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EDITORIAL

This edition of the Bulletin comes to you not from the capable hands of Therese Lindström Tiedemann, but from the acting editorial hands of Fiona Marshall (Sheffield) and me. We would like to take this opportunity to congratulate Therese on the birth of her daughter Tove this summer, and to thank Therese for somehow still managing to get the May Bulletin out to us all.

The first two articles in this Bulletin juxtapose two very different linguists of the early decades of the 20th century: Reichling in the Netherlands, and Marr in the Soviet Union. Els Elffers discusses the contribution of Anton Reichling (1898-1986) to the study of general linguistics at the University of Amsterdam in the 1920s and 1930s and considers his reception in later linguistic theory. Meanwhile, Ekaterina Velmezova offers an insight into the Japhetic ideas of the Russian linguist Marr (1864-1934) to argue that a mis-translation of the title of a work by the French anthropologist Lévy-Bruhl (1857-1939) into Russian was not the simple error it might first appear. These two papers deal with near-contemporaries, but who were worlds apart. L.G. Kelly, like Velmezova, deals with problems of translation, but takes us back to the apothecaries of the 17th century to consider the approach taken by Puritan apothecaries. Also in this edition, John Walmsley reviews Graffi's *200 Years of Syntax* (Amsterdam: Benjamins, 2004) and, for me, at least, adds to books-I-must-read pile. More such reviews please!

In addition, this edition contains three calls for papers for conferences in 2006: first and foremost, of course, for the Henry Sweet Society Colloquium to be held at Sheffield over four days in September 2006; but also for the annual conference of our sister body based in Germany, the *Studienkreis Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft*, whose conference takes place in Leiden, the Netherlands, in June 2006, and for the *Perspectives on Prescriptivism* conference in Ragusa, April 2006.

As readers will know, the colloquium of the Henry Sweet Society took place last spring at Darwin College, Cambridge. Warm thanks are due to for L.G. Kelly for arranging the event, a shorter one-day affair, as is usual in ICHoLS conference years. We were particularly pleased to be able to welcome Vivien Law's husband, Professor Sir Nicholas Shackleton, at the Colloquium to witness the launch of a collection of essays in her memory (1954-2002), *Flores Grammaticae. Essays in Memory of Vivien Law*, edited by Andrew Linn and myself (Münster: Nodus, 2005).

This issue also contains some of the more mundane fruits of the labour of the HSS Colloquium at Cambridge: the Society's accounts for 2004, and a slightly revised constitution for the society, both approved at the Annual General Meeting held during the Colloquium.

Anders Ahlqvist provides a report of the ICHoLS X at the University of Illinois in this issue, but proof of the stimulating discussions can be found in the Open Letters by David Cram and John Joseph with which this edition begins, and which will no doubt promote further lively discussion. Let the games begin!

Nicola McLelland, *Nottingham*
Editor

Two Open Letters

An Open Letter to John Joseph

Following the discussion we had at the conference in Champaign-Urbana this summer (ICHOLS X), and subsequent correspondence, I am writing this open letter, as we agreed, to give public airing to some of the issues we touched upon. What started out as a spirited academic dispute has served to foreground some substantial questions about the direction of our discipline.

Although the history of linguistics is currently a buoyant discipline in its own right, as attested by the level of conference and journal activity, I fear we are failing to promote the subject among younger academic linguists, and this cannot be a good thing for the future. What disturbed me at ICHOLS X was the tendentious tenor of the debate when recent trends in linguistic theory were being considered, as they were at the plenary sessions and elsewhere. It worried me that the discussion was pitched at a level that will have the inevitable effect of alienating younger scholars who are themselves working in linguistics departments. May I stress that I am not objecting to radical critique of current theoretical trends, but to a critique which appears to be undermining specific theoretical positions by belittling them.

I hope you will forgive my plucking an example from your own plenary lecture, which was on the multifarious usages of the term 'natural' in discussions of language. (To preclude misunderstanding, I should add that I consider your book on which you were drawing, *Limiting the Arbitrary*, to be in my top ten linguistics books of recent decades.) At one point in your argument, you cited a quotation from Chomsky to the effect that he was prepared to 'disregard the phenomena' in moving towards the larger goal of establishing underlying explanatory principles. Now the logical step that this quotation represents is a seemingly paradoxical one, but one which is not unfamiliar in the philosophy of science. It calls to mind Einstein's slogan that it is more important to have beauty than truth in one's equations. Establishing a theory which will fully and satisfactorily 'save the phenomena' may at some stages properly involve disregarding phenomena which are cluttering the foreground.

Now you know (and you know that I know that you know) what Chomsky is doing here. Although paradoxical, it is no more incoherent than what we do when we first of all train our students to respect the facts, only to instruct them subsequently that 'the facts' cannot be taken unproblematically at face value. My worry is that flourishing the Chomsky quotation out of a Chomskyan context runs the risk of a double error, rhetorical and logical. The rhetorical error is in inviting people (or at least appearing to invite them) to laugh at Chomsky for the wrong reasons, to commit an *ad hominem* fallacy; Chomsky may be misguided, but he is not stupid, as the bare quotation would seem to suggest. The logical error is more serious (indeed perhaps *mort subite*). In taking Chomsky to task for disregarding the phenomena, but doing so by quoting him out of context, the very act of quoting him out of context means that one is oneself misrepresenting the historiographical phenomena. It is a case of being hoist with one's own petard.

There are other Chomsky statements which invite similar attention but pose similar rhetorical dangers. One such that I am myself fond of tilting at is from *Reflections on Language* (Fontana, 1976, p. 76, emphasis added):

We must distinguish between the literal meaning of the linguistic expression produced by S [the speaker] and what S meant by producing this expression (or by saying that so-and-so, whatever expressions he used). The first notion is the one to be explained in the theory of language. The second has nothing particular to do with language; I can just as well ask, in the same sense of ‘meaning’, what S meant by slamming the door.

But of course the deliberate slamming of a door is interpreted as meaningful by virtue of Grice’s ‘maxim of manner’, the same maxim that plays an integral part in the interpretation of utterances. On these grounds, I would want to disagree profoundly with the claim that what a speaker means by producing an expression ‘has nothing particular to do with language’. But we both know how Chomsky has managed to argue himself into this position, and attacking it requires the careful unpicking of a whole network of theoretical assumptions, many also held by linguists of quite different persuasions, and traceable back to the Saussurean distinction between *langue* and *parole* (though de Saussure himself, given his belief that the study of language in its own right forms part of a larger science of semiology, might have blenched at this outcome). It is not a position to be laughed at, but to be deconstructed.

What I am arguing is that if Chomsky is wrong in these two instances, he is wrong in a sophisticated way. Students make up their own minds about whether they think Chomsky is right or wrong on these issues, and they welcome arguments which contribute to the cut and thrust of debate, since important and fundamental issues are involved. But what they find alienating, in my experience, is when a sophisticated position (whether one finds it wrong or not) is simply not taken seriously, but dismissed out of hand as laughably benighted. In short, if as historians of the present we are to engage in radical critique of contemporary theory, we need to avoid falling into the trap of misrepresenting a complex position as simple-minded, for the sake of rhetorical effect. To the young scholar working in a contemporary linguistics department, this is likely to be viewed as intellectual luddism.

It has been suggested to me that what I am saying amounts to arguing that only ‘practising linguists’ should legitimately engage in the discipline of linguistic historiography. But this is not what I am arguing, any more than I would want to argue that only Jews should write Jewish history, only women should write feminist history, and so forth. In many scientific disciplines (e.g. medicine, astronomy, etc.) the history of the subject is most frequently tackled by non-practitioners. It is not surprising that this should also hold for the history of the language sciences, given that they come in the plural to begin with. I am not saying that all linguistic historiography should be done by ‘linguists’. What I would like to argue, though, is that all ‘linguists’ should take some serious interest in linguistic historiography. I fear that intellectual luddism defeats the objective of promoting our subject within linguistics departments.

I hope this open letter will serve to highlight some fundamental points on which I believe we probably agree, and to foster discussion where others don’t.

David Cram (20 October 2005)

An Open Letter of Reply to David Cram

Of the tasks I am aiming to achieve in this reply, the first and foremost is to acknowledge the deep and genuine concern for the well being of the history of linguistics that motivates your letter. The Society is fortunate to have as Chair of its Executive Committee someone who is dedicated to promoting the subject among young linguists, and I am fortunate to have in you the sort of friend and colleague who, when displeased with something I have done, tells me about it directly rather than talking about it behind my back, and arranges for me to have the chance to give my answer in this forum.

Secondly, I assure you that it was never my intention to offer the Chomsky quote as a laughing stock — quite the opposite. Since you raise the issue of taking things out of context, it may be helpful for anyone reading this who wasn't at ICHoLS if I provide the quote and sketch the context in which it was presented and received. Having resumed the core argument of my book, viz. that across the history of linguistic thought we can trace continuous threads of 'naturalism' that take different forms in different periods, I offered some examples, including a run-down of Chomsky's core-periphery distinction and the various ways in which he has described periphery. I focussed on Chomsky because, as stated in Joseph et al. (2001: 122), "From the mid-1960s onwards his influence on academic ideas about language has been unrivalled by any living scholar".

The slide to which you refer was headed 'Ideal as real (Chomsky)', and this is the quote it contained:

[I]dealization is a very misleading term, because it really means a move towards reality. When you talk about idealization or abstraction, it is an effort to find the reality. When you roll a ball down a frictionless plane, that is called an idealization, but what you are really doing is finding the real principle by which things attract one another. It is the phenomena that are a nuisance: they are unreal in a way, because they are too complicated. Reality hides behind the phenomena, as it were, so you have to get rid of a lot of the phenomena to find it. (Chomsky, in Dillinger & Palácio 1997: 184)

This brief text is a very important one for my hypothesis of an intellectual continuity from the *Cratylus* to modern linguistics — a notion that tends to provoke disbelief, scorn and even laughter (directed at me, not Chomsky) from non-historically-oriented linguists who can't imagine that Plato might have any relevance to their own concerns. Here however we see Chomsky at his most obviously Platonic. It makes a *prima facie* case for people at least to hear me out, regardless of whether they finally accept my argument.

