalgarno and Lodwick, let alone more peripheral figures such as John Pell, John Beale, John Wallis and Robert Hooke, people the entire spectrum of early modern belief. Let us hope, I say, because OUP have in their wisdom priced this book out of the range of many who might otherwise have bought it (their webpage seeks £70, or \$90 in the USA), and it is nevertheless speckled with unimportant but annoying typos, and the occasional venial error in manuscript transcription. But these scarcely mar a fine edition, clothed in lucid editorial prose, inviting to the interested amateur, and informative for the specialist. It has obviously been a long labour of love.<sup>14</sup> Perhaps OUP may wish to reconsider their price? Again, let us hope so, because now, thanks to the labours of Cram and Maat, the richly documented trajectory of the Aberdeenshire schoolmaster need no longer be eclipsed by the linguistic work of that eminently clubbable, but rather relentlessly lime-lit, future Bishop of Chester.

**William Poole, Cambridge**  
[wep21@cam.ac.uk](mailto:wep21@cam.ac.uk)

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<sup>14</sup> Cram and Maat are also constructing a web resource on Dalgarno, *TULIP: The Universal Language Internet Portal*, at [http://acdt.oucs.ox.ac.uk/acdt/projects/detail.php?proj\\_id=2002k](http://acdt.oucs.ox.ac.uk/acdt/projects/detail.php?proj_id=2002k).

**Hüllen, Werner**

*Collected Papers on the History of Linguistics Ideas*,  
ed. Michael M. Isermann.

Münster: Nodus Publikationen, 2002. Paperback, xxix+390pp., € 69,50.

(Vol. 8 in *The Henry Sweet Society Studies in the History of Linguistics*).

ISBN 3-89323-458-6.

This volume brings together twenty papers by Werner Hüllen, spanning (with one exception from 1987) the years 1990-2000. The collection reflects Hüllen's enviably wide range of interests across the history of linguistic ideas, with particular attention to Germany and England. Hüllen's chief focus is perhaps the 17<sup>th</sup> Century, but the papers gathered together here also deal with equal sure-footedness with topics from the later Middle Ages to the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. The collection offers three papers in each of the sections *On the Method of Historiography*, *On the Royal Society and the Plain Style Debate*, *On Onomasiology*, *On Comenius*, and four papers *On The Evaluation of Languages*. A final section groups together two reflections on semiotics and on 'linguistics and national-(social)ism'. It is perhaps worth mentioning, since the book's title does not suggest it, that five of the twenty papers are in German.

I thoroughly enjoyed reading this collection from cover to cover. True to Hüllen's own reflections on historiography of linguistics, whatever his topic, he judiciously combines (but never confuses) narrative (*Sicherung der Fakten*) with exposition, argument and analysis. The result is contributions which are accessible and valuable to readers of differing expertise. Where the topics were new to me, I found the key facts presented with great clarity. Where I knew the material somewhat better, I appreciated Hüllen's ability to impose a meaningful and invariably enlightening structure, within which already known details take on new significance. It is reassuring for the reader too that the author himself always makes explicit *that* he is imposing a structure and an interpretation – that he is engaged in historiography. The most obvious case is his presentation in the first essay of Francis Bacon's rules for scientific discourse, followed by an explicit deconstruction of that presentation. Hüllen reflects on the need for self-aware anachronism (as he also does in the third paper in this first section), here the necessity to paraphrase Bacon's terminology with words from another era. He also warns against teleological interpretations of the past (a tendency he criticizes in some interpretations of 19<sup>th</sup>-century linguistics which seek in them the seeds of later national-socialist ideas on language and race – see the final essay in the book).

The second contribution in the book is pure meta-historiography. 'Schemata der Historiographie. Ein Traktat' consists of eighty short interrelated assertions about the nature of historiography, which I found both extremely insightful and thought-provoking. Isermann comments in his preface that it is a



'marvellous piece of scholarly work' and 'an invitation to agree or disagree with the author, an offer which the attentive reader cannot afford to decline' (xxi). I can only agree – I am sure it is a text I will return to repeatedly. I shall not even try to do justice to its scope here, but will merely note that it should be compulsory reading for all of us and would be a marvellous text around which to base reflections on the nature of our subject in any class or panel discussion. It is a great shame that non-German speakers will not read it.

