

EDITORIAL

Not only is this quite a substantial issue of the *Bulletin*, but readers get two editorials for the price of one. One reason for the *length* is the large number of abstracts from the Dublin conference. It remains to be seen whether it was simply the lure of Dublin or whether the number of people identifying their research with the discipline of the history of linguistics is simply continuing to increase. The double dose of *editorials* is explained by the fact that there is an outgoing editor and an incoming one. I have been an editor for ten issues of the *Bulletin*, and I have learned a great deal about the subject as a result, because I have had to read every word! In Therese Lindström I have a very dynamic and committed successor, and I trust that members of the Society will support her as they have done me by responding positively to requests for material and for information, and by ensuring that the *Henry Sweet Society Bulletin* remains a useful and informative organ for the subject. One of the most important functions of the *HSS Bulletin* is as an arena in which contributors can take risks. Contributions are reviewed by more than one member of the executive committee, but they are unlikely to be rejected on the grounds that they are preliminary, incomplete, brief, risky, outrageous. Members are more than welcome to use the pages of this *Bulletin* to ask questions, air ideas, or dip their toe in the water before launching out into the deeper waters of more earnest journals.

If the *Bulletin* is really to be subversive in the way I fondly believe it is capable of being, then perhaps I am no longer the person to preside over it, since, having become a professor of the history of linguistics, I am, I suppose, poacher-turned-gamekeeper. I'm not sure yet what professors are supposed to do, but I suspect it will involve more committees, more meetings and more administration. More interesting is the question of what a professor of the *history of linguistics* does, and this is a question I'll be thinking about a lot in the coming period. My final plea from these pages (for the time being anyway) is however this: what do members of the community of historians of linguistics think that somebody whose job title is formally linked to the subject can and should be doing?

Andrew R. Linn

It is time for the editorship to pass to new hands, and this time the committee has decided to give me the honour of this assignment. I would like to take this opportunity first of all to thank the retiring editor, Andrew Linn, with whom I am co-editing this issue. He has done a fantastic job over the years in encouraging people to contribute to the *Bulletin* and to the society in various ways. He has also been part of the important process of turning this publication into a *Bulletin* from having started out as a *Newsletter*.

When David Cram and Andrew Linn introduced the first issue of the *Bulletin* in November 1997, they not only carried over some of the standing items from the *Newsletter*, they also initiated a new series of sections (announcements, abstracts of papers from the colloquium, notices from sister societies, research in progress, small-scale biographies, brief articles dealing with particular terms and concepts, etc.). The then-editors also invited the members to “come up with other suggestions”, and expressed a wish that the *Bulletin* would “become a team effort”.

In taking over the responsibility of looking after the *Bulletin* I will carry on accepting contributions to all of the sections that David Cram and Andrew Linn introduced and those continuing from the *Newsletter*, but I will also introduce some new items. One new sub-section that appears in this issue presents abstracts of recent PhD theses in the history of linguistics. This will give the members of this Society a better idea of how much of an interest there is for history of linguistics among graduate students, what kind of areas are being researched, and which the main universities are with an interest in educating historiographers of linguistics. Another new item in this issue is *requests*, which will include requests for books and missing issues of publications that someone is interested in getting hold of.

Like the editors of the first issue of the *Bulletin*, I would also like to encourage the members of this society to come up with their own suggestions, and to send in material that they are interested in sharing with the readers. Like David Cram and Andrew Linn I would also like to express a wish that this bulletin will become more of a team effort, with all members contributing their information, articles and reviews.

Being a PhD student myself in the last stages of writing up my thesis I would also hope to be able to encourage more students to take an interest in the history of linguistics and in this society, and in this issue I am happy to say that we have a conference report by Anita Auer, PhD student at the University of Manchester, a fascinating article on the emergence of the subject by Sune Vork Steffensen, University of Aarhus, and, as a bridge between students and faculty members, the abstract of Rhodri Lewis’s thesis.

Finally, I would like to mention that I have lately been working on improving online access to the *Bulletin*, and I will continue to work on this in the next year. The first issue of the *Bulletin* (issue 29) is now available in PDF-format online, and the rest will be added as soon as possible. The latest issues will however be kept offline for the time being, with only their list of contents appearing online (possibly with the addition of brief abstracts in the future), unless members express a strong wish that these should also be made fully available.

Therese Lindström

Heteroglossia in Lewis Grout's *The Isizulu*: critical theory and missionary linguistics

The American Congregationalist missionary Lewis Grout was arguably the American Board of Missions' premier nineteenth-century Zulu linguist. Among his works on the language, he published by far the largest and most elaborate Zulu grammar at that time, *The Isizulu*, in 1859. In this short article I will discuss just a few aspects of Grout's grammatical work in *The Isizulu*, and in so doing I shall try to demonstrate a couple of ways in which particular kinds of linguistic texts can be explored through strategies offered by critical theory: in this case, the work of Mikhail Bakhtin. This sort of approach was discussed by Richard Steadman-Jones at the Dublin HSS Colloquium as a means to further open up interdisciplinary links and dialogue between historians of linguistics and scholars in adjoining fields, notably cultural historians and literary theorists. The discussion at the Colloquium dealt centrally with colonial travel writing, currently a popular area of research and an ideal point of contact with other disciplines. Missionary linguistics, by contrast, can make no such grand claims, remaining an under-addressed field – although we can hope that this is changing, since the recent inaugural International Conference in Missionary Linguistics, held at the University of Oslo demonstrated the range of new work being done in this area. But this kind of critical approach seems to offer, at least potentially, a means to open up the field and to demonstrate the relevance of missionary linguistics to, for example, postcolonial studies and to cultural history. It provides a critical vocabulary with which to explain some of the complexities of the work of colonial missionary linguists in the context of other disciplines which have generally regarded them in quite monochrome terms – usually as straightforward agents of linguistic, cultural, and religious standardisation and colonial control.

Mikhail Bakhtin

Bakhtin's work, still very current in the field of cultural history, offers one pertinent means to explore the complex and often contradictory nature of descriptions of language or languages. Essentially Bakhtin's theory of social and historical conflict revolves around two opposed terms: monoglossia and heteroglossia. As Tony Crowley's analysis makes clear, monoglossia and heteroglossia can be understood both as *forces*, and as *types of discourse* generated by those forces:

First, the pair of terms is used to refer to the historical forces which are in constant conflict in discourse: monological versus dialogical forces. Second, they are used to indicate the effects brought about by the conflict: monological versus dialogical discourse. (Crowley1996:32)

Thus on the one hand, the centripetal forces of monoglossia 'serve to unify and centralize the verbal-ideological world', imposing a sense of unity and order, and serving the ideological purposes of control and containment (Bakhtin 1981:271). At the same time on the other hand, the centrifugal forces of heteroglossia go about their work:

At any given moment of its evolution, language is stratified not only into linguistic dialects in the strict sense of the word (according to formal linguistic markers, especially phonetic) but also – and for us this is the essential point – into languages that are socio-ideological: languages of social groups, "professional" and "generic" languages, languages of generations and so forth. (1981:271-2)

Bakhtin here aligns the linguistic 'in the strict sense of the word' with the 'socio-ideological' – so we are to understand monoglossia as a force for linguistic and ideological unification, and heteroglossia as a force for linguistic and ideological stratification and decentralisation. It is worth noting here that a lot of existing historical scholarship implicitly assumes the workings of missionary linguistics to be strictly monological in both senses: attempting to impose a unified, standardised version of the language, and aligning this with a unified ideological framework best characterised in terms of Christianity, colonialism, and commerce. However, Bakhtin is insistent on the relationship between monoglossia and heteroglossia as *dialogic*. The two are always and everywhere in conflict with one another so that 'the form which is dominant at any particular time has to engage in active dialogical renegotiation and struggle with the other in order to retain its position of superiority' (Crowley 1996:32).

In *Discourse in the Novel*, it is the *novel* which Bakhtin asserts as the literary form which epitomises the operation of heteroglossia:

The novel as a whole is a phenomenon multiform in style and variform in speech and voice. In it the investigator is confronted with several heterogeneous stylistic unities, often located on different linguistic levels and subject to different stylistic controls. (1981:261)

But this is a description which, I am going to argue, is equally applicable to materials like Grout's *The Isizulu*, a text in which monoglossia and heteroglossia struggle very visibly against one another. In the rest of this article I will look first at Grout's careful emphasis on unification – in other words at his presentation of his grammatical work as monological. Then, I will examine some of the problems with this, and the impact of heteroglossia in *The Isizulu*, presenting a range of different and conflictual Zulu perspectives and 'a struggle among socio-linguistic points of view' which undermines any understanding of missionary linguistic work as simply monological in orientation (Bakhtin 1981:273).

Grout's The Isizulu

In *The Isizulu* Grout makes a vociferous legitimating case for the value of the Zulu language. This is a common feature of the work of (certainly Protestant) missionary linguists in this period, who set out to justify the study of particular languages on the grounds of their usefulness to the progress of mission, and often also to the consolidation of colonial control. This usefulness could be conceived in terms of geographical spread or utility as a *lingua franca*, and in terms of legitimating features – which might include copiousness, regularity, purity and so forth – which suited them to the onerous task of Scriptural translation. In other words arguments which were more or less monological were typical of missionary linguists, and Grout's description of Zulu is a paradigmatic example of this. He takes particular pains to emphasise the homogeneity of the language, insisting further that this marks Zulu as a particularly pure and elevated form of speech:

The Zulu nation [...] is made up of several smaller tribes, which were conquered and consolidated in the days of Chaka [Shaka]. It is evident, however, that the language of all these tribes, or clans, was substantially one, even before the days of Chaka; as it is also evident that, since that time, there has been a steady refining elevating process, the language of the conquered being gradually fashioned to the higher standard and more fixed character of their superiors. Nor can we believe that any of the African languages or dialects come to us, at the present time, in a state of greater original purity than the Isizulu. (Grout 1859:xix-xx)

Here Grout points to the power relations at work in language and implies a strong relationship between ideological and linguistic unification, as well as illuminating the perception of existing political circumstances in the region which dictated missionary linguistic policies. What he also implies is that the centripetal force he describes as *already* at work on Zulu, the 'steady refining elevating process' wrought by the Zulu court, would lend itself to the activities of missionary linguists in imposing a version of Zulu which was standardised, codified, and Christianised (see Grout 1859:li-iii).

Thus the potentiality already inherent in the language was to be realised by the work of missionary linguists. Grout's vision of the role of the missionary grammarian, as he sets it out in *The Isizulu*, was one of bringing order, distilling native speakers' competence in their own language into a shape which was workable for Western readers. As he writes of his own linguistic work:

Without an interpreter; without any thing that could be called a grammar of the language; with only a small vocabulary, written in a singular, insufficient, inappropriate alphabet; and among a people alike ignorant and destitute, not only of a grammar, but also of all those terms – nouns and verbs, number and person, mode and tense, roots and formatives,

vowels and consonants – of which the student and author of grammar needs to make the most frequent use; moreover, without a page, without a single sentence, of genuine vernacular composition, with which to commence the study of their own tongue in its purity, – it was evident, from the first, that an attempt to analyze their language, and reduce its elements and forms to a complete system, would require much time, and hard, patient study. (Grout 1859:vi)

Refracting the knowledge of Zulu speakers through categories of Western grammatical discourse – ‘nouns and verbs, number and person, mode and tense, roots and formatives, vowels and consonants’ – is associated here with the development of a standardised alphabetic orthography, and elsewhere in *The Isizulu* with quite grandiose plans for language standardisation and religious unification in the region (Grout 1859:xxxviii-lii). Here we find a clear vision of colonial missionary linguistics as monological: in this case building on a conception of the language in question as already to a large degree linguistically and ideologically unified, and working centripetally to further impose order, both in terms of linguistic standardisation and reification, and in instituting a new Western Christian world view. Numerous scholars have identified these as some of the central functions of colonial missionary language study (see for example Harries (1988, 1995); Fabian (1986); Mühlhäusler (1996)).

The above discussion illustrates some of the monological aspects of missionary language study as articulated by Grout. However, what the quotation I have given above also demonstrates is another striking feature of Grout’s grammatical work – and a potentially disruptive one – namely his determined emphasis upon the language *in use*, in the form of what he terms ‘genuine vernacular composition’. Repeatedly in *The Isizulu* Grout underlines the expressive capabilities of the Zulu language as used in debates, songs, stories, and everyday conversation by its speakers. His discussion of tense formation in Zulu is a case in point:

While the Isizulu finds no difficulty in allowing an interchange of some of its modes, particularly the imperative, potential, and optative, and displays great freedom in the interchange of tenses, sometimes representing the past or future as present, and even the present and future as already past; it is also able, & particular, to employ those modes and tenses which give a correct expression of the sense intended.

REMARK. – On many of these points, the Zulu language bears a close analogy to the Greek. So true is this remark, that we may say, almost in the language of another concerning the Greek, that the Isizulu ‘has the power of giving to narration a wonderful variety, life, and energy, from the freedom with which it can employ and interchange its tenses. Without circumlocution, it can represent an action as continued or momentary; as attempted or accomplished; as introductory or conclusive. It can at pleasure retard or quicken the progress of a

narrative. It can give to it dramatic life and reality by exhibiting an action as doing, or epic vivacity and energy by dismissing it as done. It can bring a scene forward into the strong light of the present, and instantly send it back into the shade of the past. The variety, vivacity, and dramatic character of Zulu narrative can be preserved but imperfectly in translation, from the fact that the English has, comparatively, so small a variety of tenses and so little freedom in uniting the past and present. (Grout 1859:343)

Grout's arguments here are quite audacious in providing legitimacy to Zulu, associating the language with Classical Greek in its flexibility and expressiveness, and calling it the superior of English. This rhetorical strategy appears designed to shake readers out of their conventional assumptions, calling on them to engage with the language in imaginative ways; it also demonstrates a personal fascination with the workings of Zulu which is evident throughout Grout's work. Passages such as the one above provide evidence of the ways in which missionary linguists could challenge or undermine, as well as bolster, Eurocentric assumptions about language.

As might be expected, Grout's work on Zulu demonstrates the concern to submit the language to the norms of Western grammar which is typical of missionary linguists. The grammatical portion of *The Isizulu* is founded on the Graeco-Roman grammatical model, and is filled with tables and lists which appear to emphasize the rule-governed orderliness and structural familiarity of the language for the Western learner. However, this attempt at a reified, controlled abstraction of Zulu appears in tension with Grout's undoubted fascination for the unique qualities and complexities of the language as it was used by its speakers. In his approach to the Zulu verb in particular, for which, as we have seen, he had so much admiration, his attempts to map Western grammatical categories onto his analysis of the language are unwieldy and flawed. He invents tenses and declensions to the point of unworkable complexity, stretching the model of Western grammar to breaking point and making *The Isizulu*, as Doke has pointed out, near-unintelligible for the learner (Grout 1859:138-180; Doke 1959:16-17). This interesting tension in Grout's work demonstrates one instance in which the missionary adherence to Graeco-Roman grammatical models, often construed as slavish and unenlightening, is worthy of closer attention.

'A genuine Zulu literature'

As I have already indicated, although *The Isizulu* is structured around Grout's grammatical abstractions of Zulu, in the kind of tabulated lists of declensions to which he attempted to reduce the language, his arguments for the value of Zulu are repeatedly grounded in references to Zulu narrative and 'continuous discourse' (Grout 1859:343). And it is this, he insists, that is the site of the true 'genius' of the language: its flexibility and potentiality are precisely demonstrated by examining the language *in* its cultural environment. As a

corollary to these arguments, it follows that appropriate written matter designed for the learner should in some way reflect the language as used by native speakers. Consequently the wealth of examples contained within *The Isizulu* are founded upon a corpus of 'genuine vernacular composition': written material comprising both examples of writing by Christian converts, and transcriptions of speech. Grout describes his rationale for its collection in this way:

Nothing could be done towards writing a genuine Zulu Grammar without a genuine Zulu literature [...] Hence, most of my examples, especially those of any length and particular importance, as in Syntax, which makes a large part of the work, have been taken, not from a foreigner's translation of other languages into this, but, in some instances, from the correspondence and other compositions of the natives, in their own tongue; though chiefly from their conversation and discussions, narratives and speeches, on affairs of their own and of deepest interest to themselves, – their words and sentences being caught at the time they were spoken, and written out *verbatim et literatim* from the lips of the speaker. (Grout 1859:v)

Grout's collection of 'genuine Zulu literature' provides the source for plentiful examples which are to be found in the grammatical portion of the work, and he also includes a longer selection of songs, stories, and other extracts as an Appendix to *The Isizulu*. This provides the reader with 'authentic' materials intended to facilitate both thorough language learning, and greater *cultural* understanding:

As a means of enabling the Zulu scholar to prosecute his studies, and to make himself familiar with the laws, genius, and idioms of the language, to a greater extent than would be possible from a perusal of isolated examples, I have made a selection of pieces, of a diversified, continuous character, from the manuscript literature on which the Grammar is founded; and have had these pieces printed as an Appendix. Taken, as they are, from sketches obtained from the more intelligent, though, for the most part, utterly heathen natives, who spoke from their own standpoint of feeling, belief, and observation; giving, as they do, an account of the Zulu kings and some of their wars; narrating the arts and performances of the *izinyanga*, a class of *quasi*-priests, or so-called doctors; exhibiting the views of the people respecting the *abatakati*, or so-called witches; and comprising a selection of the songs, prayers, and praises, which are wont to be said or sung, at home or abroad, to the living and the dead, – these selections help to give us some correct notion of the religious opinions and moral character, the social life and civil laws of the people, the forms and rules of whose language they serve to illustrate. (Grout 1859:v)

It is important to recognise that Grout's description of mission as based on understanding and dialogue was not founded in a particularly liberal or inclusive vision of Christianity. The *outcome* of dialogue with Zulu speakers, according to Grout's own arguments and according to the Congregationalist theology of the American Board of Missions more generally, was to be their rapid and total transformation. The Zulu were to become a Christian people elevated to an American model of 'intelligent, living' faith and 'useful, enduring, worthy civilization'; meanwhile, as Myra Dinnerstein has made clear, the Board missionaries, Grout included, were generally dogmatic and chauvinistic in their attitudes to Zulu people and practices (Grout 1859:vi; Dinnerstein 1976:105). However, it is nevertheless the case that the ambitious unifying force of Grout's intentions is belied by the heterogeneity of the 'native literature' to be found in *The Isizulu*. The Appendix comprises a range of historical narratives, personal accounts or "autobiography", accounts of religious practices, and *izibongo* or praise poems, which overlap and contradict one another, giving a complex picture of Zulu culture as multi-layered and dynamic rather than simple or static. Still more diverse materials are embedded in the grammatical portion of the text. A majority express an obviously Christian world-view, for example this wonderfully succinct, ringing endorsement of the Americans' missionary work:

Si nesikati nezin wadi nabafundisi; okukulu pezu kwako kwonke,
Umsindisi;
We have time and books and teachers; what is greater than all, a Savior.
(Grout 1859:286)

Alongside this glowing testimony to the work of the missionaries, however, we can find plenty of references to non-Christian Zulu practices such as the following:

Leyo inyanga I bi lamba amanga, a i kwazi uku bula;
That doctor has been fabricating lies, he does not know how to consult
the oracle. (Grout 1859:316)

These embedded and appended statements and narratives in *The Isizulu* can aptly be described through Bakhtin's concept of heteroglossia, as a stratified diversity of "socio-ideological languages". The dominant, monologic, Western Christian socio-ideological worldview is everywhere placed alongside – and arguably in struggle with – alternate visions and voices. There are accounts of Zulu religious practices, for example, which are presented from a variety of Christian and non-Christian perspectives; and exhortations regarding the value of wage labour and the superiority of the white man which appear with praise poems exalting Zulu leaders for their blackness (see for example Grout 1859:390; 274; 424-5). And the overall ideological framework of *The Isizulu*, the Christian narrative of human origins and redemption, is interwoven with

Zulu accounts which present an entirely different socio-ideological worldview; for example, a Zulu narrative of the origins of human mortality (Grout 1859:351-2).

Grout's intention in including this diversity of perspectives in *The Isizulu* was clearly to serve the centripetal purposes of unification, by giving readers an idea of the features of Zulu culture and practice which had to be overcome in the name of Christian progress. His position is a supremely confident one, demonstrating a good deal of faith in the power of his own monological discourse: that these insertions could not in any way undermine or threaten its stability. However, using Bakhtin's arguments about social and political struggle in language and representation, it is possible to see *The Isizulu* as a fascinatingly complex and unstable text. Taken as a whole, *The Isizulu* presents an image of Zulu society which is radically heteroglot, socially and ideologically complex and stratified, illustrating a diversity of perspectives, beliefs, practices, and orientations all working in energetic relation to one another.

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On Sweet on Horne Tooke — A Few Remarks.

In an article published in a recent issue of the *Bulletin*, Therese Lindström showed that Henry Sweet (1845-1912) makes an interesting case for those who are interested in the history of the treatment of 'grammaticalisation' in Britain. As it appears, the distinguished name-giver of our Society made a distinction between 'full words' and 'form words', i.e. between content words and function words, respectively. Lindström (2003:11) rightly observed that:

[s]everal times Sweet mentions that autonomous words can develop into function words - and he claims that this was a generally acknowledged process of change at the end of the nineteenth century, in other words taking no credit for having discovered this himself but instead emphasising that it is generally accepted - a comment which is important for us today in the study of grammaticalisation.

To the interested reader, who might wish to know when this concept was first introduced into linguistics, I would like to point to some data which could be taken into consideration when writing the history of the phenomenon.

When expatiating on the subject in his *History of Language* (1900) Sweet made a historiographical remark, which I will quote in full:

The older school of philologists regarded form-words as arbitrary inventions made for the express purpose of showing grammatical relations. One of the earliest and most energetic opponents of this view was our countryman Horne Took [sic], whose *Diversions of Purley*, first published about 1770, is an attempt to show that even prepositions and conjunctions once had a definite independent meaning, and are simply worn-down forms of full-words - a view which is now generally accepted. (Sweet 1920:43 = Lindström 2003:12)

According to the standard literature, the *Diversions* appeared only in 1786 (cf. Robins 1996:926). Evidently, nobody seems to have told Henry Sweet that he had been a bit sloppy concerning the year of publication; the phrase 'about 1770' can still be found in the last edition of his *History of Language* (1930; cf. Lindström 2003:12).

More intriguing, however, is Sweet's assertion that 'our countryman' was 'one of the earliest [...] to show that even prepositions and conjunctions once had a definite independent meaning, and are simply worn-down forms of full-words'. This view of John Horne Tooke (1736-1812) as an original theorist, however, had been challenged as early as 1790 in a critique of the first edition of the *Diversions*, viz. in Cassander's *Criticisms on the Diversions of*

Purley, a booklet written in 1787 and published in 1790 (cf. Funke 1934:156 n.1; Aarsleff 1967:61-62 n.37).

Cassander was the pseudonym of the Dutchman Johannes Bruckner (1726-1804), who had been born in the village of Cadzand in Zeeland, one of the provinces of the Dutch Republic. According to the *Album Studiosorum* of Franeker University, he enrolled as Jean Bruckner on 1 November 1742. At Franeker, a small town in the province of Friesland, Bruckner studied theology. He appears to have moved on to Leiden where he obtained a pastorship and where he associated with distinguished scholars such as the classicist Tiberius Hemsterhuis (1685-1766), 'the greatest Greek scholar of his time' (Monbodo), and the Orientalist Albert Schultens (1686-1750).¹ A gifted linguist - it is said that he could deliver a sermon in Dutch, Latin, French, and English - Bruckner became the much-esteemed minister of the Walloon or French Church at Norwich in 1753, later also of the local Dutch Church, being the last regular minister of either church.

In his *Criticisms* Bruckner showed himself well-acquainted with the writings of the 'very learned [Albert] Schultens' who 'endeavours every where to banish from the theory of languages all notions of mystery, all kinds of anomalies [...]' (Cassander 1790:16-17). Using material from Dutch and Frisian he revealed a number of mistakes in Horne Tooke,² who had been 'meddling' with words he did not really know - 'let me prevail upon you not to be too free with the Dutch', was Bruckner's advice (1790:74).

A major thrust of Bruckner's attack, however, lies in the denial of the originality of Horne Tooke's thesis concerning prepositions and conjunctions. Bruckner, steeped in Hemsterhusian and Schultensian doctrines, did not hesitate to put it in plain words:

Professor Schultens was the *first philologist* who suspected prepositions, conjunctions, particles in general to be no more than nouns and verbs, and refused therefore to make separate classes of them, among those that comprehend the parts of speech. But he confined himself in the application of this truth to the learned languages. *You are the first who applied it to those which are called modern.* It would be wrong not to acknowledge, that in this you have rendered the literary world an

¹ The year 1737 saw the publication of Schultens's Hebrew grammar, the *Institutiones ad fundamenta linguae hebraeae*, which brought him European fame. It has been claimed that Schultens's ideas on the relationships between various Semitic languages inspired Sir William Jones (1746-1794) in developing his own views: Jones's 'eyes were opened to see a similar relation between the Indo-European languages' (Fellman 1978:52). I think one can hardly doubt that a scholar of Jones's stature was acquainted with Schultens's works. Moreover, he knew Schultens's grandson very well, for Hendrik Albert Schultens (1749-1793), the third member of the "Schultens dynasty" and himself an Arabist and Orientalist of note, had studied at Oxford and Cambridge in 1772, and had held a chair at Leiden from 1779 onwards.

² Just one salient example: *Betaal* (the imperative of *betalen*, to pay) 'is a very common word among the Dutch; it is generally the first word one hears when one lands any where in their country [...]' (Bruckner 1790:67).

important service. For though you have not been allowed to proceed far in this career without frequent mistakes, yet your progress through it has been sufficiently marked with success to put others upon making some further discoveries (Bruckner 1790:78-79; emphasis added).