If you want to see the kind of reaction I *anticipated* from the ICHoLS audience, go to <http://htl.linguist.jussieu.fr/semin.html>, where you'll find a link to a videotaped talk ("Conceptions naturalistes et anti-naturalistes du signe") which I gave on 7 February of this year to the Séminaire d'Histoire et d'Épistémologie des Sciences du Langage, DEA de Linguistique formelle, UFRL, Université de Paris-7. The second half of the talk is on Chomsky, and you'll see that it was quite a sober affair. Why exactly the ICHoLS audience reacted so differently is a mystery to me; perhaps all were in a buoyant mood thanks to the exceptionally good roster of talks that had

preceded mine and the wonderful organising done by Doug Kibbee and his team. In any case, what unfolded, from my perspective at the front of the room, was as follows:

- JJ shows slide, reads Chomsky quotation.
- About three quarters of the way through, a collective gasp arises from the audience (presumably as they work out the implications of what Chomsky is saying in the context of his theory of language).
- As JJ is finishing quotation, audience bursts out in laughter.
- JJ: “Now, I haven’t put this up in order to make fun of it.”
- Laughter continues. From the audience is heard the booming voice of one D. Cram:
 - DC: “Oh yes you have!” (This no doubt prolongs the laughter.)
 - JJ: “The point I’m trying to make is that, actually, Chomsky is *right*. He’s right! [I distinctly remember saying this forcefully, twice.] We *do* always have to abstract away ‘phenomena’. The question is — where to stop? Where language is concerned, where’s the boundary between phenomena and reality? That’s the fundamental question of linguistics, and it’s a tremendously difficult one.”

Apart from insisting once again that my intention was never to belittle Chomsky, I must disagree with what you say about the quote being presented out of context. Actually, when read out of context, the Chomsky quote seems perfectly straightforward and commonsensical. It’s only when put into the context of language that it becomes interesting — and this is clearly what the audience did, spontaneously, because they of course know the context well.

The third point I wish to raise is to ask whether Chomsky necessarily represents ‘contemporary theory’. He is nearly 77, has been semi-retired for some time, and is seldom cited in syntax papers I attend in my department and at conferences elsewhere, except as a historical antecedent. Your own very stimulating ICHoLS paper on “Shelf Life and Time Horizons in the Historiography of Linguistics” points out how what is ‘current’ is continually moving and leaving a wake behind it. It is probably fair to say that Chomsky, whose writings span more than 50 years, simultaneously inhabits the present, the immediate past that is the ‘wake’, and the pre-wake ‘historical’ past. Linguists who see him as belonging fundamentally to the wake are, predictably, the most dismissive of him. Others, like me and (I think) Michael Silverstein (the other plenary speaker who referred to Chomsky), see him as fundamentally part of the historical past. As a result, we are better able to appreciate the enormity of his achievement, while also analysing his views critically without a feeling of *parti pris* with regard to the current linguistics scene, of which we are both actively a part.

Finally, your point about the need to promote an interest in the history of linguistics within linguistics departments (and other units in which linguistics is taught) is very well taken. I think that nowadays most of us tend to be grateful that our work in this area is *tolerated* in such departments. Each of us can and should do more. The Subject Centre for Languages, Linguistics and Area Studies within the Academy of Higher Education would support such promotional activities on a small scale. On a larger scale, my impression is that the AHRC would be receptive in principle to a request for funding, for instance to its Research Networks and Workshops Scheme.

Whether they would support a project looking into what makes one audience laugh at what another took dead seriously, I couldn't say.

John Joseph
28 October 2005

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Anton Reichling (1898-1986)

Between phenomenology and structuralism

Els Elffers

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1 Introduction

To tell the story of Anton Reichling is to tell the story of the rise and early development of General Linguistics as an institutionalized discipline at the University of Amsterdam.¹ Reichling was the first holder of the newly created General Linguistics chair at the University. During his professorship – which lasted for over two decades (1946-1968) – he left his mark on research and teaching activities at the (in those days, still small) Department of General Linguistics.

In Section 2 of this article I will present a general view of Reichling's development as a linguist, his professional career at the University of Amsterdam, his central linguistic viewpoints and his role in the linguistic world of his day.²

The next two sections will deal with two more specific questions concerning the content of Reichling's views. The first, which is discussed in Section 3, concerns Reichling's linguistic metatheory, which seems to combine a strong defence of the "autonomy" of linguistics *and* serious claims in favour of a *psychological* foundation of linguistic notions. How should we interpret this apparent ambivalence? The second question, which is discussed in Section 4, concerns recent attempts to "incorporate" Reichling into such present-day linguistic currents as cognitive semantics and pragmatics. Are these "precursorship" views tenable?

In Section 5 some concluding remarks will be made about Reichling's position in the history of linguistics.

2 Reichling: the man who "deeply reflected on the word"

2.1 Preliminaries: the rise of General Linguistics and the Amsterdam problem

General Linguistics arose at the end of the 19th century as a more empirical descendant of the earlier multivariate current known under the umbrella term 'General Grammar'. After a century dominated by historical linguistics, this relatively minor current was developing into a broader discipline, founding linguistic notions on a firm cross-

¹In the period discussed here, the University of Amsterdam was a Municipal University, and was usually called by that name. It became a State University in 1969.

²For the information presented in this section, my main sources are the two obituaries of Reichling by Dik (1987) and Uhlenbeck (1988), and Jan Noordegraaf's contribution "Reichling revisited: Algemene Taalwetenschap in Nederland 1935-1960" to the cluster of articles devoted to Reichling in *Voortgang* XIV, 1994. Furthermore, I am grateful for oral information, earlier provided by Reichling's widow Angèle Reichling-Zufang and by Pieter Seuren, Frida Balk-Smit Duyzentkunst and Bernard Tervoort.

linguistic and psychological basis. Simultaneously, many new types of empirical research of language arose (e.g. phonetics, dialectology, research of child language, language pathology), which brought about a growing need for a general discipline, one which would cover this diversity and lay bare its foundations. Both developments were integrated into what became a separate linguistic discipline: General Linguistics.³

In the Netherlands, General Linguistics was recognized as a formal subject of the university curriculum in 1921. This, however, did not immediately imply the establishment of new chairs of General Linguistics. In the beginning, the subject was added to existing chairs in language and literature.

In the 1930s, there were some problems concerning General Linguistics courses at the University of Amsterdam. The question arose whether one or more persons should be charged with lecturing on General Linguistics. The furthering of homogeneity and the avoidance of one-sidedness were weighed against each other. There were also some problems connected with paying professors to give these courses, which were in addition to the usual courses the professors gave. Amid all these problems, the name of A. Reichling of Maastricht came up.

2.2 *Reichling: finally a linguist. 'Het woord', his magnum opus*

Anton Joannes Bernardus Nicolaas Reichling was born in 1898 in Nijmegen, the Netherlands. After a brief stay at the School of Economics in Rotterdam, he was admitted in 1918 to the Order of Jesuits and became a student of philosophy, which was part of a Jesuit's education. After sitting his exams in 1924, he continued his career as a student of Dutch linguistics and literature at the University of Utrecht. During the second period of his studentship (1930-1932), he taught Dutch at St Ignatius College (a secondary school) in Amsterdam.

Reichling began writing early on. Articles on theological and literary subjects appeared from 1917 onwards. In 1925, his book *Het Platonisch denken bij Boutens* (Platonic thought in the work of Boutens (a Dutch poet, 1870-1943)) was published.

We do not know when linguistics rather than literature became Reichling's main subject of interest, nor do we know exactly why this happened.⁴ His first linguistic article, *Enkele notities bij de syntakties-stylistische methode* (Some notes on the syntactic-stylistic method) appeared in 1933 in the linguistic and literary journal *De nieuwe taalgids*, when Reichling was only 35. However, he must have studied linguistics very intensively for many years before that, as in 1935 he published a long

³See for this development Noordegraaf (1982, 1990) and Elffers (1991). See Noordegraaf (1994) for the institutionalization of General Linguistics as a separate discipline at various Dutch universities.

⁴There were probably various factors driving Reichling towards linguistics. There was his personal contact with the famous Celticist Anton van Hamel (1889-1945), who recommended the University of Utrecht. There was the fact that his inspiring personal contacts in the literary circles of Boutens and others were eventually forbidden by his Jesuit superiors, because of the liberal climate of free-thought and behaviour that was prevalent in these circles. Also, for Reichling himself, who would fulfil a modest role in the Resistance during the second world war, the growing fascist sympathies of some members of these circles must have been repulsive. Finally, reflection on language constituted a substantial part of Reichling's philosophical education. His interest in linguistic questions could easily have been aroused by his study of scholasticism as well as early-20th-century phenomenology.

(466 pages), very erudite book. This book was his doctoral thesis at the University of Utrecht; he was awarded his doctorate cum laude. The title of this book – which would turn out to be Reichling’s most important publication – is *Het woord. Een studie omtrent de grondslag van taal en taalgebruik* (The word: a study of the foundations of language and language use). In this book, the notion ‘word’ is given an Akt-psychological and a Gestalt-psychological reconstruction (relating to the semantic and to the phonological aspect, respectively; especially the former is elaborated in great detail), and its autonomy and primacy is defended against the view of sentence primacy, which was the usual view in those days.⁵

Reichling continued his education by studying theology at the Theological Faculty in Maastricht. In 1937 he was ordained as a priest, and in 1938 he took his final exams.

Reichling’s thesis received a lot of (mostly positive) attention both in the Netherlands and abroad.⁶ Reichling hoped to acquire an academic position. Because salaried jobs were scarce, his first endeavours were directed at obtaining an unsalaried lectureship. In 1938, during the days of the General Linguistics problems at the University of Amsterdam, Reichling tried to obtain such a lectureship for General Linguistics at the University. It is at this point that the development of Reichling as a linguist and the development of the Amsterdam General Linguistics department meet and become intertwined.

2.3 *First academic decade: a long way towards a professorship*

Although Reichling was not welcomed as a troubleshooter for or saviour of the General Linguistics curriculum at the University of Amsterdam, the University’s governors would have preferred a solution along these lines. Their plans to nominate Reichling for a regular lectureship in General Linguistics were, however, opposed by the Latinist Albert de Groot (1892-1963). De Groot not only wanted to teach General Linguistics himself, but also had severe objections to the content of Reichling’s work. I will briefly expand on this point in order to clarify the Reichling/De Groot opposition, and, by doing so, elucidate the general disciplinary situation of General Linguistics in those days and Reichling’s position in this area.

From the very beginning, General Linguistics was a multi-purpose discipline. The interpretation of “general” widely varied. The discipline was conceived as furnishing the philosophical foundations of all linguistic research, as well as an encyclopaedic systematization of the various linguistic subdisciplines. Furthermore, it was conceived as being rooted in empirical, comparative and typological linguistics,

⁵Reichling’s thesis was supervised by C.G.N de Vooyo (1873-1955), a well-known professor of Dutch linguistics and literature. De Vooyo’s honest remark to another student can be seen as typical of the reception of Reichling’s magnum opus: “I am reading the dissertation of Father Reichling at the moment. It is a splendid book, but I do not understand it entirely” (Gerritsen 1995: 12).