The three papers on the plain style debate in 17<sup>th</sup> century England address the question of appropriate scientific style – Bacon's desire for intellectually honest style that distinguishes fact from belief or conjecture, Boyle's plea for perspicuity of language or Hooke's desire for a language that is mathematical in its rigour. The discussion is absorbing in itself (and I can't help feeling Hüllen is very aware of it in his own rigorously lucid style), but Hüllen situates it for the reader very clearly within the wider social and intellectual context of its time. In the third section, Hüllen traces the history of onomasiological dictionaries in Europe from the earliest medieval glossaries to their high-point in the seventeenth century. He reads such dictionaries as coherent texts in their own right, and argues that their structure, inclusions and omissions can tell us much about an entire world-view: one which often began and ended with God, and in which things have (or can be given) their rightful names. Similarly, he shows how Wilkins's onomasiologically organised programme for a "universal character" depends on a belief that words and language reflect reality. How lexica embody organization of knowledge and beliefs about the world is also explored in the fourth section, with studies of glossaries for foreign-language learning from the Middle Ages to Comenius and his lesser-known opponent, Johan Joachim Becher.

Section V looks at what lies behind the criteria (such as 'antiquity', 'purity', 'copiousness', 'clarity', 'euphony', and 'energy') repeatedly used to evaluate languages from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, particularly within German and English discourses. Hüllen notes the emergence in the nineteenth century of a new criterion, that of functional adequacy, which has now become the dominant paradigm in linguistics, if not amongst laypeople. He also shows how perceived features of languages were often taken as indexical of moral or psychological qualities, and how in the nineteenth century these were increasingly equated with national, ethnic or racial characteristics, as *language – people – race* were confused in a trivialization of ideas of linguistic relativity. Two papers in the final section then address the continuation of the trivialization of linguistic ideas in the services of the Third Reich.<sup>1</sup>

The final section of this collection also contains two "oddments" – a semiotic reading of Eco's *The Name of the Rose* and a return to the question of how categorization of the world reflects a world-view, in the shape of early German museum catalogues. My experience of reading these two papers sums up one of the pleasures of reading Hüllen's work: he makes whatever he is

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<sup>1</sup> One of these is in fact a discussion of Christopher Hutton's *Linguistics and the Third Reich. Mother-Tongue Fascism, Race and the Science of Language* (New York: Routledge, 1999).

writing about interesting – even where, *mea culpa*, the reader does not expect to be interested. When his readable, lively style is added to the high scholarly quality of each of these papers, the Henry Sweet Society can be rightly proud to present this collection to Professor Hüllen on the occasion of his 75<sup>th</sup> birthday. It will be read with pleasure and profit not just by his colleagues, but by future scholars and students too.

**Nicola McLelland, Dublin**  
[nicolamc@tcd.ie](mailto:nicolamc@tcd.ie)

## PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

(to 1st May 2003)

**M**embers of the Society have been kind enough to donate the following publications to the HSS Library. Further contributions, which are very welcome, should be sent to:

Dr Richard Steadman-Jones  
Dept of English Language & Linguistics  
University of Sheffield  
Sheffield S10 2TN

Monographs by individual authors will be reviewed wherever possible; articles in collected volumes will be listed separately below, but, like offprints and articles in journals, will not normally be reviewed. It would be appreciated if the source of articles could be noted where not already stated on the offprints.

The Society is also very grateful to those publishers who have been good enough to send books for review.

### BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS

BEAL, Joan

*English Pronunciation in the Eighteenth Century: Thomas Spence's 'Grand Repository of the English Language'*

Paperback edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 252 pp. ISBN • 0-19-925667-5. £19.99.

BUSSE, Peter

*Cynddelw Brydydd Mawr—Archaismus und Innovation: Sprache und Metrik eines kymrischen Hofdichters des 12. Jahrhunderts.*

Münster: Nodus (Studien und Texte zur Keltologie), 2002. 160 pp. ISBN • 3-89323-615-5. EUR 38,50.

FORMIGARI, Lia

*Il linguaggio: Storia delle teorie.*

Roma, Bari: Editori Laterza (Manuali Laterza), 2001. 386 pp. ISBN • 88-420-6424-6. EUR 24,79.

HÜLLEN, Werner

*Collected Papers on the History of Linguistic Ideas.*

Münster: Nodus (The Henry Sweet Society Studies in the History of Linguistics), 2002. Edited by Michael M. Iserman. xxix, 290 pp. ISBN • 3-89323-458-6. EUR 69,50.