Horne Tooke was definitely not amused. As he saw it, Bruckner's essay contained many a 'willful falsehood'. Quoting extensively from Schultens's work Horne Tooke, 'a natural rebel' (Robins 1969:155), sought to invalidate Bruckner's interpretation of Schultens's work (Horne Tooke 1840:82 sqq., 129 sqq.).

Aarsleff (1967:61 n.37) concedes that Horne Tooke might well have been influenced by Schultens, although he emphasizes 'that the differences are too many to involve simple influence'. Without going further into the matter he referred to another author, James Bonar, who maintained that as far as Horne Tooke's derivation of the particles was concerned,³ Horne Tooke was 'not the first who struck into that path, similar views having previously been entertained, though probably unknown to him, by the Dutch etymologists Schultens, Hemsterhuis, and Lennep' (cf. Aarsleff 1967:62 n.37).⁴ Although I do not believe that Schultens was really that obscure in England at the time, I will not go into that matter now. The question I would like conclude with is whether Henry Sweet was enough of a linguistic historiographer to be acquainted with Cassander's criticism, and if so, why he kept a *silentium doctum* with regard to Albert Schultens.

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⁴ Note that the classical scholar Johannes Daniel van Lennep (1724-1771) was a fellow-student of Bruckner's at Franeker. It was argued by Samuel Coleridge (1772-1834) that '[a]ll that is true in his [sc. Horne Tooke's] book is taken from Lennep, who gave it so much as it was worth, and pretended not to make a system of it' (7 May 1830; Coleridge 1990:118). Aarsleff (1967:61) deems this view to be 'hardly correct', arguing that 'the main statement of van Lennep's doctrine' was published only in 1790 by Everardus Scheidius. However, as I have been able to establish, van Lennep's book on 'analogia' was for sale at Elmsley's in London as early as 1778.

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The Emergence of the Subject

0 Introduction

Following Karl Marx (*Grundrisse*) and Jørgen Døør (1973:45), one can distinguish between a phenomenon's *genetic* and *constitutive* conditions.¹ The *genetic conditions* are the conditions under which the phenomenon is produced, and the *constitutive conditions* are the conditions under which the phenomenon is re-produced. Historical studies, including the study of the history of linguistic ideas, have both as object, since it is equally important to ask how and why a given phenomenon has arisen, as to ask how it is/has remained, i.e. why it has not disappeared. However, the trend within the history of linguistics tends to focus on the genetic conditions.

In this paper I will follow this trend and investigate the genetic condition for the emergence of the *subject* notion in modern European grammar. The subject notion, as a theoretical term in modern linguistics, is the object of my Ph.D. thesis and the whole investigation of as well the genetic as the constitutive conditions will later appear as Steffensen *forthcoming b*.

I sketch four phases in the development of the subject notion. I will explain these four phases with reference to the following theoretical positions:

- Aristotle: *Categoriae* (ca 350 BC)
- Antoine Arnauld & Claude Lancelot : *Grammaire générale et raisonnée de Port-Royal* (1662)
- Jens Høysgaard: *Accentuered og raisonnered Grammatica*² (1747) and *Methodisk Forsøg til en Fuldstændig Dansk Syntax*³ (1752).

One shall not be confused by the fact that the *genetic* conditions are described through a period that spans more than two millennia. The reason is that I describe the genetic conditions of the *modern linguistic subject*—rather than the *subject* in logic, philosophy, psychology, etc.—and as we shall see, this is not fully implemented until the middle of the 18th century, although the first birth pangs took place in Athens in the fourth century BC. Surely this investigation will then include some of the constitutive conditions for e.g. the logical subject, but one shall also not be confused by the fact that a genetic condition of one phenomenon—or indeed the phenomenon itself—at the same time can be a constitutive condition of another phenomenon.

¹ This paper is a revised version of my paper given at the 20th Annual Colloquium of the Henry Sweet Society for the History of Linguistic Ideas, held in August 2003 at Trinity College, Dublin.

² *Accentuated and reasoned Grammar*.

³ *Methodical Attempt at a Complete Danish Syntax*.

The four phases according to which I describe the development of the subject notion (in sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively) can be summarised as follows:

- *A Depersonalisation Phase.* Aristotle uses *subject* (or *hypokeimenon* in Greek) to refer to the object of the epistemological process, i.e. the process in which an epistemological subject, e.g. a human being, perceives or conceives, senses or knows, an epistemological object, i.e. that which is sensed by the epistemological subject. An implication of Aristotle's focus on the epistemological object is a neglect of the epistemological subject. Thus, Aristotelian epistemology implies a fundamental break with the pre-Socratic person-dependent logic. Aristotle fixes the relation between the epistemological object (the *hypokeimenon* or *subject*) and its properties as existing *per se*, and he presupposes that there is only one way for the subject to sense an epistemological object, wherefore the *differentiae* of the epistemological subjects can be ignored.
- *A Textualisation Phase.* In the centuries following Aristotle—and maybe initiated by Aristotle himself—the *subject* is reinterpreted as referring, *not* to the epistemological object, but to the *textual expression* for the epistemological object. This reinterpretation coincides with the growing importance of formal logic, i.e. Aristotelian logic. The textual expression for the epistemological object typically appears in the initial position of a categorical proposition, e.g. *all men are mortal*. In this example *all men*, or sometimes only *men*, is said to be the *subject* of the proposition, while *are mortal*, or *mortal*, is said to be the predicate.
- *A Dualist Phase.* I regard two kinds of dualism to be important in this phase: (i) in Cartesian philosophy, there is a dualism between *res extensa* and *res cogitans*. Language is seen as the representation of *res extensa* in the *res cogitans*, i.e. it is a *medium rerum*; (ii) in Ramistic logic, there is a dualism between logic and rhetoric. Grammar is treated as a part of logic, i.e. it is universal and usage-independent (unlike in the pre-Ramistic humanist tradition). The *Port-Royal grammarians*, Arnauld & Lancelot, carry on both dualistic traditions. In their grammar from 1660 they treat grammar in terms of logic, and the *subject* (or *sujet*) is transferred from logic to grammar, where it is treated as identical with the nominative case of Latin grammar. At the same time, the subject in Aristotelian logic is hypostasised as necessarily being a grammatical subject.
- *A Segregation Phase.* The segregation phase takes place in the century following the Port-Royal grammar. It implies a segregation of grammar and logic, so that logic continues along the Aristotelian-Cartesian lines, while grammar is treated as a formalised syntactic system (with or without semantic implications). With e.g. the Danish grammarian *Jens Høysgaard* the subject (or *subjectum*) becomes a constant and formally definable sentential unit.

In the final section 5 I sum up the results of the historical investigation by outlining three characteristics of the modern subject notion. These three characteristics are central in my critique of the theoretical use of the subject notion in modern linguistics. This critique together with a theoretical alternative will also be sketched in this section. I do this to underline the fact that *history* implies a relation between a historian and the historical object in a social context. The purport of the historical analysis is thus related to the social context in which history is written; for this reason one, including myself, must be able to answer the question, *why* and to *whom* the historical analysis is important in a modern context.

1. The Depersonalisation Phase

1.1. The Elimination of Topos in Aristotelian Logic

An appropriate place to start this account for the genetic conditions for the subject notion is *Aristotle*. He did not himself use the word *subject* of course, but *subject*, or *subiectum*, is Boethius's translation of Aristotle's concept *hypokeimenon*. Boethius (AD 480-526) used *subiectum* to refer to the difference between substance and accident: "substantia enim in subiecto non est" (quoted after Ritter & Gründer 1971-2001, vol 10:374). As we shall see later, this definition is in its essence Aristotelian, and it makes good sense to start with an analysis of the Aristotelian *hypokeimenon*.

On the last pages of his *De sophisticis elenchis* Aristotle writes about his logical method that it is unlike those sciences that have grown forward in the past:

Of this inquiry, on the other hand, it was not the case that part of the work had been thoroughly done before, while part had not. Nothing existed at all. (Aristotle, *SE* 34, 183b)⁴

In a certain sense it is surely true that before Aristotle there were no scientific methods as we know them today. But since Aristotle was neither the first man on earth nor in Athens, *something* must have existed in advance. One example of pre-Aristotelian logic is the fragment called *Dissoi Logoi* from the end of the fifth or the beginning of the fourth century BC (W. & M. Kneale 1962:16). In order to really understand the revolutionary effort made by Aristotle in his logical treatises, it is worth comparing with the Kneales' description of the *Dissoi logoi*:

[*Dissoi logoi*'s] author seems to be arguing that it is possible not only to make contradictory statements (*antilegein*) but even to maintain in a

⁴ All quotations from Aristotle refer to Aristotle [1928]. I use the traditional abbreviations of the titles of Aristotle's work, cf. the list in Barnes (1995:xxiii).

variety of contexts two plausible theses which contradict each other. [...] Of special interest is the fourth antinomy in which the writer shows that it is possible to uphold either side of a contradiction about true and false discourse. In the thesis he tries to prove that true and false discourse are identical by quoting the example of a verbal form, e.g. 'I am an initiate', which is true when spoken by A but false when spoken by B. It is possible, however, to draw from this argument the conclusion that it is not the verbal expression (the sentence) which can properly be called true or false. These predicates must be applied to what is expressed by the sentence, i.e. the statement or proposition. (W. & M. Kneale 1962:16)

The Knealean interpretation is essentially Aristotelian with its distinction between (inner) propositional meaning and (outer) sentential expression.⁵ But Kneales' conclusion is not the only possible conclusion; we might as well state that the *Dissoi logoi* demonstrates the necessity of a *contextual* or *topical* interpretation of discourse: logic is not a meta-discursive structure being constant through different speech events or thought events. Logic depends on *who* talks to *whom*, about *what*, *where*, *when* and *why*.

What Aristotle did, i.e. the reason why he can say about himself that before him "nothing existed at all", is that he executed the *decontextualisation of science*—with Aristotle science became *atopical*. It ceased to matter *who* the scientist was, because all scientists were obliged to follow the same logical rules of deduction; hence, two scientists would get to the same result. One might even state, that it was not the *scientists* who did the reasoning; it was reason herself who reasoned.

1.2. Literacy: The Background of Aristotelian Logic

What caused this development? We cannot just explain the rise of modern logic with a reference to the genius of Plato and Aristotle, for surely there is a multitude of economical, political and cultural causes. I will mention only one, namely a change in the *paideia* (cf. Jaeger 1946-47), i.e. the educational climate, of Greece in the fifth century BC, namely the social diffusion of literacy.⁶ Literacy pervades Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy as a metaphorical basis for understanding the world.⁷ Two examples will suffice:

⁵ In modern linguistics this is reflected in the semantic trinity of *utterance*, *sentence* and *proposition* (cf. Hurford & Heasley 1983:15ff.), where Kneales' *sentence* corresponds to Hurford & Heasley's *utterance*.

⁶ Admittedly, studies of literacy, especially within the "autonomy school" of Havelock, Ong and Goody, have had a tendency to overemphasise the import of writing. But that should not lead one to deny the social implications of medium changes. I think Keith Hoskin (1990) is on sound ground when he transcends the idealist literacy-mentality model in favour of a model with four poles: (i) literacy *per se*, (ii) the educational praxis of teaching/learning literacy, (iii) the Foucaultian concept of *power of knowledge* and (iv) the sociocultural environment. Especially the second point is important to Hoskin.

⁷ I think Robins is wrong when he writes that *stoicheia*, which was Apollonius's term for the letters (*grammata*), was "a term already in use for the ultimate constituents of the physical

Just as in learning to read, we were satisfied when we knew the letters of the alphabet [...] in all their recurring sizes and combinations [...] not thinking ourselves perfect in the art of reading until we recognize them wherever they are found [...] so neither we nor our guardians can ever become 'musical' until we know the essential Forms of temperance, courage, and their kindred, as well as their opposites, in all their combinations and can recognize them and their images wherever they are found, whether in small form or large. (Plato, *The Republic*, quoted after Hoskin 1993:41)

What it [the soul] thinks must be in it just as characters may be said to be on a writing-tablet on which as yet nothing actually stands written: this is exactly what happens with mind. (Aristotle *An* 431B; quoted after Werry 2002:209)

The widespread ability of reading in writing is less than a century old when Aristotle starts philosophising. As Havelock states:

Organized instruction in reading at the primary level, that is before the age of ten, cannot have been introduced into the Athenian schools much earlier than about 430 BC. (Havelock 1982:187)

So what really makes the Platonic-Aristotelian era remarkable is that it *as the first in the Western history* is characterised by a widespread literacy. I agree with Hoskin when he states that the crucial point is not the medium *per se*, but rather how it was taught in school. I quote Hoskin:

It was the ultimate meaningless but analytically rigorous technique, and as such a total break with the whole structure of elite learning before this. It began by teaching the letters in alphabetic order, both forwards and backwards, then proceeded to demand that the learner theoretically learn every conceivable two-letter and three-letter syllabic combination in the language (in English, from BA to ZY and BAB to ZYZ). Only when there was perfect recognition of every syllabic combination did one move on to the level of the individual word. And lack of meaning continued to be a virtue. Thus learners were given long tongue-twisting combinations of nonsense-syllables known as 'bridles' (*chalinoi*), plus long esoteric rare words to decipher. Then, finally, learners progressed to reading words in context as phrases and sentences. (Hoskin 1993:38)⁸

world" (Robins 1990:37). Robins refers to Plato's *Theaetetus* and to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, but he seems to forget that they formed their thinking about the physical world according to the ideological basis of their educational praxis. So rather the *stoicheia* was "a term already in use for the ultimate constituents of the written word."

⁸ How the pupils experienced this pedagogy can for instance be seen in Plato's dialogue *Theaetetus*, l. 206A and on.

For the pupils, Hoskin adds, this way of learning literacy “structured the way they learned” (ibid.). And with this vital inclusion of the pedagogical praxis we can conclude that literacy did form the way of thinking. This educational praxis also formed Aristotle’s thinking on logic. The very concept of empty logical structures in different syllogistic combinations corresponds to the syllabic method of learning to read, mentioned by Hoskin. Even the names of the parts of the syllogisms, A, B and C, are formed in agreement with alphabetic thinking.

1.3. *The Elimination of Subject in Aristotelian Epistemology*

Aristotle’s *decontextualisation strategy* had a number of implications. First of all it led to a dualism between *logic* and *rhetoric*, rhetoric being the science of language in use for certain ends, logic being the science of universal mental—and/or linguistic—structures, independent of content and person. When Aristotle in the *Rhetorica* states that “I call the enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and the example a rhetorical induction” (Aristotle *Rhet* 1356b), he obviously understands the rhetorical figures as special instances of general logical figures; i.e. logic is the common *atopical* or *supratopical* structure, rhetoric the use of this structure for certain topical purposes.

Secondly, it led to a dualism between the *epistemological subject*⁹ and the *epistemological object*, i.e. between the *knower* and the *known*. Just like the text in school seemed to exist in advance of anybody reading it, so the epistemological objects seemed to exist in advance of anybody perceiving them. And just like it really did not matter *who* read the text, so it did not seem to matter *who* knew, i.e. *who* the epistemological subject was. Hence, *knowledge became an aspect of the epistemological objects themselves*.

This change in epistemology is in my view the basis for the whole of Aristotle’s scientific programme, and thus for the Western sciences until our time, since it did not just affect how we perceived the world around us, but more fundamentally how we perceived ourselves: the Aristotelian personality ceased to matter or make a difference, since the individual differences were interpreted as obstacles in the quest for true objective knowledge. Grammatically, the consequence of this development is a syntactic dislocation where the epistemological object is displaced from grammatical object to grammatical subject. The grammar of the historical development of epistemology thus is as described in Figure 1:

⁹ I use the term *epistemological subject* to refer to the sensor or knower, prototypically the human being sensing the world. This does *not* correspond to the *hypokeimenon* which in Aristotle’s epistemology corresponds to a prominently sensed entity in the world and which corresponds to what I term the epistemological object.

Pre-Aristotelian epistemology:	A perceives S as X'; B perceives S as X''
Proto-Aristotelian epistemology:	Everybody perceives S as X' and/or X''
Aristotelian epistemology:	S is X

Figure 1. *The Grammar of the Historical Development of Epistemology*

Thus, one consequence of the segregation between the epistemological subject and object is that the object becomes the *prominent part* of the epistemological process. But this does not mean that the subject-object distinction disappears from Aristotelian epistemology, since it must be a common sense assumption that in order to perceive it is necessary that there is a perceiver; but the perceiver changes status from an explicit quality of the epistemological process to an implicit quality. The question thus is: *How is the epistemological subject implicitly preserved in Aristotelian epistemology?*

The prime method is the above mentioned *depersonalisation* of the epistemological process where the *differentiae* of the epistemological subjects are being wiped out. This *epistemological depersonalisation* has two aspects: (i) language is transferred from the sphere of the subject to the sphere of the object, so that a subject-independent *linguistic isomorphism* arises in which the structure of language (the medium) is correlated with the structure of the known (the object). And (ii) the *relational* attributes of the epistemological process are being *reified* as *intrinsic*, i.e. subject-independent, attributes of the epistemological object. The *isomorphism* will be discussed below, the *reified relations* in section 1.4.

The *linguistic medium-object isomorphism* is a pervasive aspect of Aristotelian philosophy. I doubt that the cause of this can be reduced to mere opaqueness from Aristotle's side, as e.g. the Kneales do when they state about *Categoriae*:

In the first place it is unclear whether Aristotle is classifying symbols or what they symbolize, words or, in a very wide sense, things. (W. & M. Kneale 1962:25)

They seem to misunderstand the purpose of the first chapter, which, admittedly, seems to be out of context—maybe due to Andronicus, the compiler of the Aristotelian *oeuvre*. The Kneales comprise the whole of this chapter in the following adverbial construction: "After drawing a distinction between homonyms, synonyms, and paronyms, [...]" (ibid.). But what Aristotle does is clearly to distinguish between words and things:

Things are said to be *named* 'equivocally' when, though they have a common name, the *definition* corresponding with the name differs for each. [...] *things* are said to be *named* 'univocally' which have both the

name and the *definition* answering to the name in common. (Aristotle *Cat* 1, 1a; emphasis added)

This paragraph only makes sense if Aristotle clearly distinguishes between things, the words referring to these and the definition of these words. What might have misled the Kneales to their interpretation is the fact that *for practical epistemological reasons* this distinction only plays a minor role in Aristotelian philosophy. The reason for this is that—since (i) “symbols” belong to the Aristotelian medium, (ii) “things” to the Aristotelian object, and (iii) there is a medium-object isomorphism—then the classification of symbols and of things will be structurally identical in Aristotelian epistemology. Hence, for classificatory ends one can equate the structure of symbols and the structure of things, as long as one maintains the ontological distinction.

1.4. Hypokeimenon: The Aristotelian Subject

The *reified relational attributes*, or the “Expressions which are in no way composite” (Aristotle *Cat* 1b), are divided by Aristotle into ten *categories*: “substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, or affection” (*ibid.*).¹⁰ All the Aristotelian categories express relational attributes, but to Aristotle there is a fundamental epistemological difference between substance (or essence or *ousia*) on the one hand, and the other nine on the other.¹¹ An analysis of this distinction reveals the nature of Aristotle’s concept of *hypokeimenon*.

In order to substantiate the theoretical distinction between (primary) substance and everything else, Aristotle introduces the notion of the *subject* into the epistemological process. Thus, Aristotle makes a twofold distinction of things¹² according to the way they relate (note the reified terminology) to the subject. The first criterion is whether they are “present in a subject” (Aristotle *Cat* 2, 1a-1b) or not; the second criterion is whether they are “predicable of a subject” (*ibid.*) or not. This gives life to the matrix of Aristotelian epistemological ontology in Figure 2:

¹⁰ The categories are here stated as in Edghill’s English translation; Pickard-Cambridge translates (in *Topica*) the categories into: “Essence, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place, Time, Position, State, Activity, Passivity” (Aristotle *Top* 103b). Strangely, in the analytical table of contents chapter four of *Categoriae* is named “The *eight* categories of the objects of thought” (emphasis added).

¹¹ This distinction is presented in chapter 2; *ousia* is explained in chapter 5 and the nine other categories in chapter 6-9.

¹² I use the word *thing* in the widest sense of the word—just as Aristotle does.

“Things...”	Not present in a subject	Present in a subject
Not predicable of a subject	<i>Primary substances</i> The individual man or the individual horse	<i>Individual attribut-units</i> Point of grammatical knowledge: present in the mind Whiteness: present in the body
Predicable of a subject	<i>Secondary substances</i> ‘Man’ The species ‘man’ The genus ‘animal’ All predicable of the individual man	<i>Predicates</i> ‘Knowledge’: present in human mind, predicable of grammar ‘White’: present in human mind, predicable of white body

Figure 2. A Matrix of Aristotle’s Epistemological Ontology¹³

The matrix clearly demonstrates that Aristotle’s *epistemological depersonalisation* presupposes the *hypokeimenon* notion, i.e. the Aristotelian subject. However, it is worth noting that Aristotle does not introduce subject/hypokeimenon as a technical term with a concise definition. Thus the very first time we see the notion is 20 lines into the *Categoriae*:

Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are never present in a subject. (Aristotle *Cat* 2, 1a)

This indicates that the term, in a non-technical sense, must have been well-known to a contemporary literate Greek. According to Liddell & Scott’s *Greek-English Lexicon* (the revised 1996 edition), the initial non-technical sense of *hypokeimai* (i.e. the verb from which the particle *hypokeimenon* is derived) is to *lie under* or to *lie close to*.¹⁴ And actually Aristotle uses this very verb to indicate the relation between the primary substance and everything else:

Moreover, primary substances are most properly called substances in virtue of the fact that they are the entities which *underlie* everything else, and that everything else is either predicated of them or present in them. [...] Further, primary substances are most properly so called, because

¹³ In the matrix we see again Aristotle’s distinction between things (‘non-predicables’) and words (‘predicables’) and his presupposition of a 1:1 relation between the two (i.e. the medium-object isomorphism). Furthermore, we see the (reified) attributes of these, divided into the *ousia* of the substance and the individual property-units, i.e. Aristotle’s nine other categories.

¹⁴ For instance in Aristotle’s *Progression of Animals*: “Further, since the bird is a biped and not erect, and the front parts of its body are lighter, it is either necessary (or at any rate more desirable), in order to enable it to stand, that the thigh should be placed, as it actually is, underneath [*hypokeimenon*], by which I mean growing towards the hinder part.” (*IA* XV, 712^b32).

they *underlie* and are the *subjects* of everything else. (Aristotle *Cat* 5, 2b; emphasis added)¹⁵

In this quotation Aristotle equates the subject and primary substance. But primary substance is, as we saw, defined as *not* being present in a subject and as not being predicable of a subject. Thus, the Aristotelian subject is characterised by (i) not being present in (another) subject, and by (ii) not being predicable of (another) subject.

The second point merely means that the Aristotelian subject cannot be a *word*, since words *per se* are predicables, since they by nature can be predicated of their referent. Nowhere does Aristotle thus use *hypokeimenon* as a reference to a *linguistic* entity, e.g. a sentence member.¹⁶

What the first point means is explained to us by Aristotle himself:

By being 'present in a subject' I do not mean present as parts are present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from the said subject. (Aristotle *Cat* 2, 1a)

Since the mode of existence of primary substances, and thereby of subjects, is that they are *not* present in a subject, then the subject is per definition *capable* "of existence apart from the said [i.e. another] subject". What Aristotle actually does here is to characterise the subject as a thing (not a word) which exists as a *relatively autonomous whole* or with a modern term as a *gestalt* (or in cognitive terms: *Basic Level Categories*, cf. Ungerer & Schmid 1996:98):

to speak more generally, that which is *individual* and has the character of a *unit* is never predicable of a subject. (Aristotle *Cat* 2; emphasis added)

What Aristotle achieves with his substitution of the epistemological subject with the *hypokeimenon* gestalt is a neat answer to the grand philosophical question of the pre-Socratic philosophers: Is the world essentially changing (Heraclitus) or essentially stable (Parmenides)? Our perception of the *hypokeimenon* gestalt makes us able to recognize a fundamental *sameness* in an

¹⁵ Thus: "Everything except primary substances is either predicable of a primary substance or present in a primary substance" (Aristotle *Cat* 5, 2a).

¹⁶ There is an apparent exception in *De interpretatione*: "An affirmation is the statement of a fact with regard to a subject, and this subject is either a noun or that which has no name; the subject and predicate in an affirmation must each denote a single thing" (*Int* 10, 19b). If this is truly an Aristotelian statement about subject and predicate, i.e. *hypokeimenon* and *katêgoria*, then it will surely falsify my interpretation of Aristotle. Luckily it is not! The Greek text runs:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔστι τι κατὰ τινὸς ἢ κατὰ φάσις σημαίνουσα, τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἡ ὄνομα ἢ ἄνώνυμον, ἐν δὲ δεῖ εἶναι καὶ καθ' ἑνὸς τὸ ἐν τῇ καταφάσει (Aristotele [1949] *Int* 10, 19b 5-7).

E.M. Edghill, the English translator, thus seems to make use of specialised English terms even in the translation of non-specialised Greek terms.

ever-changing object, i.e. without relying on an unchangeable Platonic idea of the object.

But sadly, Aristotle's break from the Platonic ideas became a break from everything *beyond* the objects themselves, and this included a neglect of the epistemological subject. Therefore he does not recognize that the gestalt nature of the epistemological process is not due to the epistemological objects but to the epistemological subject—the ability to perceive sameness-through-change does not depend on what we perceive but on our gestalt perception. I term this fallacy *the Aristotelian Gestalt Fallacy*.