⁶Important Dutch reviews are Langeveld (1936) and Royen (1936); outside the Netherlands, the reviews of Mossé (1936) and Hermann (1937) are the most important, also because they were taken into account in the debate about Reichling’s position at the University of Amsterdam (cf. Noordegraaf 1994). Cf. Vonk (1994) for a general discussion of the reception of Reichling’s *Het woord*.

and was aimed at general principles, which would apply to as many languages as possible.

The last-mentioned view of the discipline was De Groot's, the first-mentioned "philosophical" view that of Reichling. According to De Groot, General Linguistics should develop basic linguistic concepts and methods for description along the structuralist lines developed by Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) in his *Cours de linguistique générale* (1916). In order to function as suitable tools for the description of any language, these concepts and methods should be rooted in a broad empirical knowledge of languages.

Reichling, too, wanted to develop basic concepts, but his aim was an epistemological and methodological foundation rather than the creation of ready-made tools for description. Although Reichling regarded General Linguistics as an empirical – not a philosophical – discipline, and regarded himself as a structuralist linguist, his main source of inspiration was the work of psychologically-oriented linguists of the phenomenological and Gestalt-psychological tradition, and especially the work of the philosopher/psychologist/linguist Karl Bühler (1879-1963).⁷

Although Reichling discussed the central concepts of phonology and morphology – the most important linguistic levels for the structuralist approach in those days – most chapters of *Het woord* are devoted to meaning and its relation to concepts, mental images and the extralinguistic world.

Against this background, De Groot's criticism of Reichling is understandable: it was not Reichling's ideas that he criticized (on the contrary, he adopted some of them in his own work⁸), but Reichling's lack of ideas on subjects that De Groot thought essential. Reichling did not possess knowledge of many different languages – knowledge De Groot regarded necessary for the development of suitable descriptive devices. Moreover, De Groot had doubts about the relevance for the practising linguist of Reichling's detailed psychological exercises. As to academic positions, De Groot regarded Reichling as more suitable for a lectureship in philosophy and psychology of language.

De Groot's action was successful. Some of the General Linguistics courses were allotted to him, and Reichling acquired an unsalaried lectureship in philosophy and psychology of language. Reichling's inaugural "public lesson" – *Over essentiële en toevallige grammatica-regels* (On essential and accidental rules of grammar) – in 1939 concerned the relationship between logical and linguistic regularities.

⁷Bühler's main linguistic work, *Sprachtheorie* (1934), was available to Reichling when writing *Het woord* only in the very last period, which resulted in the insertion of a number of extra starred footnotes. Previously, he could make use of an almost complete earlier version of *Sprachtheorie*, however, as well as of other linguistically-relevant publications of Bühler. The role of Bühler's work in Dutch linguistics in general is discussed in Vonk (1989) and Elffers (2005).

⁸For example, Reichling's idea of the word 'Gestalt' is adopted in De Groot's *Inleiding in de algemene taalwetenschap* (Introduction to general linguistics) (1962). In De Groot (1966), Reichling's ideas about word meaning are adopted and partially emended. During the 1930s, De Groot's (and most other structuralists') research was mainly directed towards phonology. 'Extrapolation' to syntax was seen as the step to take later (cf. Uhlenbeck 1974). In the execution of this programme, De Groot's *Structurele syntaxis* (1949) became an important landmark.

World War II changed many things, also at the University of Amsterdam. After the war, De Groot and his fellow teacher of General Linguistics had to stop teaching because of their too compliant attitude during the German occupation of the Netherlands (cf. Noordegraaf 1994). The University of Amsterdam decided to make definitive arrangements with respect to the General Linguistics courses. An extraordinary chair was created and assigned to Reichling. Reichling's appointment was, suprisingly, supported by De Groot. He now exhibited a more positive view of Reichling, perhaps because of his experiences with Reichling as a teacher of incidental General Linguistics courses during the war. His negative ideas about another candidate were also a triggering factor.

Reichling was appointed to the post in 1946. One year later, he presented his introductory lecture, *Wat is Algemene Taalwetenschap?* (What is General Linguistics?). Not surprisingly, Reichling put the emphasis on general linguistics' "generality" in the sense of its establishment of basic, epistemologically-founded linguistic categories. According to Reichling, the importance of this type of generality should be recognized, next to generality based on language comparison. Linguistic description presupposes *and* results in general insights into the nature of language. Therefore, general linguistics is neither *a priori* nor *a posteriori*.

Reichling was first appointed as an extraordinary professor, but became an ordinary professor in 1951. During the 1950s, almost all other Dutch universities institutionalized General Linguistics as a separate discipline by establishing ordinary chairs.⁹

2.4 *Two decades of work on the foundations of General Linguistics*

The title of Reichling's inaugural lecture is characteristic of his intention to reveal the basic principles of General Linguistics in its broadest sense. When he wrote *Het woord*, his plans were directed at "a complete treatise on modern linguistics", which would embrace the sentence, the word group, speech acts and the language system (cf. Reichling 1936: 247).

Although these other books never appeared, Reichling's intellectual aims remained in conformity with these plans throughout his lifetime. His publications (mostly short articles¹⁰) dealt with the foundations of linguistics in all its parts and aspects.

In his articles, Reichling remained true to his original interests. Questions of meaning were discussed most frequently. Epistemological and methodological issues were prevalent; empirical linguistic description was almost absent.

In two respects, however, there was a change of perspective during the years after the publication of *Het woord*. In the first place, there was a shift with respect to

⁹ De Groot became the first professor of General Linguistics at the University of Utrecht in 1956. Uhlenbeck, who cooperated with Reichling from about 1950 onwards, took up a General Linguistics chair at the University of Leiden in 1958.

¹⁰See Uhlenbeck (1988) for an exhaustive list of Reichling's publications. His most important linguistic articles were reprinted in his *Verzamelde studies over hedendaagse problemen der taalwetenschap* (Collected studies of present linguistic problems), which first appeared in 1961 and were later revised and extended in the 1965 reprint (Reichling 1965³).

the type of viewpoints discussed. In his thesis, Reichling referred to contemporary linguists (Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), Sir Alan Gardiner (1979-1963), Otto Jespersen (1860-1943), John Ries (1857-1933), Eduard Sapir (1884-1939), but also to many (linguistic) philosophers (Franz Brentano (1838-1917), Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), Anton Marty (1847-1914), Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945), Hendrik Pos (1898-1955)) and (linguistic) psychologists (Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), Karl Bühler (1879-1963), Charles Ogden (1889-1952), Ivor Richards (1893-1979), Henri Delacroix (1873-1937), Martinus Langeveld (1905-1989)), in order to explain his own views in relation to theirs. In his later work, fellow linguists and structuralists (Roman Jakobson (1896-1982), Louis Hjelmslev (1899-1965), Leonard Bloomfield (1887-1949), Charles Hockett (1916-2000)) became his main points of reference; later on, generativists (Noam Chomsky, Paul Postal) were included.¹¹

This change is partially a reflection of a general development in linguistics: during Reichling's lifetime; linguistics became more and more an autonomous discipline. Especially psychology became less important as a direct source of inspiration (cf. Section 3.3 below). Other linguists (e.g. Bloomfield, Hjelmslev) underwent a comparable development in this respect.

However, there is also a specific development related to Reichling's biography: when writing *Het woord*, his intellectual basis was not only linguistic, but also, and perhaps even more, philosophical (including the philosophically-oriented psychology of his days) and theological.¹² During his professorship at the University of Amsterdam, two further developments took place: Reichling's contacts with Jesuit scholars decreased and his purely linguistic contacts increased. Of these two developments, the former culminated in his resignation from the Order of Jesuits and his subsequent marriage in 1949. The latter development was due to the fact that his professional task was now exclusively linguistic: he had to teach language students about recent developments in linguistics and present his own assessment of them.

One important result of this more linguistic orientation was a more detailed semantic theory. In *Het woord*, Reichling's main tenet was the word's constant identity, despite the variable "actuation" of its semantic features for various speakers in various situations ("disjunctive relevance") and despite the possibility of ("conjunctive") applicability of all features to the referent (in literal use) as well as ("disjunctive") applicability of only part of the features (in metaphorical use).

Reichling now divided the all too global notion 'meaning' into *semantisch aspect* (semantic aspect, e.g. the relatively independent meaning of, for example, "cat"), *semantische waarde* (semantic value, e.g. the meaning of, for example, "near" or "this", which depends on the deictic function) and *exponentiële waarde* (exponential value, e.g. the "identification" meaning of "the", which applies to the minimal constituent, e.g. "the man", as a whole). He also formulated some basic, mainly semantic, principles of the language system, such as the *principes der beweeglijke*

¹¹See Swiggers (1994) for this development and an assessment of Reichling's later publications.

¹²In Elffers (1998), the Thomistic basis of some Reichlingian concepts (his three types of "aanschouwelijkheid" (representation)) is discussed. Cf. Elffers (1999b) for a more systematic discussion of the relevance of Reichling's personal biography to his intellectual development.

symbolisatie (principle of mobile symbolization, allowing for polysemy) (cf. Reichling 1947).

The second shift was Reichling's turn towards syntax. In *Het woord*, hundreds of pages are devoted to the formal and semantic identity of words in isolation from their function in syntactic structures. Only the last chapter (*Het woord als syntagma*; The word as syntagm) deals with the syntactic function of words.¹³ In some of his later articles, syntax became a more prominent subject of discussion. This was partially due to his collaboration with his Leiden colleague Eugenius Marius Uhlenbeck (1913-2003), who developed the so-called linear method, a view of syntax based on Reichling's ideas about syntactic relations, especially on his notion 'verband' ('connection'). Connections were divided into "direct" and "indirect" connections, and connections "within time" (sequentiality) and "beyond time" (Reichling 1967 [1935]: 366 sqq.). According to this method, syntactic structure should be based on the listener's position and his possibilities to observe connections between the sentence elements as they successively reach his ear (or eye). This method became one of the approaches that can be distinguished within Dutch structuralism.¹⁴ Although Uhlenbeck played the largest role in elaborating the method, it was founded on the views Reichling developed in *Het woord* and discussed with Uhlenbeck time and again.¹⁵

As with the shift towards a purely linguistic framework of discussion described above, the shift towards syntax was furthered by a general tendency in linguistics. Within the area of linguistic phenomena, syntax became more and more important during the 1940s and 1950s. Structuralism gradually abandoned its self-imposed restriction to the phonological and morphological levels, in order to "extrapolate" its method to the level of syntax. The number of syntactic studies with a structuralist signature began to increase (cf. note 8). With the rise of generative grammar in the late 1950s, syntax became the most central part of linguistics. In short, syntax developed from an almost neglected part of linguistics into a very popular one. Reichling could, therefore, build on a solid foundation when giving more prominence to syntax. Furthermore, the centrality of syntax in the newer linguistic approaches almost automatically gave syntax an important position in his discussion of these approaches.