LEVIN, Saul

*Semitic and Indo-European II: Comparative Morphology, Syntax and Phonetics.*

Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins (Current Issues in Linguistic Theory), 2002. xviii, 592 pp. ISBN • 90-272-4734-X (Eur); ISBN • 1-58811-225-5 (US). US\$ 110, EUR 110,00.

SCHABERT, Ina and BOENKE, Michaela (eds)

*Imaginationen des Anderen im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert.*

Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz Verlag (Wolfenbütteler Forschungen), 2002. 288 pp. ISBN • 3-447-04631-7. EUR-D 69,00.

#### PERIODICALS

*Beiträge zur Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft.* **12.2** (2002) and **13.1** (2003). ISSN • 0939-2815.

#### ARTICLES AND REVIEWS

BECKER, Thomas

Review of Helmut Henne and Jörg Kilian (eds), *Hermann Paul: Sprachtheorie, Sprachgeschichte, Philologie. Reden, Abhandlungen und Biographie*, Tübingen: Niemeyer. *Word*, **52** (2001), 95-101.

GWOSDEK, Hedwig

Review of Monika Polife, *Richard Mulcasters 'Elementarie': Eine kultur- und sprachhistorische Untersuchung*, Heidelberg: Winter, 1999. *Anglia*, **120** (2002), 409-412.

GWOSDEK, Hedwig

"The Copies of Wolsey's *Methodus*, Colet's *Aeditio*, and Lily's *Rudimenta Grammatices* in Chichester Cathedral Library." *The Library (The Transactions of the Bibliographical Society)*, **3** (2002), 413-416.

NOORDEGRAAF, Jan

"Dutch Linguists between Humboldt and Saussure: The Case of Jac. van Ginneken (1877-1945)", *Historiographia Linguistica*, **29** (2002), 145-163.

SUBBIONDO, Joseph L.

“John Wilkins’ Theory of the Origin and Development of Language: Historical Linguistics in 17th-Century Britain.” In Hans-Josef Niederehe and Konrad Koerner (eds) *History and Historiography of Linguistics, Volume I*. (Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benamins, 1990), 357-365. ISBN 20-272-4541-X.

SUBBIONDO, Joseph L.

“From Pragmatics to Semiology: The Influence of John Wilkins’ Pulpit Oratory on His Philosophical Language.” *Historiographia Linguistica*, 23 (1996), 111-122.

SUBBIONDO, Joseph L.

“17th-Century Universal Grammar and Contemporary Linguistics: John Wilkins and Noam Chomsky.” *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft*, 8 (1998), 1-9.

SUBBIONDO, Joseph L.

“Educational Reform in Seventeenth-Century England and John Wilkins’ Philosophical Language”, *Language & Communication*, 21 (2001), 273-284.

**Henry Sweet Society for the History of  
Linguistic Ideas**

**Annual Colloquium**

**Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland, 28-31 August 20023**

**T**rinity College, Dublin was founded in 1592. It is home to the famous Book of Kells, and to the Dublin Philosophical Society, which was founded by Molyneux in 1684 and still thrives here today. Trinity College is located in the heart of the Dublin city centre, Ireland, where the Guinness really *does* taste different.

Local attractions include the historic Trinity library and the nearby Marsh's library and Chester Beatty Library and there will be an opportunity to visit these during the conference.

**THE REGISTRATION FORM IS AVAILABLE ON THE SOCIETY'S WEBSITE ([HTTP://WWW.HENRYSWEET.ORG](http://www.henrysweet.org)) OR FROM THE CONFERENCE ORGANISER:**

**DR NICOLA MCLELLAND  
DEPARTMENT OF GERMANIC STUDIES  
TRINITY COLLEGE  
DUBLIN 2  
IRELAND**

**(NICOLAMC@TCD.IE)**

## Draft programme

### Thursday, August 28th, 2003

2-4	<b>Arrival and Registration</b>
	<b>Room 1</b>
4.00	<b>Welcome</b>
4.30	Chris Stray (UWS): <i>Mnemonics and general grammar: Gregor Feinaigle in Dublin, 1813-19</i>
5.00	Marjorie Lorch (Birkbeck College, London): <i>The Dublin School of Aphasia Research in the 19th Century</i>
5.30	Jaap Maat (Amsterdam): <i>The Tulip project: a novel approach to the history of linguistics</i>
6.00-7.30	<b>Reception</b>