Aristotle's subject-independent epistemology became Western epistemology for centuries and millennia. But the gestalt attributes of Aristotle's *hypokeimenon* soon became ignored and the attention of Western philosophers has been focused on the epistemological object and on the Aristotelian categories which explicitly deals with the attributes of the object. Only recently, in the second generation of cognitive grammar, has the gestalt reappeared, but now as an aspect of the epistemological subject's perception. This is for instance indicated by Lakoff & Johnson's term for their philosophical position: *experientialism* (1980).

2. *The Textualisation Phase*

In the first section of this essay I have presented the idea that the subject notion is rooted in Aristotelian epistemology and that—for that reason—*every theory of the subject implicitly is an epistemological theory*. Before I in the third section demonstrate how this has influenced renaissance grammar, I will very roughly sketch how the subject notion was transformed from an epistemological notion into a logical notion. I thus postulate that on the turn from epistemology to logic, a *textualisation* took place. It happened later than Aristotle and probably earlier than Boethius, but the exact chronology of this process is a matter of further research. The textualisation process implied a reinterpretation of the Aristotelian subject, so that it referred to the textual expression for the *hypokeimenon*, rather than the *hypokeimenon* itself. The subject of European logic is thus a textual unit rather than a "real" unit. Roughly, the process can be reconstructed as follows.

Aristotle treats his categories of *Categoriae* as (i) a set of (primary) substances from which any given subject can be chosen, and (ii) as a set of attributes expressed by the nine unsubstantial categories. These two sets exist inseparably, since the latter is *present in*, i.e. "incapable of existence apart from," the former. But in order to linguistically express this relation, it is necessary to actually separate the two sets, so as to combine them syntagmatically in a proposition:

A simple proposition is a statement, with meaning, as to the presence of something in a subject or its absence, in the present, past, or future, according to the divisions of time. (Aristotle *Int* 5, 17a)

Here, clearly, *subject* refers to the epistemological object, *not* to the propositional (i.e. symbolic) part referring to this. Similarly, the *something* is an attribute of the subject, not a predicate referring to this attribute. This combination of subject and attribute is *not* a proposition; the proposition is, on the contrary, a *statement* made in order to linguistically express this subject-attribute relation.

Actually, *De interpretatione* can be interpreted as Aristotle's attempt to make a universal interpretational relation between, on the one hand, any given proposition (with a subject-reference and a attribute-reference) and, on the other hand, the subject, the attribute and the subject-attribute relation. Of course this relies heavily on the medium-object isomorphism discussed in 1.3. This observation is quite important since it leads to the conclusion that what Aristotle first and foremost was occupied with was not logic *per se* but his physical and social surroundings.

This picture changes radically in his posterity. Logic became an independent discipline within the sciences, and thus Aristotle was re-interpreted in a way so that his treatises were read as *propositional logic per se* and *environmental logic for particular ends*. *Aristotelian logic was textualised*, partly as a consequence of his own medium-object isomorphism, partly because of a need in the posterity to implement a division of labour between, in the first place, science and production and later on, within the sciences, between pure universal science (theory) and dirty applied science (praxis). This division of labour can be observed within every discipline, cf. theoretical/applied linguistics, physics, etc. Philosophically these divisions of labour were expressed in the Cartesian dualism between *res cogitans* and *res extensa*.

Another consequence was, as mentioned, that the notion of the *subject* was re-interpreted to refer to the propositional entity referring to a thing rather than the thing itself. The exact chronology of this development is a matter for further investigation, but it is fully implemented when Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole publish their *La logique ou l'art de penser* in 1662. Hence they write:

Ce jugement s'appelle aussi *proposition*, & il est aisé de voir qu'elle doit avoir deux termes: l'un, de qui l'on affirme, ou de qui l'on nie, lequel on appelle *sujet*; & l'autre que l'on affirme, ou que l'on nie, lequel s'appelle *attribut* ou *praedicatum*. (Arnauld & Nicole 1662/1970:156)

I quote this rather than some of the earlier expositions where the same manner of thought can be found because it was the logic of Arnauld & Nicole that was transformed into the grammar of Arnauld & Lancelot. This interpretation of the subject notion seems to be quite universal within logic, and even such a wonderful philosopher as Peter Thomas Geach interprets the subject and the predicate along these lines:

the name “Peter”, not the Apostle, is the subject of “Peter was an Apostle”, and not the property of being an Apostle but its verbal expression is a predicate. (Geach 1962:22)

And to end where we started, in *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle*, the father of Western philosophy is interpreted as having placed the *subject* and the *predicate* in the proposition:

Aristotle thus takes any assertion to consist of two parts: a *predicate*, which is either affirmed or denied of something, and a *subject*, of which the predicate is affirmed or denied. (Smith 1995:33)

Western formal logic thus rests on a textualisation, i.e. a symbolic transformation, of Aristotle’s decontextualised logic and depersonalised epistemology. Aristotle’s presupposition of a medium-object isomorphism becomes a pitfall for his posterity. Language is reified as an autonomous system placed between *res extensa* and *res cogitans* and functioning as a *medium rerum*, i.e. as the transparent “translation” of an outer reality into the epistemological subject’s mind: language is, so to speak, the representation of the *res extensa* in the *res cogitans*.

3. The Dualist Phase

3.1. Renaissance and Rationality

It is a part of the Aristotelian heritage that language, *the word*, for 25 centuries has been treated in three separate disciplines: *grammar*, *logic* and *rhetoric*. These three disciplines have from ancient times been the cornerstones of the so-called “seven liberal arts” and since Boethius they have been termed *trivium* (the remaining four arts—music, arithmetic, geometry and astronomy—were grouped together as the *quadrivium*, cf. Robins 1990:78).

We have already seen that Aristotle separated logic and rhetoric along similar lines as Saussure separated *langue* and *parole* (Saussure 1916/1972, cf. Steffensen 2000). But Aristotle, according to R.H. Robins, did not do any work within grammar:

up to and including the time of Plato and Aristotle the word [*grammatikós* (γράμματικός)] meant simply one who could read and write, and *téchne grammatiké* (τέχνη γραμματική) was the skill of reading and writing. (Robins 1990:16)

Plato and Aristotle make scattered references to grammar, but do not deal with it consecutively or as a specific topic. (Robins 1990:30)

In the first centuries of the *trivium* the teaching in grammar had the purpose of enabling the students to read and write the scientific *lingua franca* of the time,

Latin. This was not a mother tongue language, and therefore the first Latin grammars had a didactic purpose. So when grammar became a scientific discipline with purposes beyond language teaching, it had to be re-orientated towards other language approaches than the didactic. At disposal were the two fellow *trivium* disciplines, i.e. Aristotelian logic and rhetoric. And ever since the segregation of these two disciplines (cf. 1.1.), they have been at war to dominate grammar and literacy:

The war between these literary camps is basically the opposition between dialectics [i.e. logic] and rhetoric to control the modes of literary composition; and the ramifications of this opposition stretch into the realms of ethics and politics, both in antiquity and in the Renaissance. (Marshall McLuhan; quoted in Kuhns [1996])¹⁷

The two camps mentioned by McLuhan are (i) the *logical-rational* tradition from Socrates, Plato and Aristotle to the Renaissance thinkers such as Peter Ramus, Gabriel Harvey and, I add, Descartes and the Port-Royal school; and (ii) the *analogical* tradition from the pre-Socratics, via Cicero to Augustine and Thomas Nashe.¹⁸ The *analogy* of the latter is between eloquence (speech) and wisdom (thought):

In the beginning [...] was the Logos, in which all knowledge, scientific and humanistic, is contained. There, eloquence and wisdom are identical, and all knowledge is unified in the tangible equations of the spoken and the known. The heart and mind of man had, so to speak, an Eden of one selfsame and encyclopedic knowledge. (Kuhns [1996])

From the early days of the *trivium* to the middle of the 16th century, grammar was caught in the field of fire between logic and rhetoric. This situation only changed with the advent of *Pierre de la Ramée* (alias Peter Ramus (1515-1572)).¹⁹ With him the relation between logic and rhetoric was profoundly changed:

¹⁷ The quotation is from Marshall McLuhan's Ph.D.-thesis, "The Place of Thomas Nashe in the Learning of His Time." The thesis investigates the history of the *trivium*. It has never been published, so my source to it is Kuhns [1996].

¹⁸ McLuhan's historic understanding of the development of the *trivium*, and of science in general, is amusingly contradictory to the standard histories, according to which the two peaks of enlightenment were achieved by the Greek trio and the Renaissance thinkers. The background for McLuhan's inversion of history is a re-interpretation of truth and of scientific method: "Truth to the analogist, he [McLuhan] said, is a creative act: 'a ratio between the mind and things, made by the shaping imagination.' Truth to the logician is mere 'mechanical matching' of object with object. To the analogist the world is invention itself, what McLuhan in his later shorthand would abbreviate to percept. The logician by contrast will flatten, fix, nail down every percept into what McLuhan would call concept" (Kuhns [1996]).

¹⁹ For an exposition of Peter Ramus, see Padley (1976:77-96).

Ramus, in his search for criteria in delimiting the boundaries of each art or science, seeks above all to keep these two apart, to ensure that what was taught in rhetoric is not repeated in logic, and vice-versa. [...] Ciceronian rhetoric as commonly practised had consisted of the five operations invention (i.e. discovery of the subject matter), arrangement, style, memory and delivery. Invention and arrangement were also traditional operations of logic, but with Ramus' insistence on no two arts teaching the same body of knowledge, and the consequent confinement of these two topics to logic, rhetoric tended to be limited to style and delivery. (Padley 1976:79f.)

Post-ramistic Rhetoric was thus preoccupied with the "advertising and propaganda" disciplines style, memory and delivery: how well is a message delivered, i.e. to which degree does it change the audience's attitudes and actions, e.g. in relation to buying and voting. Rhetoric had lost its umbilical cord to the ontological and ethical dimension of *inventio* where the subjects and objects, and methods and goals, of scientific investigation were determined.²⁰ But due to the Aristotelian heritage, according to which logic is orientated towards universal and general structures, and not local and particular subject, object, methods and goals, these dimensions were, paradoxically, not included in post-Ramistic logic either.

When the front between logic and rhetoric moved in favour of the former, grammar was irreversibly caught by the logic of logic—grammar, too, became preoccupied with universal and general structures. To begin with, this was instantiated by the three major rational grammarians in the 16th century: Scaliger (*De causis linguae Latinae*, 1540), Ramus (*Grammatica* 1559) and Sanctius (*Minerva, seu de causis linguae latinae*, 1587). All of these works, and especially Sanctius's, were very influential on the "crown jewel of rationalist grammar": Antoine Arnauld & Claude Lancelot's *Grammaire générale et raisonnée de Port-Royal* from 1660. As a focal point of rationalist grammar I discuss this *oeuvre* in section 3.2.

3.2. *Port-Royal and the Subject in Universal Grammar*²¹

With Ramus grammar became logical, but it did not merely revert to traditional Aristotelian logic since the logic of the Renaissance was heavily influenced by Rationalism. Here we must remember that the *Grammaire générale et raisonnée de Port-Royal* (GGR) is the product of a unique cooperation between a linguist, Claude Lancelot, and a philosopher, Antoine Arnauld, at the Jansenist monastery, Port-Royal. Both were deeply influenced by the Rationalist movement, and the GGR has an explicitly Rational purpose since it is engaged in finding "les raisons de plusieurs choses qui sont ou communes à toutes les Langues, ou particulières à quelques-unes" (GGR:1). However, the

²⁰ Unfortunately this lingers on as a fatal crisis in modern rhetoric.

²¹ For a general discussion of the historical background of the Port Royal school or the Port Royal grammar, see Donzé (1967) and Wheeler (1993).

rationalisms of the two authors are not identical. Lancelot was deeply influenced by Sanctius (and through him Aristotle and Ramus); Arnauld was more influenced by Descartes's dualist Rationalism:²²

There can be no doubt as to the Cartesian influence on Arnauld's notions of method for the discovery and exposition of truth. [...] Arnauld unreservedly accepted the Cartesian division between mental substance and physical substance [i.e. *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, respectively]. [...] Arnauld, as well as Descartes, believed in the simplicity and indivisibility of the soul, which cannot be broken into smaller parts since it has no extension. (Wheeler 1993:116)

The Cartesian influence has as consequence that the notions of subject and predicate, *sujet* and *attribut*, are detached from their Aristotelian roots. Thus, in Cartesian philosophy only *res cogitans* has a gestalt quality, whereas *res extensa*, qua its definition as divisible, under no circumstances can be treated as a gestalt. And since Aristotle's epistemological object is a *res extensa* it cannot maintain its original gestalt quality.

Traditionally the alternative to *holism*, where an entity is perceived as gestalts, is *compositionality*, where an entity is perceived as the sum of its parts. Rationalist philosophy is thus based on a compositional interpretation of Aristotle, where Subject = Σ attribute₁+attribute₂+...+attribute_n. This changes the interpretation of the proposition, so that it is not interpreted as *describing* certain properties of the subject, but as *ascribing* certain properties to the subject. The original interpretation was an epistemological interpretation, while the compositional interpretation is an ontological interpretation. Hence, the Cartesian dualism between *res cogitans* and *res extensa* entails the idea of objectivism, i.e. as perceiving the world *as it is per se*.

This Cartesian turn of the subject-predicate logic is evident in GGR from the very first mention of the *sujet* and *attribut*. These are introduced in the "Chapitre premier" of the "Seconde partie" of the GGR:

Le jugement que nous faisons des choses, comme quand je dis *la terre est ronde*, s'appelle PROPOSITION; et ainsi toute proposition enferme nécessairement deux termes: l'un appelé *sujet*, qui est ce dont on affirme, comme *terre*; et l'autre *attribut*, qui est ce qu'on affirme, comme *ronde*; et de plus la liaison entre ces deux termes, *est*. (GGR:47)²³

²² It is frequently discussed to what degree the Port-Royal school was influenced by Cartesianism (and Jansenism). The discussion, though, is often misguided by an attempt to homogenise the school, and thereby the differences within the school have been ignored. For instance, Arnauld seems to have been much more influenced by Cartesianism than, for instance, Blaise Pascal who was almost hostile towards Descartes.

²³ It is worth noticing that the hidden agenda of the "la terre est ronde" example is to profess the Copernican view on the heliocentric nature of the universe. This is not just a *propositional* or *epistemological* act; Arnauld & Lancelot do not merely put forward a

The Aristotelian heritage, e.g. the *hypokeimenon-katêgoria* distinction, is obvious. But it soon becomes clear that the Aristotelian distinction between substance and property (accident) is removed from its central position:

Les objets de nos pensées sont ou les choses, comme *la terre, le soleil, le bois*, ce qu'on appelle ordinairement *substance*; ou la manière des choses, comme d'être *rond, d'être rouge, d'être dur, d'être savant* etc., ce qu'on appelle *accident*. (GGR:48)

Arnauld & Lancelot do not refer to the Aristotelian epistemological object *per se*, i.e. as a *res extensa*, on the contrary they only refer to it as an "objet de nos pensées", i.e. as an entity whose existence is justified *only* by its being at the disposal of the mind, *res cogitans*. The *terre* of rationalism is a referent of thought, whereas the Aristotelian *terre* is an entity in the world.

This distinction between referent-of-thought and entity-in-world gives rise to a confusing usage of the term *sujet* in GGR. Thus "les objets de nos pensées" can either be expressed as the propositional *sujet* or as the propositional *attribut*, which means that *objet* is the common category of *sujet* and *attribut*. These two are obviously *syntactic* categories.

But along with this usage coexists the traditional Aristotelian usage of *hypokeimenon/sujet*, i.e. as an entity-in-world, albeit in the radical dualist version as a *res extensa* versus a *res cogitans*. This is expressed in the distinction in chapter XVIII on "Des Verbes qu'on appelle Adjectifs; et de leurs différentes espèces, Actifs, Passifs, Neutres" (GGR:128):

On appelle proprement actifs, ceux qui signifient une action à laquelle est opposée une passion, comme, *battre, être battu; aimer, être aimé*; soit que ces actions se terminent à un sujet, ce qu'on appelle action réelle, comme *battre, rompre, tuer, noircir*, etc., soit qu'elles se terminent seulement à un objet, ce qu'on appelle action intentionnelle, comme, *aimer, connaître, voir*. (GGR:128f.)

Here *objet* signifies a referent-of-thought, i.e. the picture of *res extensa* in *res cogitans*, and *sujet* signifies the entity-in-world itself. Thus, *sujet* and *objet* are complementary categories which taken together make up the common category of *patients* (with a traditional grammatical term), i.e. entities which are goals of actions. This distinction is obviously a *semantic* distinction since it depends on the meaning of the verb describing the action implied.

In the GGR there thus seems to be two mutually exclusive and internally coherent ways of using the subject term, namely the *logical-syntactic* and the *ontological-semantic*. These analyses are sketched in Figure 3:

proposition to be either affirmed or denied, they make an *ontological* claim (cf. Steffensen forthcoming a): the property of being round is purported as a necessary, though not sufficient, *part* of the definition of the whole earth.

Examples	He	hits	me	She	loves	you
<i>Logical-syntactic</i>	<i>sujet</i>	<i>attribut</i>		<i>sujet</i>	<i>attribut</i>	
<i>Ontological-semantic</i>	[<i>sujet</i>]		<i>sujet</i>	[<i>sujet</i>]		<i>objet</i>

Figure 3. Two Port-Royal Analyses of two examples

At a first glance the logical-syntactic analysis is quite peculiar since there is no copula-verb (or *liaison*), *is*, which is a distinctive mark of the Aristotelian affirmation. But this is explained by an observation made by Aristotle:

to say 'man walks' is merely equivalent to saying 'man is walking'
(Aristotle *Int* 12, 21b)

This analysis is repeated by Arnauld & Lancelot:

Ils y ont joint celle de quelque attribut, de sorte qu'alors deux mots font une proposition, comme quand je dis : *Petrus vivit*, Pierre vit ; parce que le mot de *vivit* enferme seul l'affirmation, et de plus l'attribut d'être vivant ; et ainsi c'est la même chose de dire : *Pierre vit*, que de dire : *Pierre est vivant*. (GGR:110)

In the time after the publication of GGR the logical-syntactic analysis becomes the dominant one, and I see two main reasons for this. First of all it continues a *textual* tradition in which the use of the terms *sujet* and *attribut* are normally applied to the textual structure of the proposition, whereas the ontological-semantic distinction between *sujet* and *objet* is used to distinguish between physical and mental entities. To use *sujet* and *objet* to denote the textual expressions for physical and mental entities is thus only secondary, since it is derived from the ontological distinction.

The other reason for the preference of the logical-syntactic analysis is that GGR initiated a quest for *rationality* in grammar, and to be *raisonnée* is to be *générale*. Thus the Rational tradition naturally must prefer a more general syntactic analysis to a less general analysis. And since the classes of verbs denoting "action réelle" and "action intentionnelle" are more *special* than the *general* class of verbs denoting "action", so the ontological-semantic analysis will be less general than the logical-syntactic.

For these reasons the logical-syntactic analysis becomes the dominant one in posterity. This development of course has implications for the interpretation of the propositional subject as well as the propositional predicate. In relation to the subject, the logical-syntactic analysis implied that the propositional subject of the logical template was equated with the nominative of traditional grammatical analysis. This equation is not without problems, which I discuss in section 3.3.

In relation to the predicate, there is one major problem with the logical-syntactic analysis. Thus the binary distinction between subject and predicate opens no possibility to distinguish between the verbal (cf. the Aristotelian

rhema) and the nominal (cf. the Aristotelian *onoma*) element of the predicate, unlike in the ontological-semantic analysis. This problem is solved within a century. But since the solution implies a segregation of logic and grammar, I will describe it in relation to the segregation phase, i.e. in section 4.1.

3.3. *The Subject and the Nominative Case*

So far I have described this historical development as a unidirectional movement from epistemology to logic to grammar. But such developments are always bidirectional, or *dialectical*: surely Aristotelian epistemology frames the emerging logic, and surely logic frames the grammatical analysis. But at the same time, though to a less dominant degree, grammar changes logic and logic changes epistemology. An example of the latter is already mentioned in 1.3., where the development of logic transforms the pre-Aristotelian “subjective” epistemology into the “objective” epistemology underlying formal logic. Similarly grammar determines logic. This is especially obvious in the relation between the *subject* (an originally logical category) and the nominative case (a thoroughly grammatical category). This relation will be investigated below.

The dialectical relation between logic and grammar implies a conflation between the subject and the nominative, since in the Indo-European languages both nominal parts in a sentence of the type *X is Y* is in the nominative (*vir est animal, der Mann ist ein Tier*, etc.). Thus, the nominative part of a grammatical sentence is equated with the logical subject, and in the verbal expression of a logical proposition the logical subject is interpreted as necessarily being in the nominative case. In GGR this is expressed in the paragraph “Du Nominatif” (GGR:59) in the sixth chapter where the subject is explicitly said to be the part of the sentence in the nominative:

La simple position du nom s'appelle le *nominatif*, [...]. Son principal usage est d'être mis dans le discours avant tous les verbes, pour être le sujet de la proposition : *Dominus regit me, le Seigneur me conduit*; [...] (ibid.)

However, this equation of subject and the nominative case implies that there is one and only one logical analysis of a sentence in a natural case language. In Latin, the logical analysis of *puer amat puellam* is then that *puer* is subject and *amat puellam* predicate; it cannot be that *puer amat* is the predicate of *puellam*. But this analysis is not coherent. Thus the subject-nominative relation is not a part of the Aristotelian logic. On the contrary he states that “the premiss must be understood according to the case of the noun” (Aristotle *An.Pr* I 36, 48b). According to Geach the meaning of this is that “a logical subject need not be in the nominative case” (Geach 1962:28f.), and he concludes:

We must beware of supposing that a proposition admits of only one subject-predicate analysis. “Peter struck Malchus” is at once a predication about Peter and a (different) predication about Malchus; either “Peter” or “Malchus” may be taken as a logical subject [...] Logic

would be hopelessly crippled if the same proposition could never be analyzed in several different ways. (Geach 1962:28f.)

In "Peter struck Malchus" the predicate is "— struck Malchus" if we take "Peter" as the subject and "Peter struck —" if we take Malchus. (Geach 1962:30)

Hence, Geach reminds us that in Aristotelian logic the analyses in Figure 5 do not mutually exclude each other, and the one is in no way better or more natural than the other.

Examples	He	hits	me
	She	loves	you
	Peter	struck	Malchus
Analysis 1	<i>subject</i>	<i>predicate</i>	
Analysis 2	<i>predicate</i>		<i>subject</i>

Figure 4. Two Aristotelian analyses in Geach's interpretation

Most grammarians and logicians do only acknowledge Analysis 1, but in certain contexts we must make use of Analysis 2. If, for instance, someone told us that Peter struck Malchus and that Malchus is a dog, we of course know that Peter struck a dog. We know this because we know the syllogistic formula in the first figure: "A is B; B is C; therefore A is C." But this syllogistic reasoning is only possible if we accept Analysis 2! Hence, if we plot Analysis 2 into the syllogistic scheme (1) we get a result which is close to our intuitive understanding of what is going on between Peter and the poor creature (I mark the **subject** with **bold** and the *predicate* with *italics*):²⁴

²⁴ In the syllogisms below there are some problems with the copula entering and leaving the propositions. This is due to a notational problem in traditional logic, a subject discussed by C. Williamson in *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy* (1995), in the entry "logic, traditional." The problem pointed out by Williamson is one of syntax, since there are at least three ways of describing the syllogistic syntax, namely as consisting of two terms (subject and predicate), of three terms (subject, copula and predicate) or of four terms (quantifier, subject, copula and predicate). Williamson concludes: "The only analysis which is truly consistent with the traditional system is one in which propositions are treated as containing two distinct sorts of elements, but these are not subjects and predicates; they are logical constants and terms." Williamson's solution, though, presupposes a total abandonment of traditional logic. Another, solution, admittedly a formally unsatisfying one, is to accept a propositional syntax where a predicate can be of two forms: *bald* and *is bald*; similarly the subject can have two forms: *man* and *every man*. The choice of these are naturally guided by the preference of a certain syntactic pattern in a natural language; so if the proposition is said to be two-termed, the subject is *every man* (and not *man*) and the predicate is *is bald* (not *bald*); if it is three-termed, the predicate is only *bald*; if it is four-termed the subject is only *man*. Williamson's problem could thus be solved by loosening the bond between formal, logical structure and syntax (informal, logical structure).