What remained unchanged throughout Reichling's work, despite the changes just discussed, was his preference for fundamentals over concrete linguistic description, and his inclination to deal with fundamentals in two very characteristic ways: firstly, by formulating principles and defining central notions and their possible

¹³In Elffers (1999b), the relatively unintegrated character of this last chapter is discussed. Cf. also Daalder (1994).

¹⁴In Bakker & Dibbets (1977), three types of Dutch structuralism are distinguished, the linear method of Reichling and Uhlenbeck being one of them, with Van den Berg as their main student. The others are the approaches of De Groot and Paardekooper, respectively.

¹⁵In Uhlenbeck (1988), the author stresses the frequency of his contacts with Reichling (initially at the monthly meetings of the Leiden linguistic circle, later in Reichling's house in Amsterdam), and their fruitfulness for both because of their high degree of mutual understanding and intellectual affinity. Uhlenbeck, originally a Javanologist, felt that his research of Javanese morphology strongly confirmed Reichling's ideas about the word.

distinctions (an approach that could be directly borrowed from scholasticism), and secondly, by very extensively discussing and criticizing the views of others.

From the very beginning, his work exhibited a characteristic polemical tone, which became predominant in his last articles.¹⁶ This was due to Reichling's very negative opinion of later American structuralism and early Chomskyan generativism, which were the most recent trends on which he commented. Although Reichling had never fully supported any existing paradigm, he considered himself to more or less fit in with the mainstream of earlier 20th-century linguistics. Despite criticism, he appreciated the central ideas of de Saussure, Sapir, and Jespersen. The a-semantic approach and positivism of Harris, continued in early generativism, was, however, repulsive to him.

Although Reichling was not the only Dutch linguist to criticize the rise of generativism, he was certainly the most fanatical one.¹⁷ All his polemical power was used to oppose the principled a-semanticism of Chomsky's early work, its allegedly a-linguistic appeal to formalisms borrowed from other sciences, and its naive psychologism.

After his retirement in 1968, Reichling remained professionally active at the University of Amsterdam, and for three years continued as Professor of Philosophy of Language. In 1972 the first signs of a serious illness appeared. After a long period of bad health, Reichling died in 1986.

2.5 *Reichling's position in Dutch linguistics*

According to Bakker & Dibbets (1977: 182), Reichling was the most influential Dutch structuralist, at least in the Netherlands. The latter qualification is important: unlike his colleagues De Groot (Utrecht) and Uhlenbeck (Leiden), Reichling hardly published in a language other than Dutch and seldom gave lectures abroad. Although Reichling was not entirely unknown outside the Netherlands, his international role was marginal. Reichling went abroad only twice to give lectures, viz. to Innsbruck in 1963 and to South Africa in 1965 (cf. Reichling 1963). In the United States, Uhlenbeck functioned as Reichling's ambassador by presenting Reichling's lecture at the 9th International Congress of Linguists in Cambridge Mass.¹⁸

Reichling's Dutch influence is remarkable for several reasons. In the first place, both the quantity and the size of his publications are extremely small. After his magnum opus *Het woord*, relatively few articles appeared; most of those that did were short, and a number were earlier lectures and publications that had been reworked. Neither the wealth of ideas nor the evidence of Reichling's extensive reading, both of which emanated from every page of *Het woord*, were ever equalled in his later work.

¹⁶Reviews of *Het woord* criticize the over-use of polemics, which renders the main line of the argument difficult to follow (cf. e.g. Royen 1936: 352).

¹⁷As in other countries, rejection and acceptance of what is sometimes called the "Chomkyan revolution" was partially (not entirely!) a question of generation. Cf. Doeve (1987) and Elffers (1982) for the reception of Chomskyanism in the Netherlands.

¹⁸At this congress, Uhlenbeck defended their linear method and the syntactic analyses resulting from this method (*[The man saw] [the boy]*) against Chomsky, who defended the traditional analysis (*[The man] [saw the boy]*). Cf. Reichling & Uhlenbeck (1964) and Chomsky (1965: 194).

One main cause of this lower activity and production is well known: his mid-life marriage, and resignation from the *Societas Jesu*. A lot of Reichling's attention was taken up not only by the positive aspects of this change – especially his three children – but also its negative aspects, i.e. the subsequent troubles with the Roman Catholic Church, of which he remained a faithful member despite his (temporary) excommunication.

A second cause appears to be the general decline of the phenomenological approach which was Reichling's main intellectual framework when writing *Het woord*, and remained so during his lifetime. He did not feel any affinity with the more empiricist orientation which was characteristic of most post-war philosophy, psychology and linguistics, not only in America but also in Europe. New publications that could function as intellectual food for Reichling failed to appear.

Because of his lower productivity, Reichling's plan to make *Het woord* the first volume of a series was doomed to failure. A new synthesis of his later insights into a larger work was intended, but never appeared. Earlier attempts at an English translation of *Het woord* were unsuccessful, partially because Reichling hesitated about making use of this opportunity to rewrite the text. Eventually, an identical reprint of *Het woord* appeared in 1967.

In addition to Reichling's low productivity, a second reason why his influence may be thought remarkable, is the fact that his predilection for philosophical and psychological foundations of linguistics was not shared by most of his fellow linguists. The importance of the questions discussed and the views presented in *Het woord* was recognized; the book was regarded as a landmark in the history of general linguistics, comparable to de Saussure's *Cours* (Stutterheim 1949: 70). Reichling was admired for the depth of his reflections. Nevertheless, only very few of his colleagues could really understand his intricate discussions and subtle philosophical distinctions. A very characteristic "description" of *Het woord* can be found in Bakker & Dobbets' historical overview of Dutch structuralism: "Reichling rejected the theory of sentence primacy and directed all his attention to the word, on which he deeply reflected" (Bakker & Dobbets 1977: 176).

In his later work, Reichling's discussions became less abstract and easier to follow, but the main questions discussed continued to be of the linguistic-philosophical and linguistic-methodological type. The unempirical character of his work – once De Groot's main objection to Reichling's lectureship – continued to be regarded as a severe weakness.¹⁹ Given this character of his work, a "Reichling school" could not develop.

A third reason why his influence is remarkable is Reichling's polemical style, which was, along with its abstractness, a hindrance to readers and audiences who wanted to construe a clear picture of Reichling's views (cf. note 16). From the

¹⁹For Reichling's colleague at the University of Nijmegen – Jac. van Ginneken (1877-1945) – the non-empirical character of Reichling's work was, for example, a lasting reason for his very low appreciation of it. Much later, in Dutch defences of generative grammar, Reichling's lack of descriptive results is sometimes polemically employed. For example, in Koster (1983: 203) a non-autonomous and communicative-instrumentalistic view of language structure (attributed to, among others, Reichling) is claimed to be a blind alley: "Even the most determined communicative-instrumentalist will admit that Reichling's empirical contribution to linguistics is almost nothing."

beginning, *Het woord* was criticized for paying too much, too detailed attention to the views of others, thereby distracting attention from the main themes and preventing the articulation of own standpoints. In his later work, Reichling remained true to this style (it even became more dominant, as pointed out above). Of course, his task as a professor of General Linguistics was to choose his own position in relation to what was happening in the field of linguistics, which underwent a lot of diversification during his professorship. But in Reichling's case, the emphasis on discussion and criticism was so high that it was at the expense of a clear statement concerning his own position, not to mention a clear empirical elaboration of this position.

Against the background of these three characteristics of his work, Reichling's important position in Dutch linguistics may seem inexplicable. However, we have to take into account that there were also other characteristics, or even aspects of the same characteristics, which were highly attractive and stimulating for others, colleagues and students.

Reichling was an inspiring teacher and colleague-researcher. Lectures and personal contacts were at least as constitutive for his influence as his publications. He also became well known in more institutionalized linguistic networks, such as the Leiden linguistic circle and the editorial board of *Lingua, International Review of General Linguistics*, which was founded by Reichling and De Groot in 1948.²⁰

Reichling's style during his professional contacts was lively and enthusiastic. He approached his students very directly and liked to involve them in his linguistic thinking and to discuss linguistic problems with them. This open, non-authoritarian attitude – which was exceptional in his days – made his teaching and professional contacts attractive. A number of important Dutch linguists took their doctor's degree under Reichling's supervision (e.g. Berthe Siertsema (1917-2001), Simon Dik (1940-1995)); some other linguists were also influenced by Reichling (e.g. Bernard Tervoort, Cornelis Stutterheim (1903-1991), Frida Balk).²¹

Another important aspect of Reichling's work was, despite the abstractness of the questions addressed, his very concrete way of dealing with his subjects. Ordinary, almost trivial cases of language use in everyday situations are discussed in the context of highly theoretical discussions about the fundamentals of language. Especially in *Het woord*, the very abstract building of concepts, related to each other by complicated definitions, is based on a wealth of commonplace, and not infrequently humorous examples, illustrating what is really going on when words are learned, used, reflected on, applied metaphorically, etc.²² This style is a result partly of the phenomenological approach Reichling adopted – essentials are to be “read” from our direct experience of

²⁰Reichling was also a member of the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences and of the Society of Dutch Literature, but was not an active contributor.

²¹A remarkable theological dissertation, making use of Reichling's semantic views, is Fruytier (1947). Cf. Vonk (1994) for a critical discussion of Fruytier's approach in analysing the development of the word *musterion* as used by Cyrillus of Jerusalem (4th century AD).

²²A concrete example showing that meaning is not the same as contextual association can be found in Reichling (1967 [1935]: 64-65): “It is not a miracle, is it, that the red on cheeks reminds us of pearmain, and that a certain kind of coffee-pot reminds us of our aunt who is fond of that fluid in a similar pot; why then does *cheek* not “mean” **pearmain** and *coffee-pot* not **aunt** and the other way round as well?”

the phenomena, undisturbed by theoretical presuppositions – and partly of Reichling’s personal way of writing, which is clearly meant to be unacademic and to approach spoken language as closely as possible.

Of course this style could not make a difficult content an easy one; in fact, for many readers its whimsical, quasi-spontaneous character made the substance of Reichling’s ideas more difficult to reconstruct (cf. Dik 1987, Daalder 1994).