### Friday, August 29th, 2003

	<b>Room 1</b>
9.00	Pascale Hummel (Paris): <i>Incunabula comparativa, la philologie comparée comme image dans le tapis</i>
9.30	Luiza Palanciuc (Université de Bucarest/ Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociale, Paris): <i>Choix théorique ou pratique linguistique? Autour des jeux de langage</i>
10.00	Frank Vonk (Doetinchem): <i>Mach and Mauthner revisited</i>
10.30	Reese M. Heitner (The City University of New York): <i>An Odd Couple: Chomsky and Quine on the Phoneme</i>

### 11.00-11.30 COFFEE/TEA

	<b>Room 1</b>	<b>Room 2</b>
11.30	John Walmsley (Bielefeld): <i>The Inadequacy of the English Lexicon: Schäfer's thesis and English grammatical terminology</i>	Ekaterina Velmezova (Russian Academy of Sciences / University of Lausanne Switzerland): <i>On the epistemological value of the semantic polarization theories by the end of the XIXth century</i>

12.00	Mike McMahon (Glasgow): <i>Richard John Lloyd (1846-1906)</i>	Serhii Vakulenko: <i>The Notion of Sememe in Adolf Noreen</i>
12.30	Warren Maguire (University of Newcastle): " <i>Mr. A. J. Ellis ? the pioneer of scientific phonetics in England</i> " ( <i>Sweet 1877</i> , vii): <i>an examination of Ellis's data from the northeast of England</i>	Nadia Kerecuk: <i>Sign, Obraz, Symbol, Symbolic Thinking and Consciousness in O. O. Potebnia (1835-1891)</i>

**1.00-2.00 LUNCH**

	<b>Room 1</b>	
2.00	Irina Vilkou-Poustovaïa: <i>Martinet face à Grammont ou une rencontre manquée entre Troubetzkoy et Saussure</i>	
2.30	John E. Joseph (University of Edinburgh): <i>Pictet's Du beau and the Crystallisation of Saussurean Structuralism</i>	
3.00	Irina Ivanova (University of Saint-Petersburg, Russia/ University of Lausanne, Switzerland): <i>From the analysis of the phonetic aspect of the poetical speech towards the analysis of the dialogue (the development of linguistic conception by Lev Jakubinskij)</i>	

**3.30-4.00 COFFEE/TEA**

	<b>Room 1</b>	<b>Room 2</b>
4.00	Vladimir I. Mazhuga (Institute for History, Saint-Petersburg): <i>The notion of the "pragmátôn poiótês " in the definition of the "noun" by the Greek grammarians</i>	Hiroyuki Eto (Osaka/Nagano): <i>Wilhelm von Humboldt and American Linguistics</i>
4.30	Andreas Schmidhauser: <i>What is a pronoun?</i>	Birgit K. Schütz <i>Wilhelm von Humboldt's "Great Work" on the American Indian Languages ? A Reconstruction</i>
5.00	Sune Vork Steffensen (University of Aarhus): <i>The Emergence of the Subject</i>	Joseph L. Subbiondo (California Institute of Integral Studies): <i>Language, Culture, and Consciousness: Benjamin Lee Whorf's Critique of the Scientific Assumptions of Structural Linguistics</i>



## Saturday, August 30th, 2004

	Room 1	Room 2
9.00	Ken-Ichi Kadooka (Ryukoku University, Kyoto, Japan): <i>A Brief Review of Japanese Phonology From the Historical Viewpoint</i>	Camiel Hamans (European Parliament): <i>The morphology of oddities</i>
9.30	Herbert Igboanusi (University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria): <i>A socio-historical survey of English in Igboland</i>	Jacqueline Léon (Paris): <i>Semantic primitives and intermediary languages in early Machine Translation in Britain (1956- 1970)</i>
10.00	Nikolai Dobronravine: <i>Arabic and Arabic-script Linguistic Thought in West Africa</i>	Garon Wheeler (Abu Dhabi, UAE): <i>Linguistic History vs. Krashen</i>

## 10.30-11.00 COFFEE/TEA

	Room 1
11.00-12.30	Richard Steadman-Jones and Rachael Gilmour (Sheffield and Queen Mary, University of London): <i>The languages of Africa in travel narratives of the romantic period (2 papers + theoretical discussion)</i>
12.30	<i>Visit to Book of Kells and Old Library</i>