- (1) P₁: *Peter is striking Malchus* (A is B)
 P₂: *Malchus is a dog* (B is C)
 C: *Peter is striking a dog* (A is C)

If we insist on Analysis 1 we cannot deduce anything relating to the identity or nature of Malchus since the middle term (i.e. the term which appears in both premises) is not *Malchus*, but the act of *striking Malchus*. Therefore the conclusion of the syllogism also regards the act rather than the agents, as in (2):²³

- (2) P₁: *Peter is striking Malchus* (A is B)
 P₂: *Striking Malchus is committing a sin* (B is C)
 C: *Peter is committing a sin* (A is C)

In this syllogism the subject in P₁ is nominal and the predicate in P₂ is verbal. This of course means that in C the subject is nominal and the predicate is verbal. But the price for this neatness is an unnatural syntax of P₂: *striking Malchus is committing a sin* is merely a necessary way of rephrasing *striking Malchus is a sin*. I thus postulate that the natural answer to the question *what do you think about striking Malchus?* is *that is a sin* rather than *that is committing a sin*. If this is true, then the premises of the syllogism is as P₁ and P₂ in (3), and then the conclusion necessarily is as stated in C:

- (3) P₁: *Peter is striking Malchus* (A is B)
 P₂: *Striking Malchus is a sin* (B is C)
 C: *Peter is a sin* (A is C)

In this instance the problem arises because the grammar of natural languages is incongruent with the grammar of formal logic. This is evident if we remember Aristotle's definition of "being present in a subject" in chapter 2 of *Categoriae*:

By being 'present in a subject' I do not mean present as parts are present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from the said subject.
 (Aristotle *Cat* 2, 1a)

Following this definition we can rephrase the premises in (3) into (4), and deduce another conclusion, C in (4):

- (4) P₁: *The act of striking Malchus is incapable of existence apart from Peter*

²³ If the predicate was interpreted as being *Malchus* alone, the result would not only be counter-intuitive, the syllogism will also be false since the middle term (B) is not the same in the two premises:

- (2') P₁: *Peter is striking Malchus* (A is B)
 P₂: *Malchus is a dog* (B' is C)
 C: ** Peter is a dog* (A is C)

P₂: *Sin* is incapable of existence apart from the act of striking *Malchus*

C: *Sin* is incapable of existence apart from *Peter*

In natural language (e.g. English) the premises could be as stated in (3), i.e. *Peter is striking Malchus* and *striking Malchus is a sin*, respectively. But the logical conclusion *sin is incapable of existence apart from Peter* would in a natural language probably be either *Peter is committing a sin* or *Peter is a sinner*. Thus the logical flaw in (4) is that natural language is treated as a formal logical system.

The next example shows that the logical subject does not even have to be a noun or a noun phrase. I demonstrate this in the following syllogism (*connoisseurs* of Japanese poetry might recognise the syllabic *haiku* structure):

P ₁ :	now snow is falling	(A is B)
P ₂ :	snow falls only in winter	(B is C)
C:	Now it is winter	(A is C)

If we remember that *snow falls* and *snow is falling* is the same in Aristotelian logic, then we can see that the middle term of the syllogism is B, i.e. the sentence *snow is falling* or *snow falls*, and *only* is a quantifier. The syllogistic subject of the conclusion and the minor premise (P₁) is A, i.e. the adverb *now*, and the predicative of the conclusion and the major premise (P₂) is C, i.e. the prepositional phrase *in winter*. Thus, the logical subject is an *adverb*.

Another example is the truly valent verbs, e.g. in Icelandic: *Nuna regnir* (now [it] rains). According to traditional logic,²⁶ one can only argue whether a statement is true or false if there is a combination of a subject and a predicate, and as everybody who has tried to forget an umbrella knows, one can actually argue whether it rains or not. Consequently, the adverb *nuna* (*now*) must be interpreted as the logical subject.

4. The Segregation Phase

4.1. Overcoming the Binaries of Logic

As stated in 3.2. the binary logical-syntactic analysis implies that it is impossible to distinguish between the verbal and the nominal element of the predicate; in *Peter struck Malchus*, the predicate *struck Malchus* is principally an unanalysable unit. However, this result is counter-intuitive, since we of course can distinguish between *struck* and *Malchus*.

²⁶ E.g. Aristotle: "No one of these terms, in and by itself, involves an affirmation; it is by the combination of such terms that positive or negative statements arise" (*Cat* 4, 2a).

The problem is solved by Abbé Gabriel Girard in his *Les vrais principes de la langue françoise* (1747).²⁷ He exploits the fact that *sujet* is used exclusively in the logical-syntactical sense, and not in the oppositional semantic pair *sujet-objet*. This makes it possible to redefine the term *objet* along logical-syntactical lines, i.e. as the non-verbal element of the predication:

Ce qui est destiné à représenter la chose que l'attribution a en vûe & par qui elle est spécifiée figure comme Objet. (Girard 1747:91)

In this way Girard has elaborated the Aristotelian dichotomy between subject and predicate (*sujet* and *attribut*) by adding, to begin with, the object (*l'objet*), and afterwards another four terms (enumerated in square brackets) to make up seven terms altogether:

Je trouve qu'il faut d'abord un [1] sujet & [2] une attribution à ce sujet ; sans cela on ne dit rien. Je vois ensuite que l'attribution peut avoir, outre son sujet, [3] un objet, [4] un terme, [5] une circonstance modificative, [6] une liaison avec une autre, & de plus [7] un accompagnement étranger [...] (Girard 1747:88f.)

Girard furthermore introduces the distinction between the *function* of a word (cf. Saussure's *signifié*, cf. Saussure 1916/1972) and the sentential *expression* of this (cf. Saussure's *signifiant*). The latter is marked by adding a suffix *-if*;²⁸ thus *subjectif* is the sentential part which expresses the propositional *sujet*, etc. Girard's analysis of the two examples above is as sketched in Figure 4:

Examples	He	hits	me
	She	loves	you
Expression	<i>subjectif</i>	<i>attributif</i>	<i>objectif</i>
Function	<i>sujet</i> (<i>subject</i>)	<i>attribut</i> (<i>predicate</i>)	<i>objet</i> (<i>object</i>)

Figure 5. Girard's analysis of two examples

One notices that the analysis of the two examples is identical, so that there is no distinction between *me* as a *res extensa*, i.e. as subject in the Aristotelian sense, and as a *res cogitans*, i.e. as object in the Cartesian sense. This eradication of semantic distinctions in the grammatical analysis is a *conditio sine qua non* for the claim that syntax and semantics are unrelated, autonomous areas.

4.2. Høysgaard's Segregation of Logic and Grammar

Neither Aristotle nor the Port-Royal grammarians made any effort to segregate the science of logic and the science of grammar. On the contrary, Aristotle

²⁷ I do not know if Girard's analysis is anticipated by other scholars in the period between the publication of GGR in 1662 and the publication of *Les vrais principes* in 1747.

²⁸ Cf. the French notions for the cases: *nominatif*, *accusatif*, etc.

made some scattered grammatical remarks in his logical treatises, and Arnauld & Lancelot explicitly use philosophical, i.e. logical, distinctions *in order to* make a rational grammar.

However, one result of their endeavours is the emergence of a grammatical subject notion which is very different from the logical subject notion. As a consequence of this, it is possible to distinguish between rational logic and rational grammar, or in other words: instead of the distinction between universal structure (grammar-as-logic) and usage (grammar-as-rhetoric), it is possible to distinguish between two rational systems: logic and grammar. Arnauld & Lancelot do not explicitly carry this distinction through, but it is indeed very clear in the works of the Danish Rational grammarian Jens Høysgaard (1698-1773).²⁹

Høysgaard publishes an *Accentuated og raisonnered Grammatica* [*Accentuated and Reasoned Grammar*] in 1747. In this work he makes the following distinction between a logical proposition and a grammatical one:

§355. 1st Forklar: Hos *Logicos* eller dem, der lærer os *Raisonerings-Konsten* er *Propositio* (eller en *Sag*) enhver Tale, som bestaaer af *Subjecto*, som er det, der tales om, og af *Prædicato* eller det, der siges om *Subjecto*, og af *Copula*, der binder dem begge såmen, saas: Bonde-regning er den rætte Practik-regning: i hvilken tale Bonde-regning er *Subjectum*, som man giver sin betænkning om, men de ord den rætte Practique-regning er *Prædicatum* eller det, man siger om Bonde-regning, og *Verbum* er kaldes *Copula*, som det, der kobler og binder *Subjectum* og *Prædicatum* såmen, det er, giver tydelig tilkjende, at det ene siges om det andet. Hêrved er videre at mærke, at når er ikke findes i en *Proposition*, men et andet *Verbum* dêr i steden for, som,

§355. 1st explanation: With the logicians, or they who teach us the art of *reasoning*, a proposition (or a matter) is every speech that consists of *subject*, which is what is spoken about, and of *predicate*, or that which is said about the *subject*, and of *Copula*, which ties them together. E.g.: "Peasant calculation is the true practical calculation." In this speech "peasant calculation" is *subject* which one reflects upon, and those words "the true practical calculation" is *predicate* or that which is said about "peasant calculation", and the verb "is" is called *copula* as that which connects and ties *subject* and *predicate* together, i.e. which clearly marks that the one is said about the other. Furthermore, when the proposition does not contain "is" but another *verb*,

²⁹ Høysgaard worked as porter at Copenhagen University and as bellringer at two churches in Copenhagen. He has however won his fame as a marvellous grammarian in the Rational tradition.

f: e:, det gjernings-ord skriver, da indeholder samme *Verbum* i sin mening alle tider baade *Copulam* saa og tillige enten det hele *Prædicatum* eller et stykke deráf: thi at sige: jeg skriver: er det samme som at sige på u-brugelig Dansk: jeg er skrivende. Saa vidt om en *Logisk Proposition*.

§356. 2^{den} Forklar: Men hos *Grammaticos* eller Sprogkonst-skrivere, hvilke vi hêr al-ene vil holde os til, defineres og beskrives en *Grammatisk Propositio* saaledes: *Propositio* er (først og fornemmelig) en mening eller tale, som haver kun èt eneste *Verbum Finitum*, saas: forbemældte mening: Bonde-regning er den rætte *Practique-regning*: thi blandt disse ord findes kun èt eneste *Verbum Finitum* neml: er. Dernæst kan og den *Propositio* kaldes *Grammaticalsk*, som indeholder tu eller flere *Verba Finita*, dog saa, at de haver ord for og bag sig, som hører til dem alle: saas: vor Moder drikker og sover hver dâg: hvilket er det samme, som at sige: Moder drikker hver dag, og Moder sover hver dag: alt saa er dette slags intet andet end tvende *Propositioner* sammendragede til ên.

(Høysgaard 1747:§§355-356)

as for instance the verb [literally: action-word] "writes", then this verb holds in its meaning as well the *copula* and the *predicate* or a part thereof. Because to say "I write" is the same as to say, in useless Danish, "I am writing." So much about a *logical proposition*.

§356. 2nd explanation: But with *grammarians*, or writers of the art of speaking, which alone we will consider here, a *grammatical proposition* is defined and described in this way: a *proposition* is (first and foremost) a meaning or a speech, which has only one *finite verb*, e.g. the previous example: "Peasant calculation is the true practical calculation": for among these words there is only one *finite verb*, namely "is."

Furthermore, that *proposition* which contains two or more *finite verbs* can be called *grammatical*, if they anticipate, or are anticipated by, words that belong to them all, e.g.: "Our mother drinks and sleeps every day." This is the same as to say: "Mother drinks every day, and mother sleeps every day." Thus, this is nothing but two *propositions* contracted into one. [My translation and insertion of quotation marks in the examples]

Having carried through this segregation of logic and grammar, Høysgaard is not restricted to seeing the noun-verb relation as a subject-predicate relation only. This of course opens a whole new way of doing grammar, and five years later, in 1752, Høysgaard publishes his *Methodisk Forsøg til en Fuldstændig Dansk Syntax* [*Methodical Attempt at a Complete Danish Syntax*]. This book is a

continuation of his 1747 *oeuvre*, which is indicated by a continuation of the paragraph numbers.³⁰ Just like Abbé Girard,³¹ Høysgaard uses the notions of *relatum* and *relation* as central theoretical concept, and he even refers to Girard in order to legitimise this procedure:

Denne Læremaade, neml. at betragte *Relationer*, kan have Sted i et hvert Sprogs *Syntax*; og er nødvendig, naar man handler om et Sprogs *Constructioner*, som haver enten ingen *Casus* eller og saa faa som det Danske; ja det er en latterlig Sag at ville give Regle for Bruggen af *Sex Casus* i saadan et Sprog. Se hvad *Mr. l'Abé Girard* siger herom i hans *Vrais Principes de la Langue Française!* (Høysgaard 1752:494)

This theory [literally: way of teaching], i.e. to consider relations, is possible in the syntax of every language; and it is necessary when one treats constructions in a language that have either no case or as few as in Danish; yes, it is ridiculous to pose rules for the use of six cases in such a language. See what *Mr. l'Abé Girard* says about this in his *Vrais Principes de la Langue Française!* [my translation]

The main principle in Høysgaard's relational syntax is *government*: one member of the sentence (called *regens*) governs another (called *regendum*). Almost all of his *Syntax* (§§706-1698) thus consists of an exposition of these government relations. In particular the noun-verb relation takes up a lot of space (§§707-1519). One consequence of Høysgaard's relational methodology is that the subject is not treated as a prominent nominal part of the sentence, since its relation to the verb is identical as, say, the object's relation to the verb: they are both governed by it. In this way Høysgaard's grammar marks a decisive step away from the logical-epistemological tradition; for 200 years to come this kind of analysis will dominate in the educational system, and it is no wonder that Chomsky, when searching for roots for his binary analysis skips three centuries of linguistic analysis and goes directly to the Port-Royal grammar (Chomsky 1966).

With his verb-centred analysis Høysgaard seems to anticipate Tesnière's valency grammar, since the verb is ascribed a central sentential position. However, it is not clear if Høysgaard realises this. On the surface he treats the verb in the exact same way as he treats the noun and the adjective, i.e. he describes how they are governed by other members of the sentence. But the description nevertheless has a different character:

³⁰ The *Grammatica* (1747) covers §§1-531, and the *Syntax* (1752) covers §§532-1926. In 1769 Høysgaard further publishes his *Første Anhang til den Accentuerede Grammatika* [*First Appendix to the Accentuated Grammar*], covering §§1927-2022.

³¹ Høysgaard's *Syntax* seems to have been finished in 1747, so his analysis is not directly taken from Girard (cf. Diderichsen 1968:57).

Om Verbum, saavidt det selv skal styres og bruges. Det, som er ved et dansk *Verbum* at agte for at bruge det rættelig, er I. *Forma*; II *Modus*; III *Tempus*; IV *Numerus*; V. *Persona*, e. om det skal bruges *impersonaliter*; og VI. *Conjugatio*, [...] (Høysgaard 1752:§1539)

On the verb, to the degree that it is itself governed and used. What one should beware of in order to use the Danish verb correctly is: I. *Diathesis*; II *Mode*; III *Tense*; IV *Number*; V. *Person*, or whether it ought to be used *impersonally*; and VI. *Conjugation*, [...] [my translation]

These categories are determined by a contextual consideration, and not by another sentential member, although a demand of congruence means that the choice of subject and the choice of verbal number and person cannot be separated.

In §710 Høysgaard lists ten nominal categories where the noun is governed by a verb:

Substantivet, naar det styres af et *Verbum*, er enten I. *Subjectum pr.* [i.e. *Prædicationis*] §. 710; e. II. *Prædicatum Subjecti*, §. 718; e. III. *Objectum Patiens*, §. 763; e. IV. *Prædicatum Objecti*, §. 776; e. V. *Objectum Occupans*, § 781; e. VI. *Objectum Cui*, §. 842; e. VII. *Agens*, §. 1001; e. VIII *Objectum Sermonis*, § 1005; e. IX. *Consubjectum*, § 1027; e. X. én af de øvrige saa kaldede Omstændigheder, §. 1042. (Høysgaard 1752:§710)

The noun, when governed by a verb, is either I. *Subjectum praedicationis* §. 710; or II. *Praedicatum Subjecti*, §. 718; or III. *Objectum Patiens*, §. 763; or IV. *Praedicatum Objecti*, §. 776; or V. *Objectum Occupans*, § 781; or VI. *Objectum Cui*, §. 842; or VII. *Agens*, §. 1001; or VIII *Objectum Sermonis*, § 1005; or IX. *Consubjectum*, § 1027; or X. one of the other so-called circumstances, §. 1042 [my translation]

Although Høysgaard's terms deviate from the modern terms, the categories are very close to those used in a modern traditional grammar, i.e. a recent grammar written in the classical tradition. Number I-IV (subject, direct object, subject predicate and object predicate) and VI (indirect object) are the exact same, and number V and VII-X refer to either prepositional phrases or verbal particles with a succeeding noun.

There is not much more to say about Høysgaard's use of the subject notion; it is very close to what every first year student of linguistics learns at university – or what a first year pupil is taught in school.

I will, however, point at one minor difference between Høysgaard and modern educational linguistic analysis. Høysgaard distinguishes between a *propositional subject* (as described above), i.e. a noun as *regendum* in a noun-verb relation, and a *phrasal subject*, i.e. a noun as *regendum* in a noun-noun relation. The former is called *Subjectum Praedicationis*, the latter *Subjectum Cujus* (Høysgaard 1752:495). An example of the latter is given in §1371: *Slaaen for Dören* (*The bolt for the door*). Here *Dören* is *regendum*, i.e. the *Subjectum Cujus*.

The *Subjectum Cujus* is nothing but a detail and it shall not hide the fact that around the year 1750 (with Høysgaard in Denmark, Girard in France, etc.) syntax has found its final methodology and its standard model of syntactic analysis. I consider the different syntactic endeavours since to be minor and superficial ripples, maybe with Chomsky as an exception. At least this is true for one part of syntactic nomenclature, the subject notion.

5. Conclusions & Invitations

5.1. Summary

This essay deals with the *historical development* of the subject notion in European grammar, and it deals with the *nature* of subject theories. Concerning the latter it seems reasonable to distinguish between the *explicit* nature of a subject theory and the *implicit* nature. Hence, changes in the *explicit* subject theory can dialectically imply preservations of *implicit* parts of earlier subject theories. I sum up the results of this paper in the following three theses to form the ground for further research on the subject notion:

- A *subject theory* is implicitly an epistemological theory
- A *subject theory* is implicitly a theory of the world and a theory of consciousness
- A *subject theory* is implicitly an interference in the world

Concerning the former, the *historical development* of the grammatical subject notion, we can on the one hand establish that there today exists a similar subject notion across different theoretical positions, although the theoretical *explanation* of the subject may differ widely. This indicates that this subject notion has similar constitutive conditions in different traditions. On the other hand, however, we can reasonably distinguish between four phases in the development of this grammatical subject, i.e. four phases of its genetic conditions:

- A *Depersonalisation* Phase: With *Aristotle* the subject (or *hypokeimenon*) refers to the epistemological object, i.e. that which is sensed by an epistemological subject.

- A *Textualisation* Phase: In the centuries following Aristotle the subject becomes the textual expression for the epistemological object, mostly expressed in terms of Aristotelian logic.
- A *Dualist* Phase: With the *Port-Royal grammarians* the subject notion (or the *sujet*) is transferred from logic to grammar and equated with the nominative case.
- A *Segregation* Phase: With e.g. *Jens Høysgaard* the subject (or *subjectum*) is a constant and formally definable sentential entity, unrelated to the logical subject.

3.2. *Invitations*

The century from 1543 to 1641 revolutionised science. In 1543 Copernicus declared that the sun was the centre of the universe with the earth and other planets rotating around it (Copernican heliocentrism), and in 1641 Descartes published his *Meditationes* (Cartesian cognicentrism). In between these two events Gilbert discovered magnetism, Galileo gravity, Kepler the elliptical planetary orbits and Harvey the blood circulation of the body (cf. Cooper 1996:233). Thus, the Baconian-Cartesian-Newtonian turn in the 17th century did not just take place within a secluded academic discourse at the European universities. It had implications for the totality of European civilisation. It proclaimed the dawning of a new era in human history, an era of mental *modernism*, economic *industrialism* and *capitalism*, political *imperialism* and *bourgeois democracy* and scientific *objectivism* and *positivism*.

We seem to be, here at the doorstep of the 3rd millennium, facing a new era of post-Baconian methodology, post-Cartesian philosophy and post-Newtonian physics. After three centuries of human exploitation, earthly devastation and military insanity, the time is right for a new way of thinking, feeling and acting. Quantum physics, subtle energy healing, ecological awareness, Gaia consciousness and psi phenomena raise some weighty objections against the dominant ways of living throughout the planet. Indeed there is a scientific side of this development, and indeed also a linguistic side. Thus, I quote some wise words of M.A.K. Halliday, who in a letter to the Austrian ecolinguist Alwin Fill wrote:

I think that if we recognize that the grammar of everyone's mother tongue is (or embodies since it is other things besides) a theory of human experience, then it will follow that this must affect the way we interact with our environment; and—just as with so many of our material practices—what is beneficial at one moment in history may be lethal and suicidal at another. (Halliday, personal communication; quoted in Fill 1996:20)

Probably the subject theory of Aristotelian epistemology was very beneficial in Athens in the 4th century BC. Maybe Cartesian dualism was important in order to break the church monopoly on knowledge. And maybe both of them are suicidal today, since it is a part of those dominant linguistic trends that are

compatible with a dominant political and economical way of living that has brought our planet and its inhabitants to the verge of collapse (cf. Steffensen & Bundsgaard 2002).

For this reason I invite my colleagues within linguistics and other scientific disciplines to consider whether it is time that we develop a new subject theory. This is surely not the place to put forward such a theory (cf. Steffensen *forthcoming* b), but on the basis of the analysis of the subject's genetic conditions, as described in this paper, it is possible to outline an *alternative* to the dominant theories of the grammatical subject. Four main features of such an alternative theory can be defined as the negation of the four main features of the (history of the) traditional subject theory: the *depersonalisation*, the *textualisation*, the *dualism* and the *segregation*.

- *On depersonalisation*: There is not one and only one possible way of sensing the world. On the contrary, sensing depends on the *relation* between the sensor (the epistemological subject) and the sensed (the epistemological object), and it depends on the social praxis of the sensing. The social praxis of the sensing process functions as a *heuristic frame* for the epistemological process, and this co-determines the sensor's epistemological *focus*. None of these can be defined independently of the *persons* involved in the process.
- *On textualisation*: The textualisation process is essentially a reification process since the text is hypostasised as existing *per se*. This is of course not so, since the text depends on the persons who produce, communicate and consume it. For this reason any subject identification in a text must be explained in relation to the configuration of producer, communicator and consumer, i.e. in relation to the dialogical praxis of the text, and in relation to the background for doing the analysis.
- *On dualism*: There is no identity between the grammatical subject and the logical subject. Thus, the grammatical subject can be any member of the sentence, depending on the epistemological focus and heuristic frame. The predication depends on the choice of subject, since the sentence is an inter-predicational web. The choice of a prominent subject is made by the interpreter; it is not a feature of the text.
- *On segregation*: There is not only one way of interpreting a text. The interpretation depends on the relation between the interpreter and the text—i.e. its production, communication and consumption, and it depends on the social praxis of the interpretation. The social praxis functions as a *heuristic frame* for the interpretation, and this co-determines the interpretational *focus*. Therefore, an alternative subject theory does not ask: What is *the* grammatical subject? Rather, it asks: what is *a* grammatical subject? The question and the answer should both contribute to an awareness of our social, mental and biological conditions of life—and hence to healthier ways of living with and in each other, with and in Gaia and with and in the universe. Accordingly,

a better name for this paper is: The Emergence of *a* Subject. (Or: The Emergency of the Subject!)

If one is reluctant to throw away the whole history of linguistics, it is very understandable, but that is not my point either. It is surely possible to ground this alternative subject theory in the history of linguistics, although maybe in an alternative interpretation. To demonstrate this I will, as the final opint in this paper, draw attention to a central passage of the *Port-Royal grammar* which is normally—to the best of my knowledge—only treated as peripheral. It is taken from the end of the long thirteenth chapter on the verb (“Des Verbes, et de ce qui leur est propre et essentiel”):

Et l'on peut remarquer, en passant, que l'affirmation, en tant que conçue, pouvant être aussi l'attribut du verbe, comme dans le verbe *affirmo*, ce verbe signifie deux affirmations, dont l'une regarde la personne qui parle, et l'autre la personne de qui on parle, soit que ce soit de soi-même, soit que ce soit d'une autre. Car quand je dis, *Petrus affirmat*, *affirmat* est la même chose que *est affirmans*; et alors *est* marque mon affirmation, on le jugement que je fais touchant Pierre, et *affirmans*, l'affirmation que je conçois, et que j'attribue à Pierre. (GGR:114f.)

A reasonable interpretation of this passage is that any affirmation is *embedded* in a pragmatic situation in which a person (the pragmatic subject) utters something. Thus the totality of the *embedded affirmation* is affirmed about the pragmatic subject uttering it. This *double affirmation perspective* implies that the copula *est* is not just the glue between subject and predicate in the embedded affirmation, but that it is the textual expression of the existence of the pragmatic subject. Generally, the tense/mode marker of the verb might function as the medium of the pragmatic subject (cf. Steffensen *forthcoming a*).³²

We cannot and should not throw away history, neither history in general nor the history of linguistics specifically. But we should remember that *history*, just like sensing and interpreting, is a relation between a historian and the historical object. This means that there are always some social and personal ends of doing history: we do it for a reason, whether we *ac-know*-ledge it or not. What I suggest is that the purpose of doing history (of linguistics) is the development of (linguistic theoretical) concepts, e.g. the *subject*, that function as a heuristic frame in the endeavour to make the world a healthier and happier place to be.

³² In the minimalist programme there is also a recognition of a specific subject-tense relation (Platzack 1998:74), but explicitly related to the (not *a*!) grammatical subject. If we take the passage from GGR into account, this might indicate that tense/mode functions as a focus point of the grammatical and the pragmatic subject. I have earlier suggested a similar point in Steffensen (2001:98).

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NOVEMBER 2003

HENRY SWEET SOCIETY BULLETIN

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THE 20TH ANNUAL COLLOQUIUM OF THE
HENRY SWEET SOCIETY

TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN
28-31 AUGUST 2003

Conference Report

Thursday 28 September 2003 saw language scholars from all over the world arrive at Trinity College Dublin for the annual colloquium of the Henry Sweet Society. This year's colloquium was special as it marked the twentieth anniversary of the Henry Sweet Society for the History of Linguistic Ideas, which was founded in February 1984 in Oxford.