But through its manner of presentation, Reichling’s work was also lively and accessible, which reduced the distance between it and its readers. His most striking examples became well known and were recognized by students of language as instructive, even if few of them could get to the very bottom of the ideas the examples helped to argue for.²³

Some aspects of Reichling’s “scholastic” style had a comparable facilitating function. Amidst the increasing, more and more theoretical and rapidly and confusingly diversifying linguistic field of his days, Reichling offered the simple language researcher something to hang on to (and to refer to in his publications): basic principles (*princiepen*), explicit definitions (of e.g. the concepts ‘general linguistics’, ‘word’, ‘syntax’) and sharp conceptual distinctions (between language use and language reflection, meaning and concept, homonymy and polysemy). For example, Bakker & Dibbets (1977: 182) remind us that Reichling’s conception of the word as “an isolable, meaningful unit, strictly determined with respect to the sequence and position of its component sounds, used to mention things” (Reichling 1947) was decisive for a large number of linguistic studies in the Netherlands.

The very fact that Reichling’s theoretical reasoning resulted in explicit definitions and distinctions had a supportive function, even if the reasoning itself could only be followed in detail by a few fellow scholars.

This somewhat selective approach to Reichling’s work sometimes distorted the picture of Reichling’s central ideas. For example, the definition of the word just quoted and the slightly different definition in the very last chapter (Ch. 9) of *Het woord* (“a language element which can be isolated, has meaning and is definitely determined by the position and order of the constituting phonemes” (Reichling 1967 [1935]: 367)) have a predominantly syntactic character. This type of definition is often presented and discussed as Reichling’s main thesis about the word. However, if we take into account its context in *Het woord*, it turns out to *presuppose* the extensive psychological foundation of the word in the preceding 300 pages. Reichling himself partially contributed to this misunderstanding by referring only to the definition in his last chapter in the index under “defining the word”. In fact, word definitions conclude almost all chapters of *Het woord*. The relation between these various definitions is not entirely clear. They seem to be meant as cumulative, and certainly not as interchangeable, or as mutually exclusive. Special importance appears to be attached to

²³As a junior student, I attended Reichling’s introductory lectures. I remember, more than their theoretical content, the expressive way he illustrated what is going on when we interpret ambiguous sentences, using the example *Ik heb het paleis op de Dam gekiekt* (“I have photographed the palace on Dam Square”; “on Dam Square” is adverbial adjunct or attributive adjunct) time and again. A characteristic remark about Reichling’s style can be found in the preface of the thesis of Frida Balk-Smit Duyzentkunst: “In personal communication [with Reichling] one almost gathers that linguistics is something simple” (Balk-Smit Duyzentkunst 1963).

the definition which concludes the eighth chapter, because it is also the first of the theses which were separately added to the dissertation: “The word is the organic-psychical unit, constituted by us in the act of word-making, as a lasting working possibility of our human nature, and actualized by us in language use as the independently symbolizing sign-in-use, which makes possible our individual human way of acting, as the acting of a member of human community” (Reichling 1967 [1935], 361). It is this and other comparable statements that constitute the “total complex of concepts” that has to be presupposed “behind” the rather straightforward criterial word definition in Chapter 9 (Reichling 1967 [1935], 364-65).²⁴

From the early 1960s onwards, Reichling’s influence quickly diminished. A younger and more numerous generation of professional linguists became increasingly critical of his lack of empirical involvement in phenomena of language and of his decreasing ability to keep pace with new linguistic literature and to develop new ideas. Reichling’s inability to inspire this generation may be one of the factors relevant to the very rapid adoption of the Chomskyan approach by many linguists at the University of Amsterdam.²⁵ The fact that Chomsky presented a promising framework for syntactic description incited great enthusiasm, which was in sharp contrast to Reichling’s rather hostile attitude towards this new approach.

The linguistic climate of thought became polarized in those days, and thus a rapprochement was impossible. Many issues were amalgamated and never discussed separately. Reichling’s objections against generative grammar varied from metatheoretical to empirical. He opposed Chomsky’s psychologism and a-semantism, his consideration of language in abstraction from context and situation, his attempts at formalization in absence of a clear statement of the substance to be formalized, and also his concrete analyses of sentences, for example his view of *John hit the ball* as [NP – (V – NP)] rather than [(NP – V) – NP], as it would be according to the linear method developed by Uhlenbeck and himself.

It is remarkable that, besides the last one, Reichling’s objections cover the whole range of methodological criticism of generativism that appeared in his days and later on. These points are still central in discussions of linguistic approaches.²⁶

Although these “linguistic wars” must have been difficult for Reichling during the last years of his professorship, they did present new opportunities for his great polemical capacities. Moreover, he was supported in these wars by Uhlenbeck and many other Dutch linguists of the older generation, and, perhaps more important, by

²⁴Seuren’s severe criticism of Reichling’s view of the word is weakened by his neglect of this “complex of concepts” that is presupposed by the syntactic definition he criticizes (Seuren 1966). Although Seuren observes that Reichling’s psychological foundations of the word have to be taken into account, he seemingly renders them harmless by “summarizing” them in terms of the too general notion of ‘formal and semantic constancy’.

²⁵It is not a coincidence that the universities where more empirically-oriented professors of General Linguistics were employed - e.g. Utrecht (De Groot) and Leiden (Uhlenbeck) - were slower to accept generative grammar than the University of Amsterdam. Acceptance in Amsterdam was further facilitated by the pro-Chomsky attitude of the philosophy professors Evert Beth (1908-1964) and Frits Staal.

²⁶Even the discussion about the structure of such sentences as “John hit the ball” has an “updated” counterpart in generative grammar, as was pointed out to me by Hans den Besten (personal communication).

some young linguists working at his own Institute of General Linguistics, among them his successor Simon Dik, whose later successes as the “founding father” of Functionalism he could not foresee in those days, but whose promising achievements he recognized.

3. *Autonomous and psychological linguistics?*

3.1 *The problem*

Anyone who reads *Het woord* will be impressed by the extent of the psychological knowledge possessed by the author. On almost every page psychological ideas are appealed to, explained or discussed. A considerable proportion of the items in the index of subjects refer to purely psychological notions (e.g. ‘abstraction’, ‘apperception’, ‘association’, ‘concept’, ‘cooperation’, ‘thought’, ‘experience’, ‘expectation’, ‘behaviour’, ‘Gestalt’, ‘action’, ‘image’, ‘introspection’, ‘knowledge’, ‘perception’, ‘stimulus’, ‘synergy’, ‘Umwelt’, ‘representation’, ‘observation’) and a smaller proportion refer to psycholinguistic notions (e.g. ‘language behaviour’, ‘word representation’, ‘Symbolbewusstsein’, ‘formulation habits’); and even fully-fledged linguistic items are further specified along psychological lines. To ‘phoneme’, for example, the following specifications are added in the index: ‘constant of experience’, ‘in perception’, ‘as representation’, ‘as aspect of experience’, ‘presupposes sound’, ‘as sound concept’, ‘as relevant aspect of the Gestalt’, ‘diacritical aspect’, ‘changeable’, and ‘experience in the Gestalt’.

Especially these specifications are revealing, because they exemplify the function of psychology in Reichling’s project: i.e. furnishing the epistemological basis of central linguistic notions. In the book itself, this function may sometimes be missed or overlooked by its readers, because of the length of some of the purely psychological expositions. For example, eight pages are devoted to the notion ‘Gestalt’, complete with illustrations borrowed from the area of visual perception (pp. 171-179). It is, therefore, not surprising that more than one reviewer recognized the psychological and philosophical value of *Het woord*, but doubted – like De Groot (cf. p.14 above) – the usefulness of the book for linguists.²⁷

For Reichling himself, this usefulness was evident: linguistic notions have to be founded on a sound psychological basis. In his own words:

This investigation [of language, E.E.] is impossible without presupposing some ideas about the structure of experience in general; in this respect, psychology precedes linguistics. Linguistics finds its object situated in experience; therefore its terms have to cover the psychical reality within which language events occur. (Reichling 1967 [1935]: 40)

²⁷In Vonk (1994), quotations from reviews of *Het woord* are presented (Royen 1936, Kainz 1938, Mossé 1936); all show the same uneasiness: the quality of the book is indisputable, but, despite its goals, it is too oriented towards philosophy and psychology of language to be of great use for linguists.

This quotation reveals not only Reichling's general view of the relation between the discipline of linguistics and that of psychology, but also his phenomenologically-oriented specification of it: psychology has to furnish the *experiential* categories to which linguists should appeal.

In *Het woord*, Reichling's central aim is to apply this programme to the notion 'word'. To illustrate this approach, I quote one of the various "halfway" word definitions formulated by Reichling at the end of his chapters. At the end of Chapter 5 (*The word Gestalt as representation*) we read:

The word is the linguistically-formed sign of use that covers the relevant ways of acting in one lasting act-unit, of which the Gestalt constitutes the aspect of reflected-upon observation in which we recognize and make definable a typical sound-unity.

(Reichling 1967 [1935]: 222)

In order to appreciate the thoroughly psychological character of *Het woord*, one should realize that many of these specialized psychological notions (e.g. 'reflected-upon observation') applied in this type of definitional statement are themselves beforehand discussed at length, calibrated and defined.

This approach seems to contrast strikingly with Reichling's vehement defence of linguistics as an autonomous science, independent of other disciplines, free from foreign influences, etc. (Reichling 1967 [1935]: 51). Language is regarded as a phenomenon that abides by its own laws ("*eigen-wettelik*"), and can therefore be investigated solely by means of a separate linguistic discipline. According to Reichling, the main mistake of all earlier linguistic schools was their a-linguistic approach to language and their attempts to make linguistics dependent on other disciplines. Especially logic and psychology were frequently accepted as "foreign rulers" over linguistics. "Logicism" and "psychologism" are the terms used to characterize the mistake in question.

Reichling stresses the importance of autonomy as a laboriously gained and yet easily lost attainment of modern linguistics. The following passage taken from his inaugural speech (*Wat is algemene taalwetenschap* (What is general linguistics?) (1947) (reprinted in the *Verzamelde studies* (Collected studies)) gives a very clear picture of this view:

There are still many who feel that linguistics may be called "general" only if its principles can be reduced to a reality including more than language alone. (...) It is certainly not true that a science studying language as a form of human behaviour as such, could still be linguistics: such a science is psychology. (...) The entire theoretical account of their approach given by students of general linguistics during the 19th and the 20th century, is one struggle with the problem of autonomy and heteronomy of its principles of explanation. Philosophy, psychology, sociology, logic as conceived by the Wiener Kreis, and for some scientists even physics, contended and still contend for the mastery.