## 1.30-2.30 LUNCH

	Room 1
2.30	Paul Laurendeau (York University, Canada): <i>John Locke and Language</i>
3.00	Natascia Leonardi (University of Macerata): <i>John Wilkins's Theory of Knowledge: Language, Reality, and Representation</i>
3.30	David Cram (Jesus College, Oxford): <i>John Wilkins on the diversity of languages and the special case of Malayan</i>

## 4.00-4.30 COFFEE/TEA

	Room 1	Room 2
4.30	Hedwig Gwosdek ( University of Potsdam): <i>'Lily-Grammars'? The English grammars of St Paul's school, London and An Introduction of the</i>	[Executive committee meeting]

	<i>eyght partes of speche</i>	
5.00	Masataka Miyawaki (Senshu University, Kanagawa, Japan): <i>John Wallis's Grammatica Linguae Anglicanae: Its Aim and Orientation</i>	
5.30-7.00	<b>Annual General Meeting of the Henry Sweet Society</b>	

**7.30 Conference dinner at a local restaurant**

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**Sunday, August 31st, 2003**

	<b>Room 1</b>	
9.00	Iwona Milweska: <i>European Approaches to Sanskrit</i>	
9.30	Anita Auer (University of Manchester): <i>Grammatical prescription in English and German in the 18th century a study of the 'subjunctive' and the 'Konjunktiv'</i>	
10.00	Tinatin Bolkvadze (Tbilisi Iv. Javakhishvili State University): <i>Great tradition and Language Codification From a Sociolinguistic Point of View</i>	
10.30	Christiane Schlaps (Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Goethe-Woerterbuch Arbeitsstelle Tuebingen): <i>Transformations of the 'genius of language' in the history of linguistic discourses</i>	

**11.00-11.30 COFFEE/TEA**

	<b>Room 1</b>	
11.30	Elena Simonato (University of Lausanne): <i>Energetic metaphor in linguistics (19th-20th centuries): a page of the history of linguistic ideas</i>	
12.00	Peteris Vanags (University of Latvia / Stockholm university) <i>The interpretation of the origin of and the genetic relationship between languages in 17th and 18th century Baltic area linguistic treatises</i>	
12.30	Closing discussion	

**1.00-2.00 LUNCH**

**2.00 Excursion: Dublin Castle and Chester Beatty library, 10 minutes' walk from College (free)**

## **The Paul Salmon - Pieter Verburg Memorial Fund**

**T**he Henry Sweet Society has received two generous donations in memory of the late Paul Salmon and the late Pieter Verburg. Pieter Verburg was the author of a seminal work on the history of linguistic ideas, published in Dutch in 1952 and translated into English by Paul Salmon and published in 1998.

Once again, in 2003, the Society intends to award two annual bursaries of £100 (one hundred pounds Sterling) each to members of the Society who wish to attend and present a paper at one of the Society's colloquia but whose financial circumstances make this difficult. Preference may be given to younger scholars.

Applicants must be paid-up members of the Society before applications are made. Applicants should submit the following:

- a) letter of application indicating the reasons why support is sought
- b) an abstract of the paper to be read at the colloquium
- c) a brief curriculum vitae and list of publications (if any)
- d) a letter of support from an academic referee

Applications should be sent to the Treasurer:  
Dr Nicola McLelland  
Department of Germanic Studies  
Trinity College  
Dublin 2  
Ireland

to reach her NOT LATER THAN 30 JUNE 2003.

Applications will be considered by a sub-committee of the Executive Committee whose decision shall be final. No correspondence can be entered into.

## XVI<sup>th</sup> International Colloquium of the SGdS

**Humboldt University of Berlin (Germany), 4 - 6 March 2004**

The XVI<sup>th</sup> International Colloquium of the “Studienkreis Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft” (SGdS) will be held at the Humboldt University of Berlin from 4 to 6 March 2004. The organisers are Dr. Thorsten Fögen (Berlin) and Professor Dr. Peter Schmitter (Seoul & Münster).

Information about Berlin and the Humboldt University can be found on the Internet ([www.berlin.de](http://www.berlin.de) and [www.hu-berlin.de](http://www.hu-berlin.de) resp.). Participants will receive detailed information regarding directions to the conference site, accommodation and cultural life in Berlin in due course.