The organiser of this year's venue, Dr. Nicola McLelland, had put together a diverse and attractive programme of papers, which were held in the Salmon Theatre and the Synge Theatre of Trinity College. At times both theatres were used as parallel sessions were taking place. Since the abstracts of papers are given in this Bulletin, this report will try to show how a new member of the Society experienced the Colloquium.

The programme began in the Salmon Theatre on the late Thursday afternoon. The first two papers were to some extent dedicated to the host city of Dublin. Chris Stray talked about Gregor Feinaigle, a peripatetic lecturer on mnemonics, and his work in Dublin. Marjorie Lorch's paper was concerned with the Dublin School of Aphasia Research in the 19th Century. The third paper by Jaap Maat introduced the Tulip project, i.e. The Universal Language Internet Portal. The main aims of this collaborative project are to present results of research into seventeenth century linguistic ideas in a new way, and to make clear the links between linguistic concerns in the seventeenth century and in the present day. Maat outlined an interactive website, whose centrepiece is a computer implementation of Dalgarno's universal language scheme of 1661.

After the very interesting start of the colloquium we were taken off to the Graduate Memorial Building, in which the reception took place. The room in which the reception was held featured in the cinema classic *Educating Rita*. Considering that this film is an adaptation of Shaw's *Pygmalion*, whose main character Dr. Higgins is based upon Henry Sweet, the room was an ideal choice for the reception.

The first part of Friday morning was dedicated to two intriguing papers by Rachel Gilmour and Richard Steadman-Jones on the languages of Africa in travel narratives of the Romantic period. The first paper was concerned with John Barrow's description of and differentiation between the Xhosa and Khoi-San languages spoken around the Cape of Good Hope. The second paper discussed Thomas Bowdich's account of the languages of the Fante, Asante, and Ga.

Following a coffee and tea break the second part of Friday morning was divided into two parallel sessions. The papers given in the Salmon Theatre were by John Walmsley, who talked about the inadequacy of the English lexicon, Mike McMahon, who gave us an insight into Richard John Lloyd's life and work, and finally Warren Maguire on A.J. Ellis, the pioneer of scientific phonetics in England. In the Sygne Theatre Ekaterina Velmezova's talk was about the epistemological value of 'semantic polarization' theories by the end of the 19th century, which was followed by Serhii Vakulenko's paper on the notion of sememe in Adolf Noreen, and Jacqueline Léon's talk about semantic primitives and intermediary languages in early machine translation in Britain.

After lunch, we proceeded to hear Camiel Hamans' 'The morphology of oddities' in the Salmon Theatre, which was followed by Nadia Kerecuk on 'Sign, Obraz, Symbol, Symbolic Thinking and Consciousness in O.O. Potebnia'. The parallel session in the Sygne Theatre commenced with Irina Ivanova's paper on the development of linguistic conception by Lev Jakubinskij and was then followed by Garon Wheeler about linguistic history vs. Krashen.

The final session of the day in the Salmon Theatre was dedicated to Wilhelm von Humboldt and Benjamin Lee Whorf. Hiroyuki Eto talked about Humboldt and American linguistics and Birgit K. Schütz was concerned with Humboldt's great work on the American Indian languages. Joe L. Subbiondo's paper dealt with Whorf's critique of the scientific assumptions of structural linguistics.

The first two papers of the parallel session took us back to the beginnings of language description. Andreas U. Schmidhauser discussed what a pronoun is and Sune Vork Steffensen talked about the emergence of the subject. These two papers were followed by a history of Japanese phonology by Ken-Ichi Kadooka.

The first two papers on Saturday morning were presented in French. Pascale Hummel talked about 'Incunabula comparative, la philologie comparée comme image dans le tapis'. As Luiza Palanciuc was unable to attend the Colloquium, her paper called 'Choix théorique ou pratique linguistique? Autour des jeux de langage' was kindly read out by Jacqueline Léon. John E. Joseph proceeded by talking about Adolphe Pictet and the influence of his book *Du beau* (1856) on Ferdinand de Saussure's structuralism. The programme on Saturday was very much dedicated to works and personalities associated with the history of linguistic ideas. Hedwig Gwodesk talked about the eight parts of speech in Lily's grammars, followed Masataka Miyawaki, who was concerned with the aim and orientation of Wallis' *Grammatica Linguae Anglicanae*.

Before lunch Dr. McLelland had arranged a visit to the Book of Kells and the Old Library. The Book of Kells, which contains the four gospels and beautifully painted decorations, is believed to have been produced between the seventh and ninth centuries by monks on the island of Iona, off the coast of Scotland. It came into the possession of Trinity College in 1661. The Old Library, which is the earliest surviving building since the foundation of Trinity

College in 1592, was built between 1712 and 1732. A special exhibition of grammars from different centuries was put together in the Long Room for us.

After lunch Paul Laurendeau talked about John Locke and his views on language as reflected in his works. The final two papers of the day were dedicated to John Wilkins. Natascia Leonardi's paper was concerned with Wilkins' theory of knowledge, which was followed by David Cram on 'Wilkins and the diversity of languages and the special case of Malayan'.

After the Annual General Meeting of the Society, which revealed the venue for next year's colloquium to be Oxford, the conference dinner took place at the Fadó Restaurant close to the campus. This elegant restaurant, situated next to the Lord Mayor's Mansion, has a long and fascinating history, following its creation in 1861. In 1919 it was the site of the first Irish Parliament, the Dáil, which was held in secret for 2 years. A far more relaxed occasion took place in the Fadó as the 2003 conference dinner got under way. An evening of Mediterranean food, accompanied by enchanting piano music was enjoyed by all.

On Sunday morning the final papers were presented. My paper on the subjunctive mood in 18th century England and Austria was followed by Christiane Schlaps' paper, which was concerned with the concept of 'genius of language' and its transformations in the history of linguistic discourses. Frank Vonk's paper comparing Mach's and Mauthner's approaches towards conceptual analysis was followed by Peteris Vanags' paper 'The interpretation of the origin of and the genetic relationship between languages in 17th and 18th century Baltic area linguistic treatises'.

After the closing discussion, in which it was generally agreed that the Twentieth Annual Henry Sweet Society Colloquium had been a great success, an excursion to Dublin Castle and the Chester Beatty Library took place. The Chester Beatty Library contains a rich collection of artistic treasures of the great cultures and religions of the world. The visit to the Chester Beatty collection was a relaxing end to the Colloquium.

Finally, on behalf of all who attended, I would like to thank Dr. Nicola McLelland for this year's wonderful, well organised, and exceedingly enjoyable conference in the beautiful city of Dublin.

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**THE 20TH ANNUAL COLLOQUIUM OF THE
HENRY SWEET SOCIETY**

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Abstracts of Papers

**Grammatical Prescription in English and German in the 18th Century
- A Study of the 'Subjunctive' and the 'Konjunktiv'**

Anita Auer (Manchester)

In this paper I will discuss the description of the English subjunctive and the German Konjunktiv in 18th century grammar books set against the background of standardisation in England and Austria.

It is generally agreed that the inflectional form of the English subjunctive and the German Konjunktiv were on the decline in the 18th century. In both England and Austria this decline took place in the context of attempts to codify and fix the national language. However, the politico-cultural backgrounds for the process of language standardisation were very different. In the multinational empire Austria the Upper German 'Gemeindeutsch', gradually lost ground to the other emerging standard, i.e. 'Ostmitteldeutsch', which was based on Luther's German. There was certainly a counter-movement from a few grammarians in Catholic Austria. Whereas in England grammarians tried to refine the irregularities of the language.

This paper examines how these differences are reflected in the grammar books of the two traditions, with particular reference to their treatment of the subjunctive/Konjunktiv. I will address questions of:

1. the balance between prescriptive and descriptive attitudes;
2. the relation between formal and functional criteria in defining the subjunctive/Konjunktiv mood;
3. the influence of the classical languages on the descriptions.

Great tradition and Language Codification from a Sociolinguistic Point of View

Tinatin Bolkvadze (Tbilisi)

This paper will compare the East-Christian and West-Christian language traditions. These traditions have undergone different ways of formation and development and because of this the transformation of vernacular languages into literary and official languages in the East and in the West, i.e. the acquiring of such an attribute as codification is, took place at different times and in different situations. All languages are equal before God according to the East-Christian tradition. In spite of the fact that

the equality of languages was recognized, the languages of the Christian peoples of the East came across many difficulties in competing with the Greek Language, as Byzantium hindered their legitimization. We can follow the competition of the Georgian language with Greek after the 3rd, 4th centuries AD. The inner qualities of Georgian made the wish of being equal to Greek firm. These qualities were as follows: flexible stability that gave a possibility of the equal modification of the Georgian speech, and was characterized by a high degree of artificiality. From this point of view the concept of 'Great tradition' (introduced by J. Fishman) will be discussed. The Georgian 'Great Tradition', which was based on East-Christian language tradition, created an exoglossal society whose members believed that their language reflected their exclusive genius and is authentically connected with their unusual life and spiritual experience.

John Wilkins on the Diversity of Languages and the Special Case of Malayan

David Cram (Oxford)

In the first three chapters of his *Essay* (1668) John Wilkins summarises current views concerning language diversity as a preliminary towards his own construction of a real character and philosophical language. At the end of this survey, Wilkins makes dismissive reference to the supposedly 'special case' of Chinese, which had attracted extensive discussion in earlier debates concerning a real character. There is however another language singled out for special mention, namely Malayan, "which seems to be the *newest Language* in the World". The reason for its interest, Wilkins explains, is that "this is the onely *Language* (for ought I know) that hath ever been at once *invented*; if it may properly be styled a distinct Language, and not rather a *Medley* of many" (1668: 10).

The purpose of the present paper is, firstly, to situate Wilkins's discussion in the broader context of ideas about language diversity in the seventeenth century. Two quite different types of language classification are here relevant: alongside the genetic classification, which Wilkins adopts as his presentational principle, there is also a typological classification of languages according to their various 'excellencies'. The paper will then examine the characterization by Wilkins and others of the [pidginized] variety of Malayan used as a 'Merchants or Trading Language', as distinct from 'true Malayan', and the practical implications of this for Bible translation. It will conclude by considering the positive value assigned, within a typological framework, to mixed languages more generally, and (by authors ranging from William Camden to John Wallis) the advancement of English in particular as a mongrel language felicitously combining the individual excellencies of several others — English itself being, in Wilkins's words, "a mixture of the *British* [i.e. Welsh], *Roman*, *Saxon*, *Danish*, *Norman*, according to the several vicissitudes of Plantations and Conquests, that this Nation hath undergone".

Wilhelm von Humboldt and American Linguistics

Hiroyuki Eto (Osaka/Nagano)

In the Preface to *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax* (1965), Noam Chomsky claims that Wilhelm von Humboldt's (1767-1835) "Introduction" to general linguistics is "famous but rarely studied". It is true that Chomsky's writings on the history of linguistics demonstrate his copious knowledge of Humboldt's linguistic ideas. But this conclusion with regard to Humboldt's "Introduction" as "famous but rarely studied" is not an appropriate judgment. Nearly a century and a half before Chomsky began in the 1960s to refer frequently to the name of Humboldt and his linguistic studies, Humboldt was already well-known to then linguists in America, and his linguistic ideas were highly regarded by many of them. William D. Whitney (1827-1894) and Leonard Bloomfield (1887-1949), for example, sometimes referred to Humboldt and cited some of his important linguistic ideas. But, in the developmental history of American linguistics, Humboldt and his ideas of language had not only been a part of the "mainstream" in American linguistics, but also had often been deliberately ignored or unintentionally misinterpreted for the years before Chomsky "rediscovered" them. Through an overview of the history of the Humboldt reception in American linguistics, the present paper tries to examine the impact of Humboldt's linguistic study on American linguists and its oblivion. Furthermore, it will scrutinize reasons why American linguists had remained unaware of Humboldt until Chomsky gave "re-birth" to him and recognize the importance of Chomsky's charismatic power in Humboldt's "revival" in the world of linguistics in America.

Multiple Voices in Romantic-Period Travel Narratives

Rachael Gilmour (London) & Richard Steadman-Jones (Sheffield)

This short presentation will follow on from two papers, both of which deal with specific examples of travel narratives from the Romantic Period: John Barrow's description of the Cape of Good Hope and Thomas Bowdich's mission to the Asante. Travel writing from this period is often multivocal in a number of senses: first in the way it incorporates different genres of representation into itself (genres of linguistic analysis among them), and second in the way it includes representations of other voices and other speakers in the texture of the narrative. But how are we to understand the interaction of voices within the texts of writers such as Barrow and Bowdich? We shall suggest that the work of the literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin suggests interesting answers to this question and talk about our developing work on the possibilities of a Bakhtinian approach to the genres of linguistic representation.

**Linguistic Representation and Colonial Order: John Barrow's Description
of the Cape of Good Hope**

Rachael Gilmour (London)

At the very end of the eighteenth century, as the British wrangled with the Dutch East India Company in their acquisition of the Cape of Good Hope, the attention of European readers began to be drawn to the region through a glut of writings including travelogues, missionary writings, and scientific treatises. This paper will address some of the ways in which concepts of language development and linguistic typology impacted on and were negotiated in such early representations of the peoples and languages of southern Africa, through an examination of the writings of John Barrow, secretary to the first British Governor of the Cape of Good Hope. Among other things, Barrow's ambitious two-volume account of the new colony included one of the first published descriptions of the Xhosa language.

Barrow's vivid (if unsystematic) linguistic descriptions of Xhosa and of the Khoi-San languages spoken in and around the Cape Colony were aimed at demonstrating *difference*. In including a two-page Xhosa wordlist, side-by-side with a list of Khoi words, his wish was that 'the following brief specimen of the Kaffer [Xhosa] language, with the synonymous [*sic*] words in that of the Hottentots [Khoi], may serve to shew how little resemblance they bear to each other.'¹ As this paper will show, these differences between Xhosa and Khoi-San languages were mapped hierarchically - as a division between the 'soft, fluent, and harmonious' on the one hand and the 'monotonous mouthing of the savage' on the other - and underlined by reference to several other, more familiar tropes of inequality. This paper will demonstrate the manner in which this bifurcation between Xhosa and Khoi-San fits into Barrow's understanding of language origins, typology, and development. At the same time, it will point forward to the ways in which Barrow's account contributed to an emerging and increasing systematized ethnolinguistic typology in southern Africa.

¹ John Barrow, *An Account of Travels into the Interior of Southern Africa, in the years 1797 and 1798: including cursory observations on the geology and geography of the southern part of that continent; the natural history of such objects as occurred in the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms; and sketches of the physical and moral characters of the various tribes surrounding the settlement of the Cape of Good Hope* (London: Cadell & Davies, 1801), p. 219.

**"Lily-Grammars"? The English Grammars of St Paul's School, London, and
An Introduction of the Eyght Partes of Speche**

Hedwig Gwosdek (Potsdam)

Versions of school grammars from the early sixteenth century commonly denominated as "Lily-grammars" obscure aspects of the history of the transmission of the grammar authorized by Henry VIII in 1540. The English part of the first extant and complete copy is entitled *An Introduction of the eyght partes of speche* and was published by the

royal printer Thomas Berthelet in 1542. By royal injunction the English and Latin parts of this version became the standard Latin grammar to be used in all grammar schools in England. It was attributed to William Lily (1468?-1522), a famous grammarian and the first High Master of St Paul's School, London. In this paper I will first draw attention to the role which the English grammars of St Paul's School played in the compilation of *An Introduction of the eyght partes of speche* by starting from an examination of the evidence of the texts. I shall argue that deliberate alterations to wording and structure and the addition of material from other sources identify the *Introduction* as a new and independent grammar which also throws light on the work of the royal committee by whom it was compiled. Finally I will try to examine William Lily's connection to the royal grammar and its predecessors.

The Morphology of Oddities

Camiel Hamans (PG Breda)

Traditionally morphology deals with complex words, "words which are not simple signs, but which are made up of more elementary ones", as Aronoff (1976: 1) puts it. It is the aim of a generative theory of morphology to describe and analyse 'the rules for making up new words' (ibid: 19) and to predict which words are possible (ibid: 18 & 35). Although Aronoff accepts words such as 'slurp' and 'quack' as belonging to English (ibid:8), the coining of these onomatopoeic or partially phonetically symbolised words does not belong to the study of word formation, since the meaning of these 'composite items' can only 'be partially, but not completely, derived from meanings of their parts'. According to Aronoff (ibid: 20/21) 'portmanteau' words such as 'smog' or 'chunnel', although being derived from other forms – 'smoke + fog' and 'channel+tunnel' - should not be described in a theory of word formation either. These products of a blending process are 'oddities' just as acronyms and 'morpheme strings' such as 'transmote', a combination of the two non-independent morphemes 'trans' and 'mote'. This view of Aronoff is the traditionally accepted opinion about morphology. Also structuralists as Uhlenbeck and Schultink did not discuss what they called intentionally creative processes of word coining. However recently some linguists got interested in these oddities (Hüning, Hinskens, Kemmer, Meesters, Ronneberg-Siebold, Szpyra, Hamans). In this paper I shall discuss how the traditional morphological approach failed and why all of a sudden such different scholars came up with alternatives.

Incunabula Comparativa, la Philologie Comparée comme Image dans le Tapis

Pascale Hummel (Paris)

Si la genèse théorique de la philologie comparée est officiellement portée au crédit du XIXe siècle, sa genèse empirique remonte à la Renaissance voire au delà. Les

postulats et les méthodes des grammairiens de ces époques pré-scientifiques lui donnèrent en effet le jour pour ainsi dire incidemment et de surcroît. Les ouvrages relatifs aux langues anciennes, notamment au grec, fourmillent d'allusions de type comparatif, dont la subtilité et la pertinence préfigurent les meilleures méthodes de la philologie moderne élevée au rang de science. La philologie comparée dès l'origine accompagne donc la philologie tout court, comme une discrète mais non moins signifiante image dans le tapis.

<http://pascalehummel.org>

From the Analysis of the Phonetic Aspect of the Poetical Speech towards the Analysis of the Dialogic (the Development of Linguistic Conception by Lev Jakubinskij)

Irina Ivanova (Saint-Petersburg / Lausanne)

Russian linguist Lev Jakubinskij was the author of the first European research on the dialogic speech. Together with Viktor Shklovskij, Viktor Zhirmunskij and Roman Jakobson he was one of the OPOJAZ (the society to study the poetical language) founders in early XXth century. The main task of this society was to study the different aspects of the poetical speech, either formal or semantic. At the same time, many OPOJAZ members paid particular attention to its formal, acoustic aspect, especially, to the problems of rhythm and sounds. That is why, the first articles by Lev Jakubinskij published in the OPOJAZ books of collected articles were on the phonetics. Yet in 1923, Jakubinskij publishes the 'On the dialogical speech' article, in which he states the basic principles of the everyday life dialogue analysis. This sharp change of the object of researches could seem strange. Yet the attentive analysis of this article let us note that it was not by chance. It was the comparison of poetic and practical languages' phonetics which made this linguist analyse the mechanisms of verbal influence over the addressee. We shall show in our report how the conception of poetical and practical languages by Jakubinskij had been formed, which influence the works of other phoneticians of his epoch had on him and why his own phonetic works were so important for this theory.

Pictet's *Du beau* and the Crystallisation of Saussurean Structuralism

John E. Joseph (Edinburgh)

It has long been known that the key formative figure in the intellectual life of the young Ferdinand de Saussure was Adolphe Pictet (1799-1875), a family friend best remembered for his *Les origines indo-européennes, ou, Les Aryas primitifs: Essai de paléontologie linguistique* (1859-63). This book is praised in the *CLG*, as well as being criticised, and has received some attention from historians of linguistics in search of the sources of Saussure's original views. However, a slightly earlier book by

Pictet entitled *Du beau, dans la nature, l'art et la poésie: Etudes esthétiques* (1856), has been ignored, presumably because its subject matter seems far removed from the concerns of linguistics. In fact, though, Pictet makes clear that aesthetics is principally centred on the problem of the meaning of the word *beauty*, and that within this problem are to be found all the tensions between the rational and sensible, the intellectual and emotional, the subjective and objective, and intention and reaction, that are at the heart of the whole Enlightenment discourse on the nature of language. A number of remarks on regularity of form in nature, for example in crystallisation, find echoes in Saussure's later characterisation of the language system, as do Pictet's assertions about the arbitrary nature of the linguistic sign and about the signified being not a thing but a concept. Indeed, a number of 'influences' on Saussure which Aarsleff (1982) credited to Taine — for whom we have no independent evidence of such influence — can more convincingly be ascribed to his early mentor Pictet, whose *Du beau* moreover provides a 'missing link' between the Enlightenment philosophers whose aesthetic views it details, and the traces of their philosophical positions that have repeatedly been detected in the *CLG*.

A Brief Review of Japanese Phonology From the Historical Viewpoint

Ken-Ichi Kadooka (Kyoto)

This paper is a brief review of Japanese phonology from the historical and orthographic point of view. In the early days of Japanese linguistics (about 9th century A.D.), all syllables in the Japanese language are arranged in a matrix of vowels and consonants and called *gojuu-on zu*, literally 'a list of fifty sounds.' This naming comes from the fact that there are five vowels and ten consonants in Japanese, and the possible combination of them make fifty syllables. Since only voiceless and non-palatalized consonants are taken into account in these ten consonants, the actual number of the syllable inventory is several times of fifty. Another interesting point is that the order of the *gojuu-on zu* is after Sanskrit phonology, beginning with a vowel /a/ and ending with a moraic nasal. The first five syllables are represented by five vowels /a, i, u, e, o/ whose orders are also after the Sanskrit phonology. The second series is those syllables with the onset consonant /k/, then followed by those with /s, t, n, h, m, r, y, w/. Orthographically, the voiced obstruent consonants are derived from the voiceless counterparts; two dots are added as superscript in the kana syllabary. This may reflect the intuition that the voiceless obstruents are unmarked while the voiced are marked. Only exception are those with the onset /p/, which are considered to be 'half-voiced' in the term of Japanese phonology. To conclude, the phonological system of Japanese has influenced the orthography.

**Sign, *Obraz*, Symbol, Symbolic Thinking and Consciousness
in O. O. Potebnia (1835-1891)**

Nadia Kerecuk (London)

This paper will examine some of the essential concepts in Potebnia's theory and philosophy of language. As I have argued elsewhere (1999, 2000, 2001 & 2002), three complex components lay at the basis of his theoretical construct: external form, internal form and content in language. These are fundamental ideas for the understanding of Potebnia starting from the internal form as the representation of the complexes of signs/marks of apperceived universe(s). Developed in conjunction with the concept of '*obraz*', which means both 'form' and 'icon' (sign, image, symbol). For Potebnia, word or language 'can be both an instrument of analysis and *condensation* of the thought uniquely because it is a representation, *i.e.*, not an *obraz*, but the *obraz* of an *obraz*. If an *obraz* is an act of consciousness, then a representation is the cognition of that consciousness.'(1862/1913: 138).¹ The symbolic forms of thinking evolve along with the acquisition of language as it can be observed in children learning to speak. Indeed, it is present in man's primeval word as a poetic creation. The capacity to think symbolically (conscious) develops along with the development of language both in the individual and in speech communities, in society. The case of mathematics is one example where man demonstrates his capacity to substitute natural language by symbolic forms of thinking. Also, the paper will briefly refer to both some of Potebnia's sources to examine his philosophy of symbolic forms and to the influence of his ideas in Eastern European and Soviet traditions.

¹ *Mysl' I iazyk –Thought and Language* – translated and annotated Kerecuk, N. (forthcoming English and Portuguese).

John Locke and Language

Paul Laurendeau (Toronto)

The views of John Locke on language are not present only in the Book three of AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, but are flowing as an implicit in the totality of his works. The anti-speculative empiricist stand tends to open philosophy to glottocentrism, by restricting the manifestation of general ideas to the sector of language. In the continuity of the Nominalists, and preparing the field to his French follower Condillac, John Locke puts in place the gnoseological framework which will allow the linguistic deviation in philosophy to kick in. The questioning of the status of the notion of SUBSTANCE is a fine example of that: "I confess there is another idea which would be of general use for mankind to have, as it is of general talk as if they had it; and that is the idea of SUBSTANCE; which we neither have nor can have by sensation or reflection. If nature took care to provide us any ideas, we might well expect they should be such as by our own faculties we cannot procure

to ourselves; but we see, on the contrary, that since, by those ways whereby other ideas are brought into our minds, this is not, we have no such CLEAR idea at all; and therefore signify nothing by the word SUBSTANCE but only an uncertain supposition of we know not what, i.e. of something whereof we have no particular distinct positive idea, which we take to be the SUBSTRATUM, or support, of those ideas we do know." John Locke, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, Book ONE, Chapter THREE, OTHER PROOFS AGAINST INNATE PRINCIPLES, Dover Publication, Vol. 1, pp 107-108. We will inquire into that important and influential moment of the shift from an ontological gnoseology to a linguisticist gnoseology, and its impact on John Locke's conception of the specifics of semantic problems as they are worded in the section titled OF WORDS of his ESSAY...

Semantic Primitives and Intermediary Languages in Early Machine Translation in Britain (1956- 1970)

Jacqueline Léon (Paris)

In the 1950s, a renewal of interest for universal languages can be observed among first Machine Translation (MT) researchers. MT itself took on the mission of international communication, traditionally assigned to universal languages. Some issues raised by the scientists on the feasibility of MT were similar to those raised by the authors of universal languages in the 17th century; namely the problem of language ambiguities as well as the use of the logical structure of language and of language invariants to design MT systems.