(Reichling 1965³: 10-11)

We can now isolate the core of the apparent contradiction in Reichling's work: psychology should provide linguistics with its basic conceptual apparatus, namely the categories of "experience in general", but, at the same time, linguistics may not reduce

its principles to a reality including more than language. Appeal to other disciplines, including psychology, should be rejected.

3.2 *'Psychological a-psychologism' as a general trend in European linguistics*

Reichling's "psychological a-psychologism" is so prominently present in his work that the problem, so to speak, strikes the eye. In a less conspicuous form, however, the apparent contradiction is a characteristic of two main currents in the humanities of Reichling's day, currents to which Reichling affiliates himself: i.e. structuralism and phenomenology.

De Saussure (1916) reconstructs his new structuralist approach to linguistics as a redefinition of "linguistics" purely in terms of its object, i.e. language. This implies a liberation of the discipline from a-linguistic (e.g. psychological, anthropological, philological) points of view, which throw light on only part of the linguistic phenomenon and miss the very essence of language (de Saussure 1916: 32).

To this essence belongs, firstly, the abstract, social and conventional nature of language, and secondly, its mode of existence as a system of signs, of which both sides – sound and meaning – are determined by mutual relevance.

In this context, what is wrong with a purely psychological approach to language is that it sticks to individual occurrences instead of collective underlying systems, and views meaning as "thought" as such, instead of as "thought" in so far as it is relevant to a specific system of linguistic signs.

At the same time, de Saussure's ontological view of this abstract system of mutually relevant values of form and meaning is purely psychological. The system is regarded as present in the mind of the language user, who puts it into action when speaking or listening. The famous "circuit de parole", representing forms and meanings as "images acoustiques" and "concepts" travelling from one brain to another, constitutes a striking illustration of this ontology. De Saussure's general view of linguistics as part of a future *psychological* science of signs ("sémiologie") is in accordance with this overall psychologism (de Saussure 1916: 43).

Phenomenology also exhibits a striking ambivalence towards psychology, but its source differs from de Saussure's. Its basis is Brentano's Akt-psychology, which rejects the view of psychology as the study of mental representations and their law-governed associative relationships. Instead, psychological entities are conceived as essentially intentional: the basic mental occurrences are acts directed towards intentional objects. Linguists adopting this view rejected the earlier representationist "occurrence" view of meaning in favour of a view of meaning as the objective content of such intentional acts as representing or judging. The study of this content was incorporated by Brentano in a special type of psychology, called "descriptive". The study of the acts themselves and their physiological correlates was conceived as another type of psychology, i.e. "genetic psychology". Husserl, a student of Brentano's, further de-psychologized the idea of objective content. He rejected the term "descriptive psychology" in favour of "phenomenology", the science which describes the objective world of contents and essences. In this context, "psychologism" became a negative qualification, referring to the unjustified reduction of contents to such psychological occurrences as representations and associations (or, in later

behaviourism, stimuli and responses). At the same time, however, phenomenology did not abandon all links with psychology; it maintained the idea that contents and essences ontologically belong to a world of “pure consciousness” and are directly accessible by psychological means (“Wesensschau” or “eidetic intuition”).²⁸

More than structuralism, phenomenology arose as a reaction to all too concrete psychological interpretations. Therefore, its rhetoric includes the criticism of “psychologism” as a main weapon in discussions. The frequent use of this somewhat misleading term could easily give the unjustified impression of an entirely non-psychological metatheory.²⁹ In the words of Jakobson (1975: 16):

The legend of a “militant anti-psychologism”, allegedly proper to this movement (structural linguistics, E.E.), is based on several misunderstandings. When phenomenologically-oriented linguists resorted to the slogans of anti-psychologism, they used this term in the same way as Husserl did when he opposed a model of new, phenomenological psychology with its fundamental concept of intentionality to the orthodox behaviourism and to other varieties of stimuli-response psychology.

A phenomenological approach to linguistics was, therefore, thoroughly psychological, despite its “anti-psychologist” rejection of psychological but non-phenomenological reconstructions of linguistic entities. Phenomena of language were regarded as contents of intentional acts and founded on experiential categories, which were further elaborated and sophisticated by phenomenological psychologists and Akt- and Gestalt-psychologists.

Bühler, the scholar who inspired Reichling more than any other, already combined Saussurean and phenomenological “psychological a-psychologism”. He adopts de Saussure’s emphasis on a purely linguistically-based linguistics, instead of “membra disjecta aus gänzlich heimatverschiedenen Wissensbereichen” (Bühler 1934: 8). His ‘Prinzip der abstraktiven Relevanz’ is a radicalized restatement of de Saussure’s view of form and meaning as mutually relevant aspects of the totality of phonetic and conceptual phenomena embodying language.

At the same time, Bühler felt that de Saussure did not work through this view sufficiently, by not recognizing, as Husserl does, the “ideal” character of language, and describing his “circuit de parole” in terms of “associations” of “sound images” and “mental facts” (concepts).

Reichling, in his turn, tried to radicalize Bühler’s position further, on the one hand by stating that even Bühler could not escape from a non-linguistic, behaviourist point of view, and, on the other hand, by elaborating a psychological foundation of linguistic notions to a degree of specification that Bühler never felt urged to achieve. The next two sections will elaborate on these two points.

3.3 *The “Reichling variety”: Reichling versus Bühler*

Reichling’s attack on Bühler’s metatheoretical position is, essentially, an attack on the famous triangular organon model, which constitutes a central element of Bühler’s

²⁸Cf. Schmitt (1967) and Heldring (1992) for a clear exposition of Husserl’s epistemology.

²⁹Cf. Elffers (1998) for an explanation of this use of the term ‘psychologism’.

“Sprachaxiomatik” (cf. Vonk 1994). Reichling’s criticism elaborates a viewpoint developed earlier by Dempe (1930): Bühler’s three main functions of the linguistic sign, “Darstellung” (function of the *symbol*), “Ausdruck” (function of the *symptom*) and “Appell” (function of the *signal*), do not belong to the same type, as the model suggests. “Darstellung” should be considered the essence of the sign itself. Being a sign implies “Darstellung” (Reichling 1967 [1935]: 30). All linguistic signs are symbols, in conformity with the Thomistic dictum *Aliquis stat pro aliquo*.³⁰ “Appell” and “Ausdruck” belong to the range of possible functions of signs in language use. They belong to the area of communication in general, whereas “Darstellung” is inherent in language. Reichling supports this idea by appealing to his view of psychical phenomena as intentional. This view implies that psychical acts, which belong to the self, are directed towards intentional objects, which do not belong to the self. Linguistic signs come into existence in an act of knowing of a particular type, as units of form and meaning directed towards “objects”, which do not belong to the self. In order to relate to such objects, linguistic signs are necessarily and primarily symbols.

Given this view, Reichling cannot agree with Bühler’s idea that there are words whose main function is “Ausdruck” or “Appell”. The fact that Bühler’s alleged examples of the latter category, the so-called “Zeigwörter” (deictic words, such as personal and demonstrative pronouns), can be shown to be mainly “darstellend”, constituted a clear confirmation of this impossibility.³¹

This result was also important for Reichling for other reasons: given his view of linguistic signs as necessarily and primarily symbolic, elements lacking “Darstellung” as their main function are not full-fledged linguistic signs, and therefore are not really words. Such an impoverished concept of ‘word’ is defended by, for example, Joseph Vendryes (1875-1960), and, understandably, opposed by Reichling throughout *Het woord*, which can be interpreted as one elaborate argument in favour of ‘word’ as the most fundamental linguistic notion.

Not surprisingly, Reichling pays much attention to parts of speech which, like deictic words, have a dubitable “Darstellung” character. Conjunctions, for example, are described as symbols for relationships between sentences. Their particular character lies in their *manner* of symbolization, namely as “technical tools” for language: the relationships are not independently mentioned, but become actual *through* the use of the conjunctions as links between the sentences to which the relationship applies (Reichling 1967 [1935]: 291).

³⁰Although Bühler, too, applies this dictum to the linguistic sign, he avoids the conclusion that symptoms and signals (elements not involved in a representative but in a causal relationship) are not really linguistic signs. Reichling does draw this conclusion (Reichling 1967 [1935]: 25) and also appeals to other properties, partially mentioned by Bühler himself, of symptoms-and-signals versus symbols, to argue that only the latter elements are really linguistic. Cf. Elffers (2005) for further discussion.

³¹Cf. Elffers (2005) for a more extensive reconstruction of Reichling’s arguments about “Darstellung” as the essential function of the linguistic sign. In this article, Reichling’s observations about deictic words are compared with observations and critical remarks about Bühler, independently made by De Groot (1949), which are highly similar to Reichling’s but fulfil their function in a quite different argumentative context. In Reichling (1963: 11), Reichling presents a more differentiated view. He now distinguishes deixis as a separate type of meaning (cf. the distinction between *semantisch aspect* and *semantische waarde* mentioned on p. 16).

Significantly, Bühler's mistake with respect to "Zeigwörter" is attributed to his being a psychologist, which is, according to Reichling, Bühler's "strength as well as his weakness" (Reichling 1967 [1935]: 8-9). This characterization clearly reveals Reichling's attempts at a radicalized variety of "psychological a-psychologism". He fully recognizes and follows Bühler's Akt- and Gestalt-psychological approach, and elaborates it by doing more justice to the essential properties of the linguistic sign. However, Bühler's partial lack of sensitivity to these properties is attributed to his non-linguistic, psychological background.

As with other criticisms of psychologism, this can be understood as directed against wrong types of psychology rather than psychology as such, as we observed above. And indeed, Reichling accuses Bühler of approaching language not from a general-psychological but a behaviourist stance: through a misinterpretation of the organon model, and even an incorrect reproduction of it in *Het woord* (1967 [1935]: 32), Reichling unjustifiably reconstructs Bühler's view of the linguistic sign along behaviourist lines: i.e. the sign should be identical to the external stimulus ("Schallwellen"). The concept of 'sign', thus impoverished, could not contain "Darstellung" as an inherent feature, but only as one of its functions, which would explain Bühler's mistaken view of "Zeigwörter".

Reichling's striking and rather puzzling misinterpretation (especially when Bühler's general anti-behaviourism is taken into account) may be partially explained by a certain, perhaps unconscious need to make a clear difference between his own and Bühler's way of leaning on psychology, thus justifying his criticism of an a-linguistic approach.³² In itself, the inclination to present criticism in the shape of the verdict of a *fundamentally wrong* orientation (even when this is unjustified, as in the above case) can be explained by the general effectivity of this type of criticism, as well as by three more specific factors.