There will be a **general section** on the history of linguistics and a **special section on “Historical and cultural dimensions of technical texts and languages for special purposes”**. For the special section, papers from classical philologists are particularly welcome, but contributions focussing on the Middle Ages, the Renaissance and the modern period are also much appreciated.

Conference languages are, as usual, German, English and French, but in exceptional cases it will also be possible to give a paper in Italian.

For the section on technical texts and languages for special purposes, the following aspects may serve as guidelines for choosing a topic for a paper, although they are by no means meant to be exhaustive:

- On the development and diversification of the genre “technical text”
- Morphological, syntactical, semantic and pragmatic characteristics of languages for special purposes and of technical texts
- Technical texts across languages and cultures
- The role of polemics in technical texts: self-presentation and criticism of other authors
- Oral and written technical communication
- Commenting on technical “classics” (e.g. Hippocrates, Vitruvius)
- Homogeneity and heterogeneity of technical literature
- Forms of citing and referring, in particular of self-reference
- Text and illustration
- The use of formalised languages (e.g. mathematical formulae) as an element of languages for special purposes

Participants who would like to give a paper are kindly asked to submit title and abstract (around 250 words) *via e-mail*. Presentations will last 30 minutes, followed by 15 minutes for discussion.

The conference fee will be €20, payable during the conference. Deadline for registration is **31 October 2003**. Please send your registration (if applicable, together with the title of your paper and abstract) to the following address:

Dr. Thorsten Fögen  
Humboldt-Universität Berlin  
Institut für Klassische Philologie  
Unter den Linden 6  
D-10099 Berlin  
Phone: (+49-30) 2093-2507, Fax: (+49-30) 2093-2718  
e-mail: [thorsten.foegen@rz.hu-berlin.de](mailto:thorsten.foegen@rz.hu-berlin.de)

## **NAAHoLS at LSA**

**Boston, 8-11 January 2004**

**T**he 2004 NAAHoLS meeting will again be held in conjunction with the Linguistic Society of America, the American Dialect Society, the Society for the Study of the Indigenous Languages of the Americas, and the Society for Pidgin and Creole Linguistics.

The meeting will take place at the Sheraton Hotel in Boston, Massachusetts between 8 and 11 January 2004. Further details about the meeting will be provided in the next issue of the NAAHoLS newsletter (to be distributed Summer 2003).

As in the past, we invite papers relating to any aspect of the history of the language sciences. All presenters must be members of the association. Papers will be 20 minutes, with 10 minutes for discussion. Abstracts may be submitted as hard copies or as file attachments (MS Word only). The length of the abstract should not exceed 500 words - a shorter (200 word) abstract will also be requested for the meeting handbook. The deadline for abstracts is 1 September 2003.

Abstracts should be sent to:

David Boe  
Department of English  
Northern Michigan University  
Marquette  
MI 49855  
USA

[dboe@nmu.edu](mailto:dboe@nmu.edu)

**Colloquium: Histories of Prescriptivism:  
Alternative approaches to the study of English 1700-  
1900**

**Sheffield, 3-5 July 2003**

**T**his colloquium arises out of a collaboration between Joan Beal, Jane Hodson and Richard-Steadman-Jones (University of Sheffield, UK), and Carol Percy (University of Toronto, Canada).<sup>\*</sup> We wish to consider how the standardization and codification of English in the later modern period both marginalized and was manipulated by, authors who were in some way outside the mainstream of 'polite' British society. Previous studies of English grammars in this period have emphasized the role of grammars in catering for the social aspirations of the bourgeois, maintaining the political status quo and uniting the British nation and Empire under the banner of a uniform standard. This colloquium aims to challenge such a monolithic view of approaches to language study in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, demonstrating that there were other, more radical approaches and agendas, whilst recognizing that the end result was, in many cases 'prescriptive'. We aim to explore the tension between 'radical' agendas and prescriptivism, and to re-evaluate the prescriptive/ descriptive dichotomy.

Anybody interested in attending should contact Joan Beal (j.c.beal@shef.ac.uk)

<sup>\*</sup>The research collaboration leading to this colloquium has been funded by the British Academy and the Association of Commonwealth Universities (grant CADF 2001 – 20).