The works of one of the first British MT groups, the *Cambridge Language Research Unit (CLRU)*, is very interesting from this point of view. It is through MT experiments, in other words practical outcomes, that they explore the notion of semantic primitives which come out of universal language schemes. The first MT method, called *Nude*, was directly inspired by Wilkins and Dalgarno. *Nude* was an algebraic interlingua, closely related to Universal Characteristics and designed as "*a semantic net of naked ideas*". This net, made of fifty primitives and two syntactic connectors, is what remains invariant during translation process. Later, in order to base these primitives empirically, the researchers of the *CLRU* were led to design a new intermediary language as a set of word contexts, namely a thesaurus inspired by Roget's Thesaurus. At the end of the 1960s, the studies on primitives were continued by one of the youngest members of the *CLRU*, within the framework of early Natural Language Understanding.

John Wilkins's Theory of Knowledge: Language, Reality, and Representation*Nataschia Leonardi (Macerata)*

The present analysis aims at pointing out the epistemological value of the *Essay Towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language* (London, 1668) by tracing the development of John Wilkins theory of knowledge in its relationship with his linguistic speculation. The basic aspects of his work can be clarified by an analysis of his conception of knowledge and language, which can also be seen as indicative of the cultural atmosphere of 17th century England. The evolution of Wilkins theory of knowledge and language can be identified through an investigation of his linguistic and religious texts, which display significant correspondences. The emergence of linguistic concern in Wilkins writings can be traced back to his religious production, where he starts facing the problem of language as an instrument of knowledge and communication. The epitomising triad of the *Essay* *things*, *notions*, and *words* reflects the wider frame of the interplay of knowledge, language, and reality, which emerges in Wilkins religious and linguistic works as far as they are planned as instruments intended to supply the correct methodology necessary for acquiring and communicating knowledge. The focus of this scrutiny is placed both on the more speculative aspects of Wilkins theory and on its "applicative" side, consisting in his practice of elaborating schemes conceived as devices enhancing the organisation of knowledge.

The Dublin School of Aphasia Research in the 19th Century*Marjorie Lorch (London)*

The history of acquired disorders of language (aphasia) in the 19th century is typically told from a continental European perspective (e.g. Broca, 1861 and Wernicke, 1874) with minor mention of English contributions (e.g. Hughlings Jackson, 1864). However, there was a very active centre of medical research in Dublin in the first half of the 19th century whose efforts included work on aphasia. The neurolinguistic research of the Irish physicians Cheyne and Graves and of their students was highly regarded by contemporaneous French physicians such as Trousseau but has not propagated through the literature of the 20th century.

Numerous papers on language disorders appeared in the Dublin Journal of Medical and Chemical Science from the 1830s to 1860s. Two significant early case studies of aphasia by Osborne (1833) and Steele (1848) will be examined in detail. Consideration will be giving to methods of elicitation and assessment of language function in different language modalities (e.g., perception, comprehension, production, reading and writing), description of symptoms, explanatory models and ideas of rehabilitation will be addressed. The particular strengths of this Irish work will be discussed with reference to the western theoretical and practical perspectives on language organization in the brain in the 19th century.

Osborne, J. 1833 On the Loss of the Faculty of Speech depending on forgetfulness of the Art of using the Vocal Organs. *Dublin Journal of Medical and Chemical Science*, 1 November 1833, p 157-170.

Steele, W. E. A Case of Loss of Speech, &c. with Observations. *Dublin Journal of Medical Science*, 1845, 26, 355-368.

Richard John Lloyd (1846-1906)

Mike McMahon (Glasgow)

Richard Lloyd was a well-known Liverpool businessman, who managed to mix business with phonetics (including acoustic phonetics), Esperanto, sub-editing part of the OED, and teaching English Literature and phonetics. His name appears sporadically in accounts of phonetics in the last part of the 19th century, but as yet there has been no systematic assessment of his work. This paper will look primarily at the contributions Lloyd made to the study of phonetics.

The Tulip Project: A Novel Approach to the History of Linguistics

Jaap Maat (Amsterdam)

The paper reports on a collaborative project that aims, first, to present the results of research into seventeenth-century linguistic ideas in a novel way, and secondly, to open up links between seventeenth-century and present-day linguistic concerns. The project involves the development of an interactive website, hosted and supported by the Academic Computing Development Team of the University of Oxford. The project's name is an acronym, 'Tulip' standing for 'The Universal Language Internet Portal'. Centrepiece of the site, which is at present under construction, is a computer implementation of Dalgarno's universal language scheme of 1661. It is hoped that both modern and historical approaches will appear in a new light if modern techniques and tools for analyzing natural languages are applied to a seventeenth-century artificial one. The website provides interactive tutorials enabling its visitors to get acquainted with the workings of Dalgarno's language. Visitors will also be invited to become active users of the language, and thus to participate in a virtually unprecedented kind of linguistic experiment. Apart from the central part, the website contains a number of modules devoted to various aspects of seventeenth-century linguistics, which are related to Dalgarno's scheme and those of others. Thus separate modules on language diversity, language teaching, language origin, knowledge representation, philosophy of language, and others are envisaged or being developed. In this way, the website is designed to be both a research and teaching resource that might usefully complement more traditional ones.

**“Mr. A. J. Ellis – the Pioneer of Scientific Phonetics in England” (Sweet 1877, vii):
an examination of Ellis’s data from the northeast of England**

Warren Maguire (Newcastle)

Appraisals of Ellis’s ‘The Existing Phonology of English Dialects’ (1889) have been both negative (Wright (1892), Dieth (1946), Wakelin (1972)) and positive (Anderson (1977), Shorrocks (1991)). Typical criticisms are directed at Ellis’s method of data collection (via intermediaries), the inaccuracy of the data collected, and the impenetrable nature of the phonetic script employed (the palaeotype). Conversely, it has been pointed out that, regardless of the method of collection, Ellis’s data is often considerably more accurate than has been claimed, and that the palaeotype is much less obscure than it first appears. In view of these contradictory opinions, this paper examines Ellis’s data for Northumberland and north Durham in light of the detailed data provided by the Orton Corpus (Rydland (1998)). This comparison enables us to do two things: to check the accuracy of Ellis’s data for the region; to shed more light on the exact values of the palaeotype symbols used. My research suggests that in many cases Ellis’s data is remarkably accurate, confirming the importance of Ellis (1889) as a unique contribution to the history of English dialectology, in terms of the data he collected and the methodology he employed. Additionally, comparison with the Orton Corpus data indicates more exactly the way in which the palaeotype has been used. This enables a more precise definition of its phonetic values than is possible in a study such as Eustace (1969), and of the extent to which it encodes both phonological and phonetic information, as suggested by Local (1983).

- Anderson, P. M. (1977). ‘A New Light on Early English Pronunciation’. *Transactions of the Yorkshire Dialect Society*, 77/14: 32-41.
- Dieth, E. (1946). ‘A New Survey of English Dialects’. *Essays and Studies*, 32: 74-104.
- Ellis, A. J. (1889). *On Early English Pronunciation, Part V, The Existing Phonology of English Dialects Compared with that of West Saxon*. New York, Greenwood Press.
- Eustace, S. S. (1969). ‘The Meaning of the Palaeotype in A. J. Ellis’s On Early English Pronunciation 1869-89’. *Transactions of the Philological Society* 1969: 31-79.
- Local, J. K. (1983). ‘Making a transcription: The evolution of A. J. Ellis’s Palaeotype’. *Journal of the International Phonetic Association*, 13/1: 2-12.
- Rydland, K. (1998). *The Orton Corpus: A Dictionary of Northumbrian Pronunciation 1928-1939*. Oslo: Novus Press.
- Shorrocks, G. (1991). ‘A. J. Ellis as Dialectologist: A Reassessment’. *Historiographia Linguistica* XVIII, 2/3: 321-334.
- Sweet, H. (1877). *A Handbook of Phonetics*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Wakelin, M. F. (1972). *English Dialects: An Introduction*. London: Athlone Press.
- Wright, J. (1892). *A Grammar of the Dialect of Windhill in the West Riding of Yorkshire*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner.

European Approaches to Sanskrit

Iwona Milewska (Cracow)

The paper consists of three parts. In the first part it includes a short glimpse on the major personalities and facts marking the history of European contacts with India. It focuses on the ways Europeans have chosen to know Sanskrit linguistic tradition. Main names, books and sources are mentioned. In the second part major instruments elaborated by Europeans for the knowledge of Sanskrit are specified and shortly characterized. It covers the period of about 300 years. In the third part methods of applied linguistics used in the European tradition of teaching Sanskrit are enumerated, discussed and compared with chosen Indian methods. Final comments and questions are obviously included at the end of the paper.

John Wallis's *Grammatica Linguae Anglicanae*: Its Aim and Orientation

Masataka Miyawaki (Kanagawa)

John Wallis's (1616-1703) *Grammatica Linguae Anglicanae* (1st ed., 1653) has been recognised as a major landmark in the history of linguistics mainly on account of his two achievements. First, in the *Tractatus de Loquela*, prefixed to his *Grammatica*, Wallis provides a systematic description of the formation of speech sounds. Secondly, in the *Grammatica* itself, he makes an attempt to describe English grammar on the basis of the actually observed phenomena of the vernacular, refusing to follow the Latin-based model. Both of these achievements have been ascribed to the inductive, empirical attitude that characterised the new 'experimental philosophy', in which Wallis himself was actively engaged as Savilian Professor of Geometry at Oxford and a founder member of the Royal Society. The purpose of my paper is to re-examine the aim and orientation of Wallis's linguistic work and thereby to characterise it as being concerned with the 'universal' principles of language as well as the 'particular' traits of English; his *De Loquela* deals with general phonetics, applicable to all languages, whereas his *Grammatica* itself treats the distinguishing features of the English language. I shall try to demonstrate that these achievements by Wallis, namely, a scientific analysis of speech sounds in general and a careful description of the peculiar features of English, can be regarded as fulfilments of two of the 'desiderata' set down by Francis Bacon for the 'advancement of learning'.

Choix Théorique ou Pratique Linguistique? Autour des Jeux de Langage*Luiza Palanciuc (Bucarest / Paris)*

Les dispositifs de l'autonomisation sémiotique et la réflexion sur les formes symboliques nourrie de post-kantisme nous conduisent à nous interroger sur les manières d'envisager l'accumulation savante des théories du signe et les articulations conceptuelles qui gravitent autour de ces théories. Est-il possible, dans le jeu des différences, des écarts ou autres décalages à l'intérieur des théories linguistiques, de saisir l'espace valide d'une archéologie de la notion d'iconicité? Selon quel régime, quel effet de bascule, peut-on considérer que c'est un même discours qui se répète chez Peirce ou chez Wittgenstein? Poser ces questions signifie en fait poser le problème de l'assomption de la sémiotique, et, à travers elle, de la phanéroscopie et de la reconstruction de tout « jeu de langage » wittgensteinien sur le modèle de la maxime peircienne : « toute pensée est en signes ». Néanmoins, un renversement de perspective a déjà eu lieu : alors que Peirce prend les symboles pour point de départ, afin de parvenir aux icônes, Wittgenstein est, dès le début, sur une position iconique, et la thèse sur l'iconicité des jeux de langage, c'est-à-dire se manifestant « par eux-mêmes », y trouve ainsi sa preuve la plus forte. En ce sens, le jeu de langage wittgensteinien doit donc être pris iconiquement, et l'iconicité est, du même coup, logiquement première dans le processus de reconstruction du langage. Le caractère public de toute pensée, comme le rejet de tout ego fondateur, sont sans doute des points de convergence entre les deux auteurs. Mais c'est précisément autour de la notion d'iconicité qu'une comparaison entre les deux pourrait éventuellement être articulée, et une solution de continuité être trouvée, malgré l'inversement de la priorité entre l'icône et le symbole.

**Wilhelm von Humboldt's "Great Work" on the American Indian Languages –
A Reconstruction***Birgit K. Schütz (Aachen)*

Wilhelm von Humboldt's (1767-1835) "Grundzüge des allgemeinen Sprachtypus" is one of his better known linguistic works. Most critics described it as one further step in the development of Humboldt's language-philosophy. This view has led to the assumption that Humboldt never worked empirically and never intended to do so. The subheading of the "Grundzüge" though shows that this work was intended as "Einleitung zu ausführlichen Untersuchungen über die Amerikanischen Sprachen". The edited text is, therefore, only the introduction to a much larger work. It contains the philosophical foundation and is at the same time an instruction for the study of languages in general. Detailed descriptions of American Indian languages were meant to follow. The theoretical ideas are not only gained from philosophical reflection, but as well from previous empirical studies. It has always been Humboldt's belief that there is no such thing as empirical study without thorough reflection and vice versa.

His way is, therefore, dialectic. And, contrary to the common belief, there is evidence for empirical studies all over the “Grundzüge”, examples drawn from Humboldt’s studies not only of the American Indian Languages but also of Sanscrit, Chinese, Basque, etc. Furthermore, the table of contents – suffixed to the text – indicates that a main part is to follow up on the introduction. The main part would have contained the empirical studies which are only available in manuscript form. The questions which remain are: Did Humboldt never write a main part? Could he not finish it? or Was it simply not edited? In my presentation I will attempt to reconstruct Humboldt’s concept for the complete “America-Book” by consulting unpublished manuscripts and published texts. Resulting from the reconstruction one gains a completely different perspective on the “Grundzüge des allgemeinen Sprachtypus”. The re-construction of the America-Book, then, allows to re-construct Humboldt’s concept of linguistics as a continuous movement between philosophical and empirical study.

Transformations of the «Genius of Language» in the History of Linguistic Discourses

Christiane Schlaps (Göttingen)

The concept of the so-called «genius of language» («génie de la langue», «genio della lingua», «genius linguae», «Sprachgeist» etc.) boasts a remarkable history in a number of European discourses on language from at least the 17th century onwards, providing philosophers, grammarians, translators, and critics with arguments in their battles over the vernaculars once the domination of Latin had given way. Main types of the concept include: the *stylistic* «genius of language», being the stylistic (in)adequacy of a given language, especially its metaphorical and phraseological idiosyncrasies, commented upon by translators or critics of language as early as the 17th century; the *grammatical* «genius of language», relating to the formal (phonetic, morphological, syntactical, and prosodic) principles of a given language, as frequently discussed e.g. in universal grammars of the 18th century; the *semantic* «genius of language», understood by philosophers such as Condillac or W. von Humboldt to be a given language’s individual way of creating semantic content by linking specific mental units to certain linguistic units in a fixed order; the *organological* «genius of language», prevalent in German(-influenced) linguistics of the 19th century, in which the concept is seen as a personified driving force behind the evolution of a given language; the *nationalistic* «genius of language», a degeneration of the concept primarily found in 19th- and 20th-century linguistic texts with a critical or didactic focus.

What is a Pronoun?

Andreas U. Schmidhauser (Geneva)

At the heart of ancient reflexion on language stands the theory of the parts of speech. Apollonius Dyscolus, the great Alexandrian grammarian of the 2nd century AD, defines

each part of speech by means of several criteria – in the case of the pronoun, for example, one can clearly distinguish a syntactic, a semantic, and a morphological condition in his definition. I shall examine the semantic condition – that pronouns define a person. Apollonius has an argument for it (Pron. 9,17-10,7). Pronouns are either deictic or anaphoric; but deictic pronouns evidently define a person, and anaphoric pronouns define a person as well, since they indicate a person that is known and what is known is definite: hence pronouns define persons. The argument is valid - are its premisses true?

[The handout will include a new edition of the passage, as well as the first English translation. More on Apollonius at [http:// andreas.schmidhauser.ch](http://andreas.schmidhauser.ch).]

“More Complex Than I Expected”: Thomas Bowdich and the Languages of the Fante, Asante, and Ga

Richard Steadman-Jones (Sheffield)

In the same period that the British were assuming control of the Cape, they were also expanding their interests in West Africa and a focal point for this activity was the fort at Cape Coast, situated in the modern state of Ghana. In the early nineteenth century the British came into conflict with the Asante, whose capital Kumasi lies roughly 115 miles inland from Cape Coast. The king of the Asante, the Asantehene, claimed suzerainty over the ‘native’ states at the coast and ownership of the sites on which the European forts were built. In 1817, therefore, the African Company, sent a mission to the Asantehene in Kumasi to negotiate terms. Among the agents involved in the mission was a young man from Bristol, Thomas Edward Bowdich, who in 1819 published an account of the experience under the title, *Mission from Cape Coast Castle to Ashantee, with a Statistical Account of that Kingdom and Geographical Notices of Other Parts of the Interior of Africa*.

Chapter IX of Bowdich’s book deals with the languages of the region, including the Akan varieties, ‘Fantee’ and ‘Ashantee’ (Twi), and ‘Accra’ (Ga). In his account of these varieties, Bowdich is concerned to examine the structure of the languages in the light of the theory of language origins developed by John Horne Tooke in *The Diversions of Purley*. The focus of this paper will be the ways in which this kind of analysis coheres with the account of other aspects of Asante culture presented in the rest of Bowdich’s book. It will also draw comparisons with the work of John Barrow discussed in the previous paper and develop an account of the ways in which linguistic analysis was incorporated into the dialogic genre of the Romantic Period travel narrative.

The Emergence of the Subject

Sune Vork Steffensen (Aarhus)

In this paper I present a dialectical analysis of the emergence of the subject category in Danish linguistics, focusing on its first appearance in Jens Høysgaard's *Accentuered og Raisonnered Grammatica* (1747). My aim of the analysis is twofold: First, I relate Høysgaard's subject notion to the emergence of the subject in European grammar, especially as it is manifested in the *Port-Royal* grammar (1660). My point of view is that the *syntactic* subject originally was conceived as a *semantic* category, rooted in Aristotle's *pragmatic*, or ontological, distinctions between *hypokeimenon* and *antikeimenon*, and between *hyle*, *eidōs*, and *ousia*. Second, I explain the emergence of the syntactic subject as an implication of the Baconian-Cartesian segregation of (i) form and function, (ii) of logic and rhetoric, and (iii) *res extensa* and *res cogitans*. I see this development as a multi-determined result of social, technological and ideological conditions and constraints. Finally, I will shortly present some indications of a change in the subject notion within some modern linguistic paradigms, e.g. cognitive, functional, feminist, ecological, and dialectical linguistics. This might indicate the dawning of a post-Cartesian-Hobbesian era of communication, science and linguistics.

Mnemonics and General Grammar: Gregor Feinaigle in Dublin, 1813-19

Chris Stray (Swansea)

Feinaigle (1760-1819) was a Cistercian monk at Salem who when the monastery closed in 1803 after the Napoleonic invasion became a peripatetic lecturer on mnemonics. His travels took him to Karlsruhe, Paris, London, Glasgow and Liverpool, and in 1813 he reached Dublin. Here the local Protestant gentry helped him to found a school (the Feinaiglian Institution) which catered largely for their sons. The literature generated by the school (governors' reports, textbooks and a *Grammar of the Methodic and Mnemonic Art* (1818) by the school's 'mnemonic draughtsman' Michael Sandford) reveal a curious mixture. The ancient theatre of memory technique was employed for learning, rooms being covered with symbols; progressive methods like those of Pestalozzi were employed; and the Port Royalist tradition of *grammaire generale* was followed. In the paper I focus on the use of mnemonics for language learning, but set this in the local social and historical context.

Language, Culture, and Consciousness: Benjamin Lee Whorf's Critique of the Scientific Assumptions of Structural Linguistics

Joseph L. Subbiondo (San Francisco)

More than a half a century ago, Benjamin Lee Whorf (1892-1941) recognized that linguistics was central to the study of consciousness. He argued that while the study of language and mind was centuries old in Western thought, these studies have generally been based on the premise that thinking is the same for all people, regardless of culture. Whorf's argument that consciousness is shaped by language and language by culture was the basis for his controversial theory of linguistic relativity – or the "Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis" as it has come to be known because of his collaboration with Edward Sapir. In light of the resurgence of consciousness studies in the 21st Century, Whorf's work is enjoying renewed interest. In the collection of his works compiled in 1955 by John B. Carroll in *Language, Thought, and Reality*, Whorf's writings can be placed into two categories: those relating to his research on the Hopi and Mayan languages; and those regarding his speculation regarding linguistic theory in particular, and science in general. For Whorf, the two categories were interrelated because in working with non-Western languages, Whorf gathered evidence to challenge the adequacy of Western scientific principles, especially as they informed the study of language. The focus of this paper will be on Whorf's later works: four essays that summarized his life-long critique of the assumptions and methodology of Western science. These essays – "Science and Linguistics" (1940), "Linguistics as an Exact Science" (1940), "Language and Logic" (1941), and "Language, Mind, and Reality" (1941) – forcefully articulate a theme that underlies all his work: namely, contemporary linguistic theory is flawed by the limits of Western science.

The Notion of Sememe in Adolf Noreen

Serhii Vakulenko (Kharkiv)

The term *sememe*, which is usually associated with the French structural semantics, initiated in the 1960s by Algirdas Greimas et Bernard Pottier, or with Leonard Bloomfield and his followers in America, had in reality appeared in the work of the Swedish linguist Adolf Gotthard Noreen (1854-1925). The fifth volume of his monumental work *Vårt språk [Our Language]*, entitled *Betydelselära (Semologi) [The Science of Meaning (Semology)]* and published in separate fascicles in the years 1904-1912, contains a detailed treatment of the notion of sememe and a classification of various types of sememes. Noreen's analysis is based on the assumption that there is a parallelism between the material and the functional aspects of the language structure, which calls for an application of similar research methods in both cases. His view of *sememe*, patterned on that of *phoneme*, substantially differs from the structuralist one, but it seems to be free from certain incongruities inherent in the later attempts to

handle the plane of expression and the plane of content as isomorphic phenomena, as far as the traditional notion of *word* is concerned.

The Interpretation of the Origin of and the Genetic Relationship between Languages in 17th and 18th Century Baltic Area Linguistic Treatises

Peteris Vanags (Riga / Stockholm)

This presentation will inspect views on the origins of and genetic relationship among languages in 17th and 18th century Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian grammars and other linguistic treatises. The theories are related to contemporary European views, but they reflect a regional distinction. The traditional Christian idea of the divine origin of the diversity and also kinship of languages was still strong in the area in the 18th century although also new ideas on the kinship of European languages were rather popular in the Lithuanian and Latvian but not in Estonian speaking area. The similar or common theories in the grammatical descriptions of the languages of the peoples of the Baltic area are rather a result of common sources of influences than of contacts between the Baltic area linguists themselves.

On the Epistemological Value of the 'Semantic Polarization' Theories by the End of the XIXth Century

Ekaterina Velmezova (Moscow / Lausanne)

The difference in the study of various language levels seems to have never been so evident as at the close of the XIXth century. If the formal language aspect had been already studied rather well, the semantic aspect of language phenomena still remained out of the linguists' interest: the word itself of semantics was introduced in linguistics in 1897 only. Yet the general diachronic orientation was typical of the beginning semantic researches at this time, and a number of very particular semantic theories appeared. Today the majority of them seem rather groundless, yet their epistemological value remains quite significant. Among them, there were the explanation of the words' changing semantics with social reasons (A. Meillet), the theory of the class character of semantic evolution (N. Marr) and the 'semantic polarization' theory. This theory presupposed the co-existence of opposite (contrary) meanings in one word and concerned the majority of words in the so-called 'primitive languages'. Later on, every of these words was 'split' and replaced with two different lexemes having opposite meanings. It is interesting to note that such theories were made up by the linguists of either Western or Eastern Europe (K. Abel, N. Marr) which worked independently from one another. It proves that these theories were conditioned by the particular paradigm in the language sciences of this period. Either peculiarities or the epistemological value of such theories are to be discussed in the central part of our lecture.

Mach and Mauthner RevisitedFrank Vonk (*Doetinchem*)

The relationship between the Viennese scientist Ernst Mach (1838-1916) and the critic of language Fritz Mauthner (1849-1923) has been amply described in recent work (cf. K. Arens: *Functionalism and Fin de siècle. Fritz Mauthner's Critique of Language*, 1981) on language critical thought. In this work the cultural and theoretical background of Mauthner's and Mach's studies has been brought to light without, however, having paid enough attention to the real meaning of Mach's thought to Mauthner's language criticism. In my contribution, I will compare Mauthner's and Mach's approaches towards conceptual analysis and thus the meaning of Mach to Mauthner's lifelong project to put concepts and their meanings at the heart of philosophical theorizing.

**The Inadequacy of the English Lexicon':
Schäfer's Thesis and English Grammatical Terminology**John Walmsley (*Bielefeld*)

The consequences of applying a received Latin-based terminology to the description of a language structurally quite different from Latin have long been lamented. It is therefore worth enquiring into how and why this approach was adopted, particularly since grammarians have been less successful than colleagues in other disciplines in freeing themselves from the rigid conceptual schema delivered by the traditional terminology.

The received view is that scientific terminologies develop in the wake of scientific progress (Sager *et al.* 1980) and that in the case of English the language "was incapable of providing a linguistic medium for traditional scholarship and for the rapidly developing scientific disciplines since it lacked the necessary terminologies. This deficiency was remedied during the sixteenth century ..." (Schäfer 1989). McConchie (1997) has questioned this view, because it fails to take account of differences between disciplines.

How do these hypotheses stand up with respect to the metalanguage English? To understand how and why the grammatical terminology of English developed along the lines it did, we need to distinguish two separate strands. I shall address both the question of a native element in the terminology inside the Latin tradition (refuting Schäfer's thesis), and the question of why the grammatical categories of Latin were applied to English as and when they were.