In the first place, there is the tradition of linguistics, which has cultivated this type of criticism since the 19th century. There is a similarity between the 20th-century criticism of "psychologism" and the earlier criticism of "logicism". Because this negative label was used by linguists to characterize a diversity of viewpoints, it became, in Marty's words, purely "eine Art wissenschaftliche Schimpfnahme". When psychological linguistics – which was once welcomed as linguistics' rescue from the evil of logicism – was rejected in favour of "autonomous" linguistics, the same diversity occurred in criticisms of a "psychologicistic" or an "a-linguistic" approach.³³ The importance of "autonomy" as a metatheoretic slogan of Dutch structuralism was emphasized in section 3.2. above.

Secondly, the phenomenological metatheory itself leaves few alternative reconstructions of mistakes. As linguistic insights are allegedly not due to the construction and testing of hypotheses, argumentation, etc., but to unprejudiced observation, "eidetic intuition", and "es der Sache selbst ablesen" (Bühler's terminology), mistakes should be due to a wrong type of observation. Given this idea, a

³²Cf. Lukkenaer (1974) and Vonk (1984) for more detailed information about Reichling's "behaviourist" reconstruction of Bühler's views.

³³Cf. Elffers & De Haan (1984) and Elffers (1990, 1994, 1999a) for more details and examples of this rhetorical strategy.

fundamentally wrong view of the object of linguistics is a plausible explanation (cf. Elffers 1994).

Thirdly, part of the phenomenological approach exhibits an inclination towards objectivism rather than psychologism. Although the work of Brentano and many others (including Reichling) exemplifies “den mit psychologistischen Mitteln vorgetragenen Versuch, den Psychologismus zu überwinden” (Knobloch 1988: 312), part of Husserl’s and the totality of Gottlob Frege’s (1848-1925) work transgresses the boundary and localizes linguistic contents (of e.g. mathematical statements) in a separate, non-psychological ontological realm. This wavering position facilitated the negative use of “psychologism” by scholars who did not reject a psychological view of their subject matter but felt affiliated with those who did (cf. Elffers 1998).

So the fact that Reichling made ample, even unjustified use of this type of criticism is not very surprising after all. His inclination towards a polemical style can only have been a further stimulus to resort to a rhetorical strategy that maximizes differences.

3.4 *The ‘Reichling variety’: the ‘recovery’ of the word and later ideas*

For a variety of reasons, “psychological a-psychologism” initially had a greater impact on discussions about the sentence and the phoneme than discussions about the intermediate level of the word. For the theory of the sentence, rejection of the representationist view had very obvious advantages. The naive idea of the sentence as a reflection of the psychological process of representations, arriving at and then disappearing from the “innere Bühne” (Knobloch 1988) prevented, when taken seriously, a fruitful analysis of sentences by not allowing abstraction from psychical processes in speakers and listeners and disregarding their intentional character. The new approach allowed for a clear distinction between linguistically-expressed content and thought-processes, and between the propositional content of a sentence and its illocutionary aim (cf. Elffers 1993).

For the new and prospering subdiscipline of phonology, the rejection of representationism was an essential step towards a clear view of the phoneme as a functional member of a linguistic system rather than as a psychical “sound image”.³⁴

Compared with these developments in syntax and phonology, the study of the word level suffered from some backlog, which cannot be explained by a lesser gain due to the rejection of representationism. On the contrary, representationism, when taken seriously, greatly impeded a clear view of the identity of words, formally but especially semantically. The identification of word meaning with representations aroused by word form obscured important distinctions, such as between meaning and referent, denotation and connotation, and linguistically relevant and linguistically irrelevant features.

The backlog of word research, partially explainable by the usual sentence primacy³⁵, so severely attacked by Reichling, and partially by the more natural linkage

³⁴The gradual “de-psychologization” of the sentence is discussed in Elffers (1993). See Lepschy (1972²) for the parallel development at the phoneme level.

³⁵The primacy of the sentence was not a dogma to the degree supposed by Reichling. For example,

between sentences and intentional acts, caused a remarkable inequality in the work of such linguists as Bühler and Gardiner. They combined a very sophisticated act-oriented view of the sentence and the phoneme with a relatively naive word view, maintaining the identification of meaning with a summary of correct applications and related to form by associative links.

Against this background, Reichling's magnum opus can be viewed as an attempt to recover the position of the word. Making use of a very broad spectrum of modern philosophical-psychological insights, he liberated the word from representationist fragmentation into linguistically irrelevant occurrences and restored its more abstract identity.

At its very basis he assumed the "unifying act of word-making", which takes place during language acquisition. Once this unity is acquired, form and meaning can be distinguished, not as ontologically independent units, but as aspects of the word. Reichling thus reverses the representationist idea of the word as the result of an "association" of form and meaning. He subsequently develops his view of form, meaning and use separately. Word form thus acquires a Gestalt-psychological foundation (the "word Gestalt"); word-meaning is founded in Akt-psychology: it is reconstructed as a unit at the level of the act of thinking.

Against the background of this "psychological a-psychologist" foundation of the word, Reichling could develop his view of word meaning as a constant as well as a variable unit. Types of meaning, polysemy and metaphor are dealt with in a manner that avoided the pitfalls of the "psychologism" he condemned so severely.

As Daalder (1994) clearly shows, Reichling's attempts to demonstrate the word's reality in language acquisition and language use actually comes down to a "parole" supplement to the already existing structuralist view of the word as a fundamental unit of "langue". In the context of this demonstration, the distinction between "language use" (*taalgebruik*) and "reflection on language" (*taalbeschouwing*), a main Reichlingian tenet, plays an important part: linguistic notions that are solely products of "reflection on language" and cannot be "proved" to be an element of the language user's experience during language use, are regarded as "a-linguistic". Many notions of traditional grammar as well as later "psychologism" are thus rejected; the word, however, turns out to be a living reality of language use, even for analphabets, as demonstrated by Sapir (cf. Daalder 1991).

The rather radical methodological restriction following from this point of view can only be understood by taking into account Reichling's very serious adherence to phenomenological principles as well as his style of linking very abstract philosophical ideas to very concrete and down-to-earth examples.

Saussurean views of "langue" adopted word primacy, sentences being regarded as "parole". However, general views, arising from the 19th century onwards, about language development (ontogenetic as well as phylogenetic) and ideas about the history of words (substantives being derived from verbs) and structures (firstly verbs and predicates, later substantives and subjects) highly favoured sentence primacy (cf. Elffers 1991 and 1999a). The growing awareness of context as a main factor in interpretation reinforced this idea: there are no "true" word meanings; word meaning has to be derived from context (cf. Nerlich 1992). Especially the latter argument for sentence primacy, and its Dutch defender Gerrit Overdiep (1884-1939) are severely attacked by Reichling.

However, Reichling aimed not only at a sound foundation of the word, but also at its establishment as the most fundamental linguistic notion. He wanted to replace the prevailing idea that the sentence is the primary unit with its reverse: i.e. the word is the primary unit of language and of language use (cf. the subtitle of Reichling's dissertation, and the very last sentence on p. 434: "The word is the foundation of language and language use").

The exact content of this primacy thesis, which is defended throughout the book with polemical tenacity, is not easy to establish. This thesis is mainly founded on the fact that sentences are impossible without pre-existing words. Contrary to Bühler, who considers words and syntax as correlative systems, Reichling argues in favour of the basic character of words: words, as they are constituted by the "unifying act of word-making" retain their autonomous existence, also when they are used as elements in the synthetic act of sentence formation. Daalder (1994) emphasizes, however, that Reichling's argumentation at this point concerns sentences conceived as propositions, not as utterances defined by characteristic intonation contours. And even as propositions, sentences have one characteristic, namely the aspect of taking a position as regards reality (*'werkelijkheidstellend aspect'*), which gives words a function determined by the larger whole of the sentence. In these latter respects, Reichling recognizes the value of the Gestalt psychological thesis "totum est prior partibus". In summary, Reichling's thesis of the primacy of the word turns out to be more differentiated and complicated than is suggested by the polemical vehemence of its defence. The primacy of the word is a far less substantial issue of *Het woord* than the reconstruction of the word in terms of what Reichling and others called "the newer psychology".

As was discussed earlier, Reichling's discussion of syntax became prominent at a moment when his involvement in phenomenological psychology had diminished. Nevertheless, his later views on syntax bear the traces of the "Reichling variety" of "psychological a-psychologism". It is no accident that the "linear method", developed by Uhlenbeck in close collaboration with Reichling, was a phenomenologically-flavoured approach which, contrary to other types of structuralism, founded structural syntactic descriptions directly on alleged facts of interpretation by the listener.

Reichling's rejection of American structuralism and generative grammar also betrays his specific phenomenological attitude. Although such names as Husserl, Marty and Pos are not mentioned in his later publications, Reichling's general approach is still theirs. It shows up, for example, in his opposition to Chomsky's appeal to the native speaker's intuitive knowledge of grammar. According to Reichling, such knowledge does not exist (at best there is some – usually defective – knowledge based on grammatical *reflection*) and its assumption is, according to Reichling, "Chomsky's catastrophe". Still worse is Chomsky's alleged explanation of facts of understanding in terms of underlying generative processes, which is condemned as "serious psychologism" (Reichling 19653: 97-98).

Reichling's persistent attachment to his variety of phenomenological-psychological principles as strict methodological tools was certainly one reason for his non-involvement in descriptive work. Whereas Bühler and others rather loosely assume that many usual linguistic assumptions conform with their metatheory, Reichling proceeds by putting existing linguistic assumptions, traditional and more

recent, to his severe phenomenological test (reflective knowledge or “real” use-of-language knowledge?) and by rather triumphantly rejecting most of them.

4 *Reichling as precursor of recent linguistic trends*

In recent years, there has been increasing historical interest in the work of psychologically-oriented linguists who operated on the margins of European structuralism. The works of Bühler, Gardiner, Pos and Reichling are now the object of renewed research.³⁶ These linguists share a strong orientation towards the psychological foundations of language and language use, against the background of a more or less Saussurean view of linguistics.

Not surprisingly, as an additional result of this growing interest, parallels have been drawn between the work of these linguists and contemporary semantic and pragmatic approaches. Especially cognitive semantics and speech act theory have been mentioned in this context. This broader perspective has the advantage that contributions are being made to a more general historiography of semantics and pragmatics. There are, however, also dangers in drawing parallels between earlier and more recent approaches. For example, superficial parallels may yield false identifications and a distorted picture of the linguistic work at issue (both the earlier and the more recent). This could result in unjustified criticism of earlier linguistic work: the (too easily attributed) research programme would be “too sketchy” and its consequences insufficiently elaborated.