**IV Congreso Internacional  
Sociedad Española de Historiografía Lingüística**

*Tenerife, Islas Canarias, España, 22-25 Octubre 2003*

**E**l IV Congreso Internacional de la Sociedad Española de Historiografía Lingüística se celebrará en la Facultad de Filología de la Universidad de La Laguna (Tenerife, Islas Canarias) entre los días **22 y 25 de Octubre de 2003**. La Sociedad Española de Historiografía Lingüística (SEHL) ha promovido desde su nacimiento la celebración de congresos internacionales con el objetivo de facilitar el encuentro entre los socios y el intercambio de sus investigadores, así como divulgar el conocimiento historiográfico de diferentes materias desarrolladas preferentemente en el ámbito hispánico, como Filología, Gramática, Retórica, Semántica, Pragmática, etc. El I Congreso Internacional se celebró en la Universidad de La Coruña en febrero de 1997, el segundo, en la Universidad de León en marzo de 1999 y el tercero, en la Universidad de Vigo en febrero de 2001.



## History of Linguistics meets the Internet: the Dutch DBNL

*I*  
**T**he *Digitale Bibliotheek Nederlandse Letteren* (DBNL, Digital Library of Dutch Language and Literature) is a growing collection of primary and secondary information on Dutch language and literature and its historical, societal and cultural context. Researchers and others who are interested, from the Dutch-speaking areas and beyond, can get direct or controlled access to this information via the Internet (<http://www.dbnl.org/>).

The site is an initiative by the Digital Library of Dutch Language and Literature Foundation (*Stichting dbnl*), founded by the distinguished Society of Dutch Language and Literature (*Maatschappij der Nederlandse Letterkunde*, founded in 1766), with financial support from the Dutch Language Union (*Nederlandse Taalunie*) and the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (*Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek*). Its e-mail address is: [post@dbnl.org](mailto:post@dbnl.org).

Various committees of specialists are currently advising the executives of DBNL on which texts should be selected and added to the rapidly increasing number of electronic editions that are already available on DBNL's website. Each month new source material and secondary literature is published.

Those colleagues who are interested in the History of Linguistics in the Netherlands and have a working knowledge of Dutch might wish to know that a number of historiographically significant linguistic texts are already accessible via this site. As a member of the Linguistic Committee of the DBNL I am pleased to inform the readers of the *Bulletin* that one can at present consult not only the important nineteenth-century linguistic periodical *De Taalgids* ('The Language Guide') in full, but also various works by the famous linguist Jac. van Ginneken (1877-1945), several Dutch traditional grammars (for example Weiland 1805, Den Hertog 1895, Overdiep 1937), a full dictionary, and nineteenth-century works on Dutch orthography and dialectology. A voluminous study like C.F.P. Stutterheim's (1903-1991) 700-page ground-breaking dissertation on *De Metaphoor* (1941) can also be searched without any problems. Among other things, the electronic edition of C. Kiliaen's *Etymologicum teutonicae linguae* (1599) is in progress.

Members of the Henry Sweet Society might appreciate being informed about similar web sites where historiographically important texts can be found; this might be useful both for students and professional researchers of HoL. Therefore, I would like to suggest that we start a new rubric in the *Bulletin*. Maybe a full list of digitally available grammars etc. could be published on the Henry Sweet Society web site and continuously updated?

**II**

The year 2001 saw the launching of another project which might be of interest to the members of the Henry Sweet Society, and which will be hosted by the DBNL, viz. the *Bio- en Bibliografisch Lexicon voor de Neerlandistiek* (BBNL, 'Biobibliographical Lexicon for Netherlandic Studies'). It was an initiative taken by the Committee for Dutch Language and Literature (*Commissie voor Nederlandse Taal en Letterkunde*), one of the specialist committees of the aforementioned *Maatschappij der Nederlandse Letterkunde*. This Committee will also act as the Editorial Board of the Lexicon. It is planned to publish entries on men and women who have contributed to the study of Dutch language and literature, both in writing, teaching, or in research, in the immediate and distant past. The master list includes not only scholars within The Netherlands and Flanders, but also the so-called 'neerlandici extra muros'. Entries on, for instance, Japanese, Afrikaans, British and American Netherlandists will be included. A representative entry will be ready for electronic inspection via dbnl shortly. Furthermore, it is expected that in autumn 2003 the first fifty entries will be accessible on the dbnl site. In 2004 the next batch will be launched, and it is hoped that many will follow later on.

As one of the editors of this digital lexicon I would like to invite interested members of the Henry Sweet Society to come up with proposals for entries that may be of relevance to this Dutch lexicon. The editorial guidelines are available to future contributors.

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## Iter

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