Linguistic History vs. Krashen

Garon Wheeler (Abu Dhabi)

When we think of the history of linguistic ideas it is natural to have a tendency to overlook recent developments. However, lessons of history can be applied to linguistics today. Steven Krashen, the most famous applied linguist of recent decades, introduced his ideas about teaching languages (the Natural Approach, comprehensible input) in the early 1980's. They were clear, simple, and practical - and, unknown to all but a few, a restatement of natural methods a century old. Much of Krashen's success among rank and file teachers may be attributed to the accessibility of his ideas and to the American tradition of anti-intellectualism and utilitarianism. Nevertheless, they reawakened the inferiority complex of the "soft" sciences such as education and applied linguistics. Krashen's failure to sound scientific at once gained him popularity but guaranteed failure in the long run. Experts in our field - the ones who decree winners and losers - want science and explanation and productivity in order to win the respect accorded the "harder" sciences such as chemistry or biology. In the end, Krashen's ideas have met the same dismal fate as those from which they sprang a hundred years ago.

Harris, Roy (ed.)

The Language Myth in Western Culture

London: Curzon Press, 2001. 228 pp. £45.00. ISBN 0 7007 1453 7

(This review was written to a strict word limit and so foregrounds certain issues to the exclusion of others.)

Because this is a book about 'The Language Myth', a concept formulated by Roy Harris in 1981 (when he was Professor of General Linguistics at the University of Oxford) who attacked it with his 'Integrationist' Linguistics, and because it contains papers presented at the first plenary conference of an 'International Association for the *Integrational Study of Language and Communication*' in 2000, it is perhaps logical that professors of general 'linguistics' are 'privileged', in that their papers appear first in the volume. This is unfortunate, because these professors of linguistics are basically trying to write philosophy (or allegedly anti-philosophy), but without the philosophical training that might allow them to do so clearly. The authors in more 'applied' studies – applied English linguistics, historical studies, foreign languages – are the ones who, at the end of the volume, make the critique of the 'language myth' somewhat cognizable (and recognizable) as an existent part of or dispute in such diverse subjects as law, Western art, music and *lastly* the history of philosophy. Was this some vain attempt to make the 'language myth' and 'integrationist' analysis something 'new', by discussing it theoretically first and its possible relationship to the history of philosophy only last? The book might have been more approachable if its order had been reversed, particularly as Harris discusses the later articles before the reader can form any idea of what they contain (pp. 20-22). As it is, the fountainhead – Professor Harris – writes the first paper, which is an overbroad attempt to equate the 'Language Myth' with almost all of the 'Western Cultural Tradition'. The 'Language Myth', however, becomes more a myth underpinning analysis of sensation/cognition, thus a 'cognitive' or ontological/epistemological myth, rather than a language (or communication) myth *per se*. The 'Language Myth' is a myth of invariance and 'telementation' according to Harris: that words/ sentences/ thought/ music/ art, etc. are 'context-free' (a fixed code) and correspond can be communicated invariantly among changing speakers/ thinkers/ hearers/ circumstances. He admits (p. 16) 'along this route we cannot get to linguistics at all *except* via the philosophy of mind, or the philosophy of perception, or both'.

Harris berates established linguists for ignoring these philosophical dilemmas while blithely pursuing their supposed natural science'. Yet he admits we do not yet know enough about the physics/ physiology, etc. of how human cognition takes place in order to replace the 'language myth' in linguistics with an explanation better reflective of what actually occurs. Thus he upbraids linguists for not thinking outside the box – for not being philosophers, neurologists (neurolinguists) or physiologists, for not being *gründlich* enough. But maybe, in our era of specialization, these fields are not what linguists *do*, and in order to narrow their field of enquiry and/ or to produce

what seem to be 'results', they have (up to this point) kept their assumptions relatively narrow and/ or developed heuristic devices (which can be considered a scientific tool or a 'myth'). It reeks of 19th-century arrogance and academic encroachment, inversely, to say that linguistics will provide the model for philosophy, neurology or physiology, except as linguistics is a sub-division of philosophy and thus has come along to try to explain a *part* of philosophy's subject matter.

Further articles focus on: the inability of current linguistics to explain what actually happens in language/ sound/ semantic change (Nigel Love), thus allowing pride of place to Saussurean synchronic language analysis; what is 'standard English' (Hayley G. Davis), the idea of a fixed code for each nation being a reflection of the post-Renaissance creation of European nations; the need for a 'humanised' science of language based on probability/ indeterminacy theory from physics and dialogism between human beings living 'closely together' (Edda Weigand); the need to render mathematics (Daniel R. Davis), law (Michael Toolan), music and art less absolute and more sensually/ cognitively/ humanly bound. Many of the essayists disagree with Harris on major points. Philip Carr finds empirical support for the Saussurean conception of 'word' and the definition of segments of language in children's speech prior to their use of writing systems.

While the volume mainly claims to be throwing out issues for discussion, since it contains *revised* versions of conference papers, one would have hoped that the selection of examples for analysis could have been made more systematic (or at least 'thickly' descriptive) than desultory. This is, however, not particularly true, for example, in the papers by Christopher Hutton on the 'Race Myth' and George Wolf on philosophy (that is, Schopenhauer and music). One would have less dispute with 'integrationism' if its goal were to integrate linguistics with other/ new fields such as neuroscience. However, the book and movement seem to have a multiplicity of miscellaneous critical goals; further, no neuroscientists, physicists or physiologists appear as authors in this collection.

Joan Leopold, London

Law, Vivien

The History of Linguistics in Europe from Plato to 1600

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Paperback, xvii + 307 pp., \$26.00.
ISBN 0 521 56532 4.

When R.H. Robins first published his *Short History of Linguistics* in 1967 there were no journals dedicated to the history of linguistics, nor were there any monograph series or conferences. The history of linguistics has not only become a recognised branch of linguistics since then, but it has grown faster than any other branch of the subject. Vivien Law begins her preface to *The History of Linguistics in Europe from Plato to 1600* by observing that 'even in the late 1980s, over five hundred publications were appearing annually in the history of linguistics, more than twice as many as in syntax, semantics or phonetics, its nearest competitors' (p. xv). Surveying the whole history of western linguistics must have been a daunting task in the mid-1960s, but getting on for four decades later it is physically impossible for any one individual to do the job adequately. I know. I have tried and failed. Bobby Robins always thought of Vivien's book as 'the book that is to replace me' (p. xvi). In the event it hasn't replaced Robins's *Short History*. It replaces Robins's 1951 *Ancient and Mediaeval Grammatical Theory in Europe*, and it replaces Even Hovdhaugen's *Foundations of Western Linguistics* of 1982, because it is much more comprehensive and up-to-date than either of those books. It would be wrong to see it as a competitor for the Robins *Short History*, which in today's research climate is irreplaceable. It is something quite different.

Unlike Robins, Law treats her 2000-year history as a whole, a shared enterprise. She does not divide history into traditional chronological chunks ('Ancient Greece', 'The Middle Ages' etc.) but into events. I will discuss the framing chapters – 1, 11 and 12 – later, but the chapters which make up the core of the book are the following:

2. Greek Philosophy and the Origins of Western Linguistics
3. Towards a Discipline of Grammar: The Transition from Philosophy
4. From Literacy to Grammar: Describing Language Structure in the Ancient World
5. Christianity and Language
6. The Early Middle Ages
7. The Carolingian Renaissance
8. Scholasticism: Linking Language and Reality
9. Medieval Vernacular Grammars
10. The Renaissance: Discovery of the Outer World

Such a structure allows Law to discuss together developments which a more traditional chronology keep apart. Matthews (1994) deals with Ancient Greek and Roman linguistics together under the chapter heading 'Greek and Latin linguistics', and it is

normal practice these days to think of ancient linguistics as one continuous tradition. Law achieves this effortlessly via her careful selection of chapter headings. Thus chapter 3 embraces the Stoics and Varro, and chapter 4 Alexandrian and Byzantine work on the one hand and Quintilian, Donatus and Priscian on the other. This type of organisation exemplifies the over-arching principle of the book: it is holistic. The personal tributes to Vivien Law which appeared in the *HSS Bulletin* 38 mentioned time and again, either explicitly or implicitly, her holistic approach to everything she did, and her *inclusiveness* in this book is one key factor in its difference from the Robins *Short History*.

While she makes it clear that her study is limited to 'the history of linguistics in Europe', Law makes plenty of reference to non-European traditions of language study, and the clarity of her presentation gives the impression of her observing the work she describes from outside. Robins, by contrast, writes as an insider, one at the centre of the tradition he describes, writing for other insiders. Law strives to include as broad a range of readers as possible. She presupposes no knowledge of Latin and actually includes a simple explanation of how Latin inflectional morphology works. Much work on the history of linguistics stands fairly accused of being eurocentric, and, in its content, this book is guilty as charged, but, for the first time perhaps, this is a European history which is accessible as much to those outside as to those within the tradition being described.

This is also the first textbook on the history of linguistics to be really student-friendly. The Routledge *Landmarks in Linguistic Thought* series is clear and straightforward and greatly appreciated by students, but *The History of Linguistics in Europe* is the first book of its type fully to take into account the student learning experience. It is richly illustrated with contemporary works of art, and with manuscript excerpts and maps, something which makes it a pleasure to browse through. Cambridge University Press have been very generous with the layout, and the book feels much more manageable than, for example, the Longman textbooks on the history of linguistics, whose pages are very dense and dark, although it must be said that the 1997 edition of Robins's *Short History* is better than previous ones in this respect. *The History of Linguistics in Europe* entices the reader in. There are boxes throughout the text, providing brief overviews of individual topics. Some of these are very valuable for students of the history of linguistics, such as those explaining The Seven Liberal Arts or The Modists or the Transmission of Aristotle's Writings. Others are less obviously issues which need singling out. Research may have been undertaken (by Anneli Luhtala) into transitivity in Greek and Latin grammars, but that doesn't necessarily make it central enough to students' needs to get its own box, and the same concern applies, for example, to the box dealing with Jewish scholars' explanations of the notion of root. Law describes herself as a 'researcher rather than a textbook-writer by temperament' (p. xvi), and the researcher who has written about Virgilius Maro Grammaticus naturally wants a box entitled 'The first linguistic parody', but this sits rather uneasily alongside the other boxes. It is unreasonable of me to complain that Vivien Law the researcher occasionally peeps out from behind Vivien Law the textbook-writer, because without her immense learning, this book would not be half what it is. The reader is beguiled by the author's knowledge and drawn along by her passion for the subject. And in any case, Law never wears her learning heavily. Her

style is always crystal clear, and she has much more of a textbook-writer's temperament than anyone else who has taken on the challenge of writing a textbook on the history of linguistics so far. In its understanding of the needs of modern students too this is a dramatically different work from Robins's *Short History*, although, given the detailed and specialised bibliographies, it does perhaps respond above all to the needs of students in ancient seats of learning with substantial libraries at their disposal.

The most original and important chapters of this book are those at the beginning and end. What comes in between is impressive and beautifully executed, and for the period in question (500 BCE to 1600 CE) it leaves the competition standing. However, Vivien Law was not someone who *did* the history of linguistics, she *was* a historian of linguistics. It was about being a person and not simply doing a job. Consequently the opening chapter 'Getting ready to study the history of linguistics' addresses defining questions, such as what the history of linguistics is (it deals 'with people and their ideas about a uniquely human phenomenon' (p. 2)); the background knowledge the would-be historian of linguistics needs ('Forget all those stories about history being "easy"!' (p. 2)); what historians of linguistics do (they ask 'why?'), and so on. The most striking answer given in this chapter is to the question 'Why study the history of linguistics?'. This rather uninteresting question usually gets a rather uninteresting answer, along the lines of it being instructive to learn from our past. Vivien Law, the holistic human being, finds that the history of linguistics is the ultimate humanities discipline, providing the fullest insights into the nature of humanity, and it is worth quoting these dramatic and compelling claims at length:

What does the history of linguistics have to offer that one could not find just as well in the history of philosophy, or the history of science, or the history of anything else? As our academic disciplines are organised at present, there is a gap right at their heart. What discipline deals with the human being? Anatomy, biochemistry and molecular biology deal with the physical structure and substance of the body; physiology, biology and genetics with life processes; psychology with the mind and emotions; anthropology and sociology with human interaction and organisation; philosophy with man's place in the universe; and theology with man's relationship to the spiritual; but no single discipline brings all these together. If we were to study the history of all these disciplines, we would be able to grasp how our view of the human being has changed through time. We would be better able to understand why our picture of the human being is so disjointed, and to take the first steps towards restoring its lost wholeness [...] Despite its fragmentation into subdisciplines, linguistics offers us a short cut, for language (as linguists are fond of saying) mirrors the nature of man [...] Consequently, views about language are a guide to views of man; by studying the history of linguistics, we can form a pretty good idea of how people saw the human being in any given epoch. The one-sidedness that we perceive in the past warns us to be alert to the one-sidedness of the present: where is our understanding lacking? Can this be remedied? Can we heal the disjointedness? It is here that the history of linguistics has something to offer which no other branch of intellectual history can. (p. 8)

Every historian of linguistics should read these words every day on waking up and before going to bed.

Of course Vivien Law is not the first person to have formulated answers to these questions in print, but she has answered them in more challenging and profound ways than anyone else to date. The last chapter of the book 'Becoming a historian of linguistics' is on the other hand, as far as I know, quite original. Vivien Law thinks of the historian of linguistics rather as Quintilian thought of the orator. You do not become somebody by acquiring a portfolio of skills. That is only part of the process. The other part of the process is to live and develop in the right way. In section 12.2 Law challenges the way we perceive things and suggests how the would-be historian of linguistics can learn to see round his or her preconceptions, to see clearly. This is perhaps surprising in a textbook, but by this stage of the book the reader should have worked out that the author is taking a holistic approach, that all the senses must be honed and employed in this uncompromising way of approaching the subject. For Robins 'the importance of the history of a science is that it helps to place the present in perspective' (Robins 1997:8)). The ambition is modest and the person of the researcher is absent. Compare this with Law's heroic crusade to 'heal the disjointedness'. More surprising still are the final sections: 12.3 'Ethics and the historian of linguistics: the impact of your work'; and 12.4 'Ethics in working methods'. These are actually immensely useful, as well as thought-provoking. Increasingly, even book-based arts research proposals require an ethical statement, and most of us who are not used to working with human subjects find this all rather puzzling, but these sections of the book provide excellent guidelines in this regard.

The chief reason why Law's book does not replace Robins's *Short History* is that linguistics post-1600 is dealt with in a mere 17-page epilogue (Chapter 11 'A brief overview of linguistics since 1600'). This is not a disappointment, however. Law is quite clear that for surveys of the later period the reader will have to look elsewhere, and the value of this chapter is certainly not as a standard account of developments in the period. It is a non-standard account, looking at the period very differently to Robins. Some of the work she mentions does not typically appear in standard overviews of the period – Tommaso Campanella's *Philosophia rationalis* or Christoph Helwig's *Libri didactici grammaticae universalis* of the early 17th century, for example. So this chapter should not be seen just as an afterthought, a damp squib. Compared with the firework display of the previous chapters it is a damp squib, but it contains plenty to stimulate. The medievalist Law does not feel at home dealing with linguistics in the 20th century, but those who are more familiar with and interested in that period can benefit greatly from her special way of seeing recent work on language and learn to use that work more responsibly:

Linguists do not design weapons of mass destruction, but they are potentially in a position of equal responsibility. Once we become aware of the power of what is encoded in the way we speak to alter our perception of identity – our own, our group's and that of others as well – and to manipulate those identities constructively or destructively, we are unleashing a tool which has just as much force as the Bomb, with one big difference: language can be used for good or for ill. We have the choice. (p. 275)

Full classified bibliographies follow each chapter, which is helpful in a book like this, and there is no need for an impenetrable list of references at the end. Sources of quotations are given in endnotes, and, while this may keep the text tidy, I fear they are likely to suffer the fate of all endnotes, to be ignored. There is one appendix entitled 'Research resources for the history of linguistics'. This is really useful given the book's aim to be a handbook for the historian of linguistics rather than a compendium of information. The resources listed are:

1. Bibliographical resources
2. Catalogues of primary sources
3. Collections of texts of primary sources
4. Biobibliographical resources
5. Specialist publishers
6. Specialist journals
7. Book reviews
8. Societies for the promotion of the study of the history of linguistics
9. Conferences

The established scholar is as likely to learn something from these tips as the student just embarking on work in the field. I'm ashamed to admit that I was unaware of the journal *Beijing Studies in the History of Linguistics* until I read of it on p. 288 of *The History of Linguistics in Europe*. Law has been careful to give as much information as was available at the time when the manuscript was completed. Unfortunately some of this is out-of-date already. URL's are notoriously prone to change, and members of the HSS should know that Nicola McLelland, not John Flood, is now the treasurer of the Society!

I hope that it is clear from what I've written here that the *History of Linguistics in Europe from Plato to 1600* is not in any way a simple replacement for the Robins *Short History*. It is tempting to think of it in this way, of course, given that Robins was the teacher of the history of linguistics to the first generation of British students and Law succeeded him in teaching the second. Both were presidents of the HSS, and their lives and careers were closely linked. However, Vivien Law was fiercely independent in outlook and this is very much her book. Given its limited chronological coverage it isn't going to replace Robins as the textbook of choice for general courses in the history of linguistics, although (if students can be persuaded to buy two textbooks) it must do for the period to 1600. However, once we've all read and absorbed the first and last chapters, its impact on the subject could be much more far-reaching.

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Peter O. Müller

Deutsche Lexikographie des 16. Jahrhunderts. Konzeptionen und Funktionen frühneuzeitlicher Wörterbücher.

Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2001. xx + 668 pp. EUR 130,00.

This is a monumental book in many respects. Its sheer size and the fact that it deals with no less than 120 dictionaries which appeared for the first time between 1501 and 1600 in many different editions and versions give it extraordinary weight (in both senses of the word). In addition, there are chronological tables, a bibliography and indices of more than one hundred pages, and exactly one hundred pictures. The works chosen were printed in the German-speaking area and list German lexemes systematically, i.e. either as lemmata (key words) or as defining (explaining, translating, paraphrasing, describing, illustrating, etc.) interpretants. Functionally, these must be equivalent to the lemmata. This is why dictionaries which use German lexemes only occasionally are excluded (although there are some border-line cases). Moreover, dictionaries must have an independent status and not be part of a different text genre like lists, indices, etc. With only few exceptions, e.g. the first German collections of synonyms, monolingual dictionaries did not exist at the time, so almost all of them are bi- or multilingual. Typologically,¹ dictionaries with general and with specialized vocabularies are distinguished. In each branch of this dichotomy and according to their macrostructure, alphabetical, onomasiological,² morphological (i.e. following word classes) and rhyming dictionaries are grouped together. Alphabetical and morphological macrostructures are, however, frequently combined. In most cases, this leads to an alphabetization according to root words with affixations and compositions attributed to the keywords in a nesting method. The dictionaries are moreover sub-classified according to the languages used (besides German). Moreover, pragmatic characteristics are the reason for sub-classifications, among them the envisaged readers and the purposes of dictionary use. This entails a differentiation of dictionaries into such as serve didactic, scientific³ or practical⁴ purposes. The hierarchically highest principle of order is chronology. Wherever feasible (and this is in most chapters), it starts anew with late-medieval traditions and then leads through the new century. What the reader, therefore, sees are several paths cut through the

¹ Name dictionaries and the one foreign word dictionary in existence play only a marginal role.

² The term has several meanings. It is used here in the sense of Müller's *Sachgruppenlexikographie*.

³ As the borderline between schools and universities was by no means clear-cut at the time, the difference between schoolbooks and scientific books is not clear-cut either. More often than not it is a matter of size, not of standard. Unlike scientific books, schoolbooks (even dictionaries) were meant to be learnt by heart.

⁴ 'Practical' here means 'for use outside the scholastic and academic sphere'. It is a misnomer insofar as even in this sphere Latin was learnt for practical purposes, i.e. for reading the relevant books, for taking part in disputations and for acting in a professional way. The much later differentiation between learning for education (German: *Bildung*) and learning for everyday use must not be read into the term 'practical' because it would be an anachronism.

thick forest of lexicography from the early to the late years. The cut-off line has, of course, a rather artificial nature. As is pointed out in many cases, dictionaries continued appearing well into the next century and sometimes even beyond this.

Each of the 120 dictionaries is given a profile according to these typological and structural constraints which not only determine *where* the work appears in the book but also *what* it is like. Naturally, historiographically descriptive aspects vary, but some are applied consistently. To them belong basic information on the authors and printers, titles varying according to editions, exact bibliographical references which often develop into entire publication histories of works, and the graphic layout if it indicates macro- or microstructures. The most prominent recurring aspect, however, is the conceptual dependency of dictionaries on previous ones. They are manifold in almost every single case and make up a complex pattern of influences.

The categories of corpus selection entail that the products of some prolific lexicographers are often not dealt with in one place or with all their works. But there are cross-references to make up for this. Nevertheless, it becomes evident that system-orientated and person-orientated lexicography can interfere. The sources of analyses are the full titles, the prefaced and appended texts, which are minutely listed in one of the final chapters of the book, and, of course, the dictionaries (word lists) proper. Often extensive quotations from the accompanying texts supply the analytical treatment most effectively.

Its overall design and its substance make this book by Peter O. Müller a companion to the great and rightly famous overviews, for example, by Starnes (1954), Starnes and Noyes (1946/1991), Stein (1985), Lindemann (1994), Hüllen (1999⁵) and others. Like these, it combines the features of a handbook which may be consulted for any kind of detailed information and is not supposed to be read *in toto* with those of a monograph which delineates the developmental lines of a linguistic technique and the concomitant ideas which can only be understood if the book is read from the first to the last page. The following is a reading protocol and report on associated ideas.

The first substantial chapter is devoted to alphabetical dictionaries with Latin lemmata and German interpretants. They are seen against the background of the incunabula tradition as represented mainly by the wide-spread *Vocabularius ex quo* (1410)⁶ and the group of *Gemma* (*Gemmula*) dictionaries (1493), which were all meant for use in schools and perhaps by preachers and which had their forerunners in the dictionaries of Papias, Hugutio of Pisa, Guillelmus Brito and Johannes Balbus. The group of typically Humanist Latin-German school-dictionaries is constituted by Georg Altenheymer (1515), Petrus Dasypodius (1535), Johannes Serranus (1538), Johannes Frisius (1548 and 1556), Basilius Faber (1571) and the trilingual works of (again) Johannes Frisius (1548) and Nicolaus Volkmar (1596). The group of typically Humanist scientific dictionaries is constituted by Petrus Cholinus and (again) Johannes Frisius (1541 and 1556), the many polyglot Calepinus editions (1510), (again) Basilius Faber (1571), David Schelling and Helfricus Emmel (1586), the special cases of Sigismund Gelenius (1537) and the various versions of the Berlaimont group (1576). The discussion of the various Calepinus-editions and the Berlaimont-group shows the

⁵ This book is in the bibliography, but obviously came too late to be included substantially.

⁶ The numbers of years, indicating first prints systematically involving German, are taken from Müller in a sometimes simplified way.

difficulties of a nationally, though language-bound, orientated historiography vis-à-vis those works whose outstanding merit it is to transcend such limits. Only a part of their full range can be documented. Something similar happens when Frisius's heavy dependence on the dictionaries of Robert Estienne is discussed. Again only part of the work of Estienne can be mentioned. The author certainly masters these difficulties, yet they show that lexicography at that time (and at other times) was certainly not a national but an international affair. As an introduction to the whole chapter, the Humanist spirit of rhetorical education and the Cicero and Quintilian imitation respectively are mentioned, together with the names of many classical authors who are often given as sources. Other traits of the time - linguistic patriotism, language comparison and the practical appreciation of vernaculars - are mentioned ad hoc, i.e. with reference to Cholinus/Frisius, Gelenius, and the many editions of language guides.

The second substantial chapter is devoted to the same type of dictionary, however with German as the language of the lemmata. Against the late-medieval background marked by the *Abgrunde* glossary, the *Vocabularius theutonicus*, the *Vocabularius incipiens*, and the *Vocabularius primo ponens*, two distinct groups of dictionaries are presented. The first, German-Latin dictionaries of synonyms, is constituted by Hieronymus Cingularius (1513), the already mentioned Johannes Serranus (1549), Heinrich Decimator (1578), Helfricus Emmel (1592), and Hermann Ulmer (1567). Analyses show the way in which Decimator and Emmel continue and elaborate Serranus's works - a relationship which has so far been overlooked.⁷ Whereas the first four lexicographers worked within the framework of Latinate Humanist education, Ulmer is innovative insofar as he uses legal and administrative texts as sources and obviously wants to ameliorate the German competence of people who do not know any Latin. The other authors aim predominantly at ameliorating the competence of Latin learners, in spite of putting the German lemma in the first place in their dictionaries.

The second group, coming into existence by turning Latin-German dictionaries into German-Latin ones (*Umkehrlexikographie*, *U-turn lexicography*), is constituted by Dasypodius (1536), who reworked his own Latin-German dictionary, Johannes Christopherus von Rotberg (1556), who reworked one of Frisius's dictionaries, and Josua Maaler (1561) who produced the first dictionary with scientific ambitions in this way, whereas the others had produced schoolbooks. In his preface, Conrad Gessner developed for the first time the concept of a universal and source-driven German dictionary. His lexicographical deliberations based on the spirit of Humanist patriotism were retrieved in the following century. The main point of discussion concerning this group are the lexicographical difficulties which arise from the U-turn under the constraints of alphabetization. They lead to what can be called entry splitting.

The group of German-Latin dictionaries following the U-turn method is complemented by four works which form unique sub-classes. Erasmus Alberus (1540) published the first dictionary with final-letter alphabetization which, moreover, integrates many onomasiological references. Its purpose was obviously to explain the

⁷ For example in Starnes (1954), Stein (1985) and Hüllen (2004).

intricacies of the German rather than those of the Latin language. Martin Ruland (1586) did something very similar in a trilingual work (German, Latin and Greek) where the groups of semantically adjacent words are intrinsically alphabetized. The elaborateness of these groups comes very close to the *Nomenclatoren*, the onomasiological dictionaries of the time. This also holds for the assumption that such groups serve as an aid to memorization. Hieronymus Megiser (1592), author of many dictionaries, paralleled German, Latin, Italian, and – for the first time – Slovene lexemes. Levinus Hulsius (1596), finally, initiated the tradition of complementing German lemmata with lemmata of another living language, in this case French. A kind of appendix to this group are two German-German works. They are the anonymous *Der Leyen Disputa* (first half of the cent.) and Leonhard Schwartzbach's (1554) aid for the scribes in chancelleries which took the many *Kanzleibandbücher* as a model.

A few titles of French-German dictionaries (Gerard de Vivre and Levinus Hulsius) may be skipped here. Their inclusion in Müller's book is warranted by their being printed in a German-speaking town, but they are rather the members of a different (viz. French) tradition than that of German lexicography. Something similar can be said about the Hebrew-German dictionary by Elias Hutter. Müller's final overview stresses the dominance of 'Latin in relation to German' over all other languages and the didactic intention behind Humanist lexicography in general. One might add that the idea of an inventorization of languages by arranging multilingual vocabularies side by side is obviously also very strong. Formally, the devices of strict alphabetization vis-à-vis word formation and word derivation are in the foreground. Their general idea is to save the didactic purposes of dictionaries from the empty formalism of the alphabet. Behind this is the conviction that teaching should be meaningful and not mechanistic.

The third substantial chapter is devoted to onomasiological dictionaries which served either as language guides for living languages or as textbooks for learning Latin in schools. Typically, they developed into multi-branched book families. The former appear against the older tradition of a German-Italian guide by one Georg von Nürnberg (1424) in the so-called *Introito e porta* group whose *editio princeps* was published in Venice in 1477 and which developed into many multilingual editions with up to eight languages. It is only the four-, five-, and six-language editions which appeared in the German-speaking area. Although decidedly devoted to the teaching of living languages, they often include Latin entries,⁸ perhaps because of the general prestige of this language, perhaps because it could make the multilingual guides useful even for speakers of such languages as were not included. The really noteworthy fact is that these guides exist at all, i.e. that there was obviously a demand for aids to self-instruction of such languages as were important for commerce and trade in Europe. Of a similar type, though by far not as successful, was the *Vocabularius Latinis, Gallicis et Theutonicis verbis scriptum* which first appeared in Lyon in 1514 but was re-edited in Strasburg the following year.

Dictionaries as textbooks for learning Latin in schools which founded whole families of sometimes more than fifty members come in an imposing series: Johannes Murrnellius (1513), Johannes Pincianus (1516), Sebastian Heyden (1530), Georg

⁸ Of course, in the 15th century Latin was a living language too, although it had no native speakers.

Maior (1531), Johann Byber (1566), Adrianus Junius (1567), Theophilus Golius (1579), and Nicodemus Frischlin (1586). In addition to these, eight more onomasiological dictionaries appeared which did not found a group during this period. There must have been an enormous interest in this method of language teaching which created an enormous market. Didactically speaking, the interest focuses on the idea that foreign language teaching rests on native language teaching and that native language teaching rests on the teaching of matters and facts of reality. It is the old relation between *res et verba* which reappears here as a teaching principle. Generally speaking, the interest focuses on encyclopedism, i.e. the desire to arrange the whole world in the neat order of its various domains which was fed just as much by medieval images of the cosmos as by the awakening of the modern sciences. This is why these foreign language schoolbooks are on their way of becoming encyclopedias, and this is also why they are a prime source of our knowledge of cultural history. Of course, there were predecessors in both these functions, for example, in medieval glossaries and also in Renaissance lexicography, like Francesco Mario Grapaldi's dictionary on the parts of houses (1491) which is mentioned several times as a source. (And it worked deep into the 17th century when, for example, Comenius made it the foundation of his pedagogy.) Apart from arousing interest in herbs, medicine, anatomy, crafts, and many objects of culture, more attention was now paid to the native German tongue which did not serve only as a tool of semanticization of Latin any more. The beginnings of special language lexicography (*Fachlexikographie*) may be found here. A general preponderance of nouns is obvious and may be explained by the close link between words and things.

Each of the dictionaries has its complex history. Many exist in expanded or epitomized versions. Some are supplemented by alphabetical indices. The division of domains is certainly indicative of a religious and philosophical background with its traditional categories. It is quite similar in the various books, but by no means identical. One of the interesting questions is where the theological domain is located, at the top or further down. Many have unique marks. Murrnellius's *Pappa* (i.e. 'pap', or soft food for babies (beginners)) is part of a textbook with rules for dialogues and behaviour, proverbs and tables of conjugations. Pincianus included alphabetical lists of plant names. Heyden prescribed which words of certain domains had to be learnt on each day of the week. His book is the first to use the name 'nomenclator' which then came into common use. Maior's dictionary was published as an appendix to Luther's catechism. The most eminent case is Junius's *Nomenclator* which was well-known all over Europe and appreciated by almost every author of onomasiological dictionaries as their model (even where this is not warranted). Its versions varied between one and eight languages and transcended the limits of school knowledge by far, becoming almost a *speculum mundi*. In consequence, epitomized editions for use in schools were made. Moreover, it became the source text of a number of specialized dictionaries. One of its unique features is that the philosophical categories whose names serve as the headings of the various sections of words are explained as to their meanings and their places in the system. There are plenty of derived editions which have their own editors (Adam Siber, Matthias Schenck, Peter Horst, Mattheus Baader et al.). The latter's version (1598) did away with Junius's encyclopedic system and replaced it by the (ultimately) Aristotelian categories of substance and accidents, thus giving the book an

unashamedly philosophical order. Golius developed this categorical system further for mnemonic reasons. The size of his word sections is adapted to what learners can grasp in their lessons, and even the amount of daily work is carefully noted. With 177 sections, Frischlin reaches the peak of philosophical categorization. He added Greek lexemes to the Latin and German ones. The name of Aristotle as the instigator of the whole system is even mentioned in the title. This nomenclator became the model for many others by authors already mentioned like Emmel (1592), Decimator (1596), and Weleslavin (1598). A unique case in this group is Jacob Schöpfer's book (1550) in which High German and Low German words are juxtaposed.

Compared to the dictionaries presented so far, the following two chapters pertain to two rather exceptional and marginal groups. The first embraces six morphological dictionaries (Johannes Altenstaig, 1516, anon. *Brevis nomenclatura*, 1563, anon. *Nomina substantiva*, prev. to 1581, Simon Verepaeus, 1572, and David Hoeschel 1593 and 1596) which follow the eight parts of speech, case endings and genera respectively. They are at the interface between grammar and lexis. The second also embraces six dictionaries (anon. *Curia palatium*, 1510, Caspar Bruschius, 1547, anon. *Latina vocabula*, 1551, Adam Siber, 1572, Michael Neander, 1579, Johann Hilner, 1599) whose entries are arranged so that the German parts form rhyming pairs in various arrangements. This was, of course, done in order to facilitate memorization. It reminds us of the fact that in the 15th century – and in later centuries, too – vocabularies for schools were meant to be learnt by heart.

The last substantial chapter of the book is devoted to specialized lexicography (*Fachlexikographie*). Again, it has its medieval predecessors in glossaries and vocabularies. It now appears in onomasiological and also in alphabetical formats. They are mainly devoted to the natural sciences and medicine (Lorenz Fries, 1519, Paul Eber and Caspar Peucer, 1549, Michael Toxites and Johann Fischart, 1574, Conrad Gessner, 1542 and 1556, David Kyber, 1553, Jodocus Harchius, 1573, Caspar Schwenckfeld, 1600). Entries vary enormously as to the range of encyclopedic information. Sometimes they are articles of encyclopedias rather than of dictionaries. They often serve the identification of relevant herbs and substances and are, therefore, a direct means of scientific progress. The people addressed are mainly in the medical profession. With Conrad Gessner, a scientist of European reputation worked as a lexicographer. The languages used are mainly Latin, (Greek), and German, but in Toxites/Frischart also French, Italian, Spanish, and English, and in Fries also Hebrew and Arabic. There is a whole group of authors busy explaining Paracelsus's terminology (Adam von Bodenstein, 1566, again Michael Toxites and Johann Fischart, 1574, Leonhard Thurneysser zum Thurn, 1574 and 1583⁹). A semantic exception to these dictionaries on the natural sciences is Valentin Schreck's collection of nautical terms (1580).

To the last type of dictionary but one belong those devoted to listing surnames and toponyms (*Aliquot nomina*, ascribed to Martin Luther, 1537, Georg Witzel, 1541, Zacharias Praetorius, 1569, the already mentioned Heinrich Decimator, 1596, and Helfricus Emmel, 1592). Some of them give etymological information, some follow a

⁹ Thurm's second book contains a table of German words with their assumed equivalents in seventeen, mostly oriental, languages

pastoral interest by telling people which name to choose for their babies. The very last dictionary treated is Simon Roths's *Teutscher Dictionarius* (1571), the only book listing foreign and difficult to use words in this century. Functionally, it is similar to the hard-word dictionaries which appeared in greater numbers in England during the 17th century.

After this overwhelming parade of individual analyses, summarizing chapters are only few and relatively short. This is rightly done, because for attentive readers the position of dictionaries within the cultural framework of the 16th century has been made sufficiently clear. Compared with Latin-orientated lexicography, the proportion of dictionaries juxtaposing German and one or several living foreign languages is surprisingly small. The language guides with their technique of parallelizing do not make up for this. They aim at different goals and follow a quite different pattern of arrangement. German – French/Italian/Spanish/Dutch/etc. dictionaries are the task of the following century, when vernaculars came into their own in contrast to the formerly omnipresent Latin. As regards interlingual relations, it is obvious that, in the 16th century, German lexicography was (receptively) influenced by works originating in the French- and Dutch-speaking world, whereas it (actively) influenced those which appeared in Slavonic-speaking countries. There was no exchange between the Continent and the English-speaking isles. In the dictionaries, English played only a minor role.

After reading this book, hardly any wish is left unfulfilled. From my own work it is obvious that I would sometimes have preferred more attention to be paid to philosophical and lexicological aspects in the case of onomasiological dictionaries. The choice, sequence, and order of words in these works sometimes allow interesting insights into cognitive coherence phenomena. But these are merely interesting points for discussion, nothing more. Peter O. Müller's book is without any doubt a great achievement. Historiographical work on 16th century German lexicography, in its own right and in the context of the history of linguistic ideas, will henceforth not be possible without consulting it.

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PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

(to 1 November 2003)

Members of the Society have been kind enough to donate the following publications to the HSS Library. Further contributions, which are very welcome, should be sent to:

Dr Richard Steadman-Jones
 Dept of English Language & Linguistics
 University of Sheffield
 Sheffield S10 2TN

Monographs by individual authors will be reviewed wherever possible; articles in collected volumes will be listed separately below, but, like offprints and articles in journals, will not normally be reviewed. It would be appreciated if the source of articles could be noted where not already stated on the offprints.

The Society is also very grateful to those publishers who have been good enough to send books for review.

BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS

AUROUX, Sylvain (ed.)

History of Linguistics 1999: Selected Papers from the Eighth International Conference on the History of the Language Sciences, 14-19 September 1999, Fontenay-St. Cloud. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins (Studies in the History of the Language Sciences), 2003. xii, 403 pp. ISBN • 90-272-4588-6 (Eur.); ISBN • 1-58811-212-8 (US). EUR 135,00; US\$ 135.00.

DIBBETS, G.R.W.

Taal kundig geregeld: Een verzameling artikelen over Nederlandse grammatica's en grammatici uit de zestiende, de zeventiende en de achttiende eeuw. Amsterdam: Stichting Neerlandistiek VU; Münster: Nodus, 2003. viii, 248 pp. ISBN • 90-726355-76-3; ISBN • 3-89323-449-7. EUR 35,50.

DÖRSCHNER, Norbert

Dichotomische Verfahren der linguistischen Semantik. Münster: Nodus, 2003. 202 pp. ISBN • 3-89323-137-4; ISSN • 0721-7129. EUR 35,50.

DUTZ, Klaus D. (ed.)

Später Mittag: Vermischte Anmerkungen zur Metahistoriographie (Festgabe für Peter Schmitter zum 60. Geburtstag).

Münster: Nodus, 2003. 237 pp. ISBN • 3-89323-218-4. EUR 38,50.

ETO, Hiroyuki

Philologie vs. Sprachwissenschaft: Historiographie einer Begriffsbestimmung im Rahmen der Wissenschaftsgeschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts.

Münster: Nodus, 2003. 180 pp. ISBN • 3-89323-290-7. EUR 35,50.

GRAFFI, Giorgio

200 Years of Syntax: A Critical Survey.

Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins (Studies in the History of the Language Sciences), 2001. xiv, 551 pp. ISBN • 90-272-4587-8 (Eur.); ISBN • 1-58811-052-4 (US). EUR 125,00; US\$ 125.00.

HÜLLEN, Werner

Welsprache Englisch: Wege und Umwege, Erwartung und Bedenken.

Essen: LAUD Linguistic Agency, 2003. 40 pp. ISSN • 1435-6473.

JOSEPH, John E.

From Whitney to Chomsky: Essays in the History of American Linguistics.

Paperback edition, Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins (Studies in the History of the Language Sciences), 2002. viii, 240 pp. ISBN • 90-272-4593-2 (Eur.); ISBN • 1-58811-350-7 (US). EUR 40,00; US\$ 39.95.

SCHMITTER, Peter

Historiographie und Narration: Metahistoriographische Aspekte der Wissenschaftsgeschichtsschreibung der Linguistik.

Seoul: Sowadalmédia; Tübingen: Gunter Narr, 2003. 187 pp. ISBN • 3-8233-6004-3; ISBN • 89-954015-1-6. EUR 16,90.

VERWER, Adriaen; VAN DE BILT, Igor (ed.)

“Daer moet maer naerstig gelezen worden”: Brieven over taalkunde (1708-1709).

Amsterdam: Stichting Neerlandistiek; Münster: Nodus, 2002. liii, 95 pp. ISBN • 90-72365-75-5; ISBN: 3-89323-526-4. EUR 15,00.

PERIODICALS

Voortgang: Jaarboek Voor De Neerlandistiek. 21 (2002). ISBN • 3-89323-448-9; ISBN • 90-72365-74-7; ISSN • 0922-7865.

ARTICLES AND REVIEWS

NOORDEGRAAF, Jan

“‘Let Us Now Praise Famous Men’: Underlying Conceptions in the Works of Lambert ten Kate.’ In Klaus D. Dutz (ed.) *Später Mittag: Vermischte Anmerkungen zur Metahistoriographie*. (Münster: Nodus, 2003), 175-90. ISBN • 3-89323-218-4.

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“‘Philogothus’ of ‘der ungemein fleissige Lambert ten Kate’: Over de receptie van de *Gemeenschap* (1710) en de *Aenleiding* (1723)”, *Trefwoord*, (May 2002), 11 pp.

NOORDEGRAAF, Jan

“Vraaggesprek aan het Rapenburg (1881): Een ontmoeting met M. de Vries, de eerste hoofdredacteur an het WNT”, *Trefwoord*, (October 2002), 12 pp.

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“Naar aanleiding van een term: monosemie”, *Trefwoord*, (December 2002), 12 pp.

NOORDEGRAAF, Jan

“L.A. te Winkel en A. Winkler Prins: Hoe een lexicograaf verouderd”, *Trefwoord*, (March 2003), 5 pp.

NOORDEGRAAF, Jan

“Het Afrikaanse alternatief: A.N.E. Changuion (1803-1881) en het WNT”, *Trefwoord*, (May 2002), 11 pp.

CRAM, David

“The Doctrine of Sentence Distinctions in Seventeenth-Century Grammatical Theory.” In Sylvain Auroux (ed.) *History of Linguistics 1999: Selected Papers from the Eighth International Conference on the History of the Language Sciences, 14-19 September 1999, Fontenay-St. Cloud*. (Amsterdam, Philadelphia: Benjamins, 2003), 109-27. ISBN • 90-272-4588-6 (Eur.); ISBN • 1-58811-212-8 (US).

CRAM, David

“De Gustibus Metahistoricis.” In Klaus D. Dutz (ed.) *Später Mittag: Vermischte Anmerkungen zur Metahistoriographie*. (Münster: Nodus, 2003), 11-22. ISBN • 3-89323-218-4.

VORLAT, Emma

“Rowland Jones and the idea of a perfect language.” in Aline Ramael and Katja Pelsmaekers (eds.) *Configurations of Culture: Essays in Honour of Michael Windross*. (Antwerpen: Garant, 2003), 173-82. ISBN • 90-441-1380-1.

**ABSTRACT OF
JOHN WILKINS'S ESSAY (1668) AND THE CONTEXT OF SEVENTEENTH-
CENTURY ARTIFICIAL LANGUAGES IN ENGLAND**

*Submitted for degree of D.Phil., University of Oxford,
Trinity term 2003.*

John Wilkins's *Essay* (1668) was the most complete attempt to realise an artificial language in seventeenth-century England. Such artificial languages were something a little akin to modern Esperanto or Ido but, unlike these, they generally laid claim to universality secondarily, their primary objective being to represent the Aristotelian common notions of humankind: a language which represented commonly held notions would, it was held, be commonly understood. As such, it was thought that such a language would not only remedy what was lost at Babel but would, to appropriate Milton's *Of education*, 'repair the ruins' of post-lapsarian knowledge. The development of such an artificial language thus came to be seen as something that could reveal the truth of Christianity, while also granting limited knowledge of the Creator.

The introduction to this thesis identifies the beginnings of this movement in the work of Francis Bacon. Chapter 1 details the way in which those working in and around the circle of Samuel Hartlib took up and pursued this idea. Chapter 2 details the spread of the language planning movement from the Hartlib circle to interregnum Oxford, while chapter 3 illustrates how the activities of both Oxford and the Hartlib group fed into language-planning in the early Royal Society. Chapter 4 analyses in detail the mixture of institutional, theological, linguistic and philosophical issues that Wilkins hoped his work would resolve. A final chapter discusses the attempts to improve on Wilkins's system, marshalled by John Aubrey, the reasons for their failure and what these reveal about Wilkins's project itself. My concluding remarks offer some thoughts on the broader significance of the English language planning movement, and on how its history should both be written and read.

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**THE HENRY SWEET SOCIETY
FOR THE HISTORY OF LINGUISTIC IDEAS**

MINUTES OF THE 2002 AGM

The Annual General Meeting of the Henry Sweet Society was held on the 30th August, 2003, during the Society's Annual Colloquium, held this year at Trinity College, Dublin.

Attendance (names in alphabetical order): Anders Ahlqvist (Chair), Anita Auer, David Cram, Theo Druyven, Hiroyuki Eto, Hedwig Gwosdek, Werner Hüllen, Pascale Hummel, Irina Ivanova, John Joseph, Louis Kelly, Paul Laurendeau, Jacqueline Léon, Natascia Leonardi, Therese Lindström, Andrew Linn, Marjorie Lorch, Jaap Maat, Nicola McLelland, Mike MacMahon, Masataka Miyawaki, Jan Noordegraaf, Jana Privratska, Christiane Schlaps, Andreas Schmidhauser, Richard Steadman-Jones (Secretary), Sune Vork Steffensen, Chris Stray, Joseph Subbiondo, Serhii Vakulenko, Peteris Vanags, Ekaterina Velmezova, Frank Vonk, John Walmsley

1. Minutes: the minutes of the previous meeting had been circulated in the Bulletin and were now agreed. There were no matters arising other than to note with respect to point 10 that there was no longer a lectureship in the History of Linguistics at the University of Cambridge, although the Department of Linguistics was hoping to maintain teaching in the area if possible.

2. Treasurer's Report: The treasurer, Nicola McLelland, stated that she intended in future to give an annual report rather than a six-monthly one and for this reason would not be speaking in detail about the Society's finances at this point. She noted that the Society's finances were healthy, assets on the 31st December 2002 amounting to £13,180.49. Income from subscriptions was currently stable, but in the previous year expenditure had exceeded income from subscriptions because of the travel expenses of the Executive Committee. For this reason expenses would now be capped at £40 per person for each meeting. Dr McLelland also noted that it was still difficult for some members to pay subscriptions and said that she would look into the possibility of setting up an online payment scheme and also investigate the Cooperative Bank's Euro accounts, although the latter seem expensive to maintain. Until this issue is resolved, the best option is to pay several years' subscription at the same time and so save on bank charges.

3. The Dublin Colloquium: Joe Subbiondo thanked and commended Nicola McLelland on the excellent organisation of the present colloquium. In response to a question about the possibility of publishing the proceedings of the colloquium, Dr McLelland stated that it was not usual to do this but that the editors of *The Bulletin* would welcome submissions.

4. Future Colloquia: Dates and Venues: It was agreed that the 2004 colloquium would be held in Oxford and organised by David Cram. Since the next ICHOLS is in 2005, the Henry Sweet Society will hold a one-day colloquium that year in London. This will be organised by Richard Steadman-Jones with the help of one of the members attached to the University of London. The colloquia for 2006 and 2007 will be held in Glasgow and Sheffield, and organised by Mike McMahon and Andrew Linn respectively. The Chairman encouraged offers to host conferences in other locations. It was agreed that late August is the best time for colloquia to be held.

5. Committee Membership: Discussion of this issue was postponed because the relevant information was not available. Michael Isermann has had to withdraw from the Executive Committee and it was agreed that Anders Ahlqvist would write to thank him for his work.

6. The Bulletin: As of May 2004, Andrew Linn will be handing over editorship of the Bulletin to Therese Lindström. They will edit the edition for November 2003 jointly: articles should be sent to Professor Linn and all other contributions to Ms Lindström. The editors invited members to send short articles and news items for inclusion in future editions. Issue 29 (November 1997) is now available online in PDF. Others will be mounted as soon as possible. The question of whether more recent editions should be available online was raised. Since *The Bulletin* is one of the benefits of membership, the most recent issue should perhaps be available only to members. However, it might be possible to publish it online and for members to access it using a password. Jacqueline Léon stated that *Historie, Epistemologie, Langage* is currently only available in hard copy but that the editors were considering electronic publication. The issue requires further discussion but Ms Lindström stated that there was no plan to stop producing *The Bulletin* in hard copy. There was a vote of thanks to Professor Linn for his work as editor.

7. Web Pages: Therese Lindström spoke about recent development to the Society's website, including a link to a new site for students of the History of Linguistics. She also asked members to suggest ways of developing the Society's site. Suggestions included links to the homepages of members (this would need to be optional because of data protection issues) and also links to resources such as online texts.

8. Publications: Nicola McLelland reported that a volume on etymology in the ancient world is currently in press and that she and Andrew Linn are currently working on a memorial volume for Vivian Law, publication of which is projected for late 2004 or early 2005. Chris Stray noted that the Thoemess Press and the Ganesha Press had both expressed an interest in publishing the field of the History of Linguistics. Andrew Linn informed members that the Publications Committee were keen to receive proposals for new volumes but noted that authors would need to be able to accept some financial responsibility for the publication themselves.

9. AHRB proposal: John Joseph reported on the progress of the Society's bid for ring-fenced AHRB studentships in the field of the History of Linguistics. The first stage of

the process had been successfully completed and the full proposal had to be submitted by the 12th September, 2003. Professor Joseph invited members to send him material that might be used in the documentation for the proposal.

10. The Library: Richard Steadman-Jones passed on a report on the Society's collection from the Head of Collection Management at the University Library at York, Elizabeth Harbord. The cataloguing of the collection is progressing well and five hundred items have been completed.

11. Thanks: Louis Kelly seconded Joe Subbiondo's earlier comments about the organisation of the colloquium and the meeting ended with a vote of thanks to Nicola McLelland for her work.

XVIth International Colloquium of the SGdS

Humboldt University of Berlin (Germany), 4 - 6 March 2004

The XVIth International Colloquium of the "Studienkreis Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft" (SGdS) will be held at the Humboldt University of Berlin from 4 to 6 March 2004. The organisers are Dr. Thorsten Fögen (Berlin) and Professor Dr. Peter Schmitter (Seoul & Münster).

Information about Berlin and the Humboldt University can be found on the Internet (www.berlin.de and www.hu-berlin.de resp.). Participants will receive detailed information regarding directions to the conference site, accommodation and cultural life in Berlin in due course.

There will be a **general section** on the history of linguistics and a **special section** on "**Historical and cultural dimensions of technical texts and languages for special purposes**".

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NAAHoLS at LSA

Boston, 8-11 January 2004

The 2004 NAAHoLS meeting will again be held in conjunction with the Linguistic Society of America, the American Dialect Society, the Society for the Study of the Indigenous Languages of the Americas, and the Society for Pidgin and Creole Linguistics. The meeting will take place at the Sheraton Hotel in Boston, Massachusetts between 8 and 11 January 2004.

Further details from the conference organiser:

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In Memoriam Henry Hoenigswald (1915-2003)

Linguists will be sorry to hear of the death on June 16 in Haverford, Pa. of Henry Hoenigswald, Professor Emeritus of Linguistics at the University of Pennsylvania. Henry Hoenigswald (1915-2003) was trained as a classicist and an Indo-Europeanist in Germany, Switzerland and Italy and taught most of his life at the University of Pennsylvania. He worked both in Indo-European and Classical linguistics and in the theory of historical linguistics, to which he contributed some of the first and most important attempts at formalization of the techniques of historical reconstruction and comparison. He was President of the LSA in 1958. Henry never stopped working and his last paper on a point of classical metre was written three weeks before his death. A number of students and colleagues owe him steady support and help which continued through all of their career. He leaves two daughters.

Anna Morpurgo Davies for the LSA

(Originally appeared on LinguistList, Tues. 17 June 2003)