Also in Reichling’s case, comparisons have been made with modern linguistic trends. In this section I will take a closer look at these parallels and see to what extent they are justified.³⁷

Reichling’s work has been compared with recent cognitive semantic approaches as well as with speech act theory. For example, Geeraerts (1983) draws detailed parallels between Reichling’s theory of meaning and basic principles of cognitive semantics, including the related philosophical views of Wittgenstein and Putnam, and the linguistic-psychological theory of prototypes. Dik, in his necrology of Reichling, stresses Reichling’s “being ahead of his time” in developing views very similar to later speech act-theoretical ideas of Austin and Searle (Dik 1987: 97). Verhaar (1970: 47) even states that the ways in which speech act theory has been elaborated by Grice “manifest similarities with Reichling’s analyses (of the speech situation) so close that this can be only due to a common frame of reference.”

The inclination toward criticism of the “lack of elaboration” type is also present in Reichling’s case. As far as speech act theory is concerned, Dik explains this lack of elaboration by pointing to the lack of popularity of a thoroughly pragmatic point of view in Reichling’s time. As for Reichling’s theory of word meaning, Swiggers (1994)

³⁶Recent examples of this renewed attention in the Netherlands are Vonk (1992) Noordegraaf & Daalder (1990) and a Reichling Colloquium in Amsterdam in 1994 (proceedings published in *Voortgang* 14 (1994)). In the context of recent research into the history of pragmatics, attention is paid to Bühler, Gardiner and Reichling, cf. Nerlich & Clarke (1996).

³⁷In Elffers (1999c), a broader evaluation of alleged precursorships of cognitive semantics and speech act theory is undertaken.

deals with shortcomings that become manifest if further implications are elaborated to a higher degree than Reichling elaborated them. The fact that Reichling discusses and compares many contemporary theories of meaning is considered more valuable than the result of this discussion, namely Reichling's own theory (Swiggers 1994: 201).

In the next two subsections, I will take a closer look at the characteristics of Reichling's views that are responsible for their identification with cognitive semantics and speech act theory, respectively.

4.1 *Reichling and cognitive semantics*

As regards cognitive semantics, the relevant similarity to Reichling's work concerns the dynamic and variable character of word meaning. Like cognitive semantics, Reichling's theory strongly emphasizes lexical semantics and aims at a maximal clarification of the phenomenon of polysemy.³⁸ Both conceive of polysemy as the "normal" state of words, as a corollary of our ability to make flexible use of the possibilities that words allow us. Nearly two decades before Wittgenstein introduced the idea of "family resemblances" between the various uses of a word (Wittgenstein 1953), an idea frequently appealed to by cognitive semanticists, Reichling defended a very similar view and, remarkably, used the same word, i.e. "game" ("*spel*"), to illustrate it (Reichling 1967 [1935]: 338 sqq.).

As a corollary of this view of word meaning, both cognitive semanticists and Reichling pay much attention to metaphor and other types of creative language use. Both explain these phenomena in terms of the normal semantic variability of words. The idea that a new metaphor implies a radical and esoteric semantic deviance is rejected. What is at issue is *the speaker's new application* of the word. Word meanings are dynamic and allow for this possibility. It is up to the speaker to make creative use of this property of word meaning. The cognitive semantic view that "metaphors are not a product of language, but a product of thought" (Dirven 1996: 33) reflects Reichling's stylistically characteristic statement that our words "are left completely cold" by the various ways in which speakers apply them (Reichling 1967 [1935]: 328).

In the context of this semantic variability, neither Reichling nor cognitive semanticists consider various semantic features to be of equal importance. For Reichling, some are more central than others. The more central features distinguish themselves by their function as a starting point for the development of new semantic distinctions (Reichling 1967 [1935]: 342). Although in principle any feature can function as a kernel from which new distinctions are developed and integrated, in reality there is an initial kernel for each word, embodying its first possible semantic extensions.

Cognitive semantics similarly favours the idea of more and less central "prototypical" semantic features. A dynamic view of meaning, comparable to Reichling's, includes the idea of permanent meaning extensions. Both Reichling and

³⁸Like many linguistic currents, cognitive linguistics is not a homogeneous movement. Quite a few general introductions to cognitive linguistics have appeared, and all stress slightly different aspects as its central tenets (cf. e.g. Ungerer & Schmid, 1996). For this article, use was made of the clear and succinct exposition in Dirven (1996).

cognitive semanticists regard these extensions as being induced by sociocultural factors. Reichling describes developmental factors influential to the child's semantic structure of "game". Dirven (1996) mentions cultural factors determining the central character of "table" and the peripheral character of "piano" as instances of "furniture".

Although these parallels are conspicuous, there are differences as well. A first difference that strikes the eye concerns the fact that Reichling's meanings are only *internally* dynamic. New features may be distinguished, but only *within* the constant semantic identity that Reichling assumes for every word. Although Reichling rejects a monosemic view as implying the idea of one constant semantic kernel consisting of specific and enumerable features, he does not doubt the existence of a constant semantic identity at the level of thought, the counterpart of the phonemic entity constituted by the word Gestalt (Reichling 1967 [1935]: 227-230).

Cognitive semantics, on the contrary, explicitly defends the *unboundedly changeable* character of word meaning. Semantic mechanisms such as metaphor and metonymy, however cognitively motivated, *do result* in changes, not only at the conceptual but also at the semantic level. New concepts as well as new meanings arise in the course of this process. This view is founded on the assumption, characteristic of cognitive semantics, that meanings and concepts are closely related, if not identical. Conceptual change and semantic change embody the same phenomenon.

At this point, we can see the main source of the differences between Reichling and cognitive semantics. Contrary to the latter, and in conformity with Bühler, Reichling makes a sharp distinction between meanings and concepts. Concepts, for example, lose their identity if any one of their features changes. They are unboundedly changeable, thereby generating new concepts. Meanings are more flexible in themselves: various features may be "actuated" and new features may be integrated without any change in the unity constituting the meaning of a word. In the case of the variable applicability of a word, for example "letter" (applicable to the visual symbol for a language sound as such *and* of a language sound as a functional unit), there is, according to Reichling, one meaning but two concepts: one feature ("functionality") induces the difference between the two concepts (Reichling 1937: 315).

We have here another aspect of Reichling's "psychological a-psychologism". In the context of his general view of linguistic entities as autonomous and abiding their own laws ("*eigen-wettelik*"), there is a wide gap between the realm of concepts, their development, change, and function in judgements, and the realm of word meanings, their development and function in language use.

One striking consequence of these various approaches of Reichling and cognitive semanticists is their radically different reconstruction of the phenomenon of metaphor, despite the similarity mentioned above. Like Bühler, Reichling refers to the phenomenon of metaphor in order to emphasize the difference between meanings and concepts. Only meanings allow for metaphorical use; there is no equivalent for metaphor at the conceptual level. The metaphorical sentence "You are a pig", with its striking difference between "actuated" and "applied" features, can never be translated into a conceptual judgement (Reichling 1937: 313-14).

Cognitive semanticists, on the other hand, defend a strong identification of meanings and concepts as one of their main tenets. Perceptual and conceptual regularities are assumed to be the very basis of semantic regularities. In this context,

metaphor is not regarded as a purely linguistic phenomenon, but as a basic cognitive *and* linguistic phenomenon, and even as our general way of conceptualizing the world around us (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1984).

Our conclusion should be that, given these differences, the alleged similarity of Reichling's theory of meaning with the views of cognitive semantics should not be exaggerated. On the purely linguistic side, there certainly are corresponding insights into the essentials of lexical semantics. With respect to the relationship between language and other cognitive capacities, however, there remain striking differences.

4.2 *Reichling and speech act theory*

There are two elements in Reichling's work that strongly suggest his precursorship of speech act theory. First of all, there is his emphasis on what he calls the "action-character of the word", an issue discussed in his thesis, but elaborated further in a separate article devoted to this subject (*Het handelingskarakter van het woord*; The action-character of the word (1937)). Various authors interpret this article as a "proto-pragmatic" manifesto, foreshadowing the speech act theories of Austin and Searle (cf. e.g. Nerlich & Clarke 1996: 344, 423).

Secondly, there is his explicit distinction between "act of speaking" and "speech act" ('*spreekhandeling*' and '*spraakhandeling*'). According to Dik (1987), this is an early example of Austin's distinction between "locutionary act" and "illocutionary act" (Austin 1971 [1962]).

As a general thesis about Reichling's orientation towards the concrete use of language as "the great medium through which human cooperation is brought about" (De Laguna 1927:19, approvingly quoted in Reichling 1937: 317) the incorporation of Reichling (together with, among others, Bühler and Gardiner) in a somewhat vague and general current that paved the way for pragmatics, is justifiable.

However, if we look at the specific types of "act" Reichling means, we have to conclude that there is hardly a more detailed relationship to speech act theory. In the first place, for Reichling, the fundamental action-character of words refers to their being tools with which to mention things. Although this sounds pragmatic, it is purely psychological. The "thing" is not the concrete referent, but the abstract meaning conveyed by the word. Now the action-character of the word explains its semantic constancy *and* its variability. Like Bühler and Gardiner, Reichling uses the "hammer parallel" to clarify matters. We use a hammer in various ways, and dependent on our position. In the same way, the use of words also varies with the situation. The aim is constant. Reichling uses as an example the word "letter", already referred to above. This word is used in order to convey the (invariable) meaning of "letter". However, depending on the situation, (i.e. "letter" as pure sound or as functional unit), various semantic features become actual.³⁹

A further indication that Reichling's emphasis on the action character of words cannot in itself be considered as paving the way for speech act theory, nor as "an

³⁹Significantly, Reichling refers to Husserl in the course of his explanation of the type of "act" that is essential to words (Reichling 1937: 317).

important contribution to early Dutch pragmatics” (Nerlich & Clarke 1996: 423), is the fact that the use of the word as a tool refers not only to concrete language use with various social functions, but also to an internal psychical act. Essential is the *intention* of the language user to apply a word. Reichling explicitly contrasts the intentional character of his linguistic act with concrete language use. Semantic change, for example, cannot be explained simply in terms of actual new applications of the word in question. The very *possibility* of the new application (selective “actuation” of features) has to be explained in terms of the intentional acts Reichling assumes to be essential to language use. Not surprisingly, Reichling often describes these acts as “acting thought”, and elaborates in these terms the above-mentioned contrast between the internally dynamic character of meanings and the rigid character of concepts.

The second apparent speech act-like element in Reichling’s work is his explicit distinction between “act of speaking” and “speech act” (“*spreekhandeling*” and “*spraakhandeling*”). However, Dik’s identification of these notions with “locutionary act” and “illocutionary act”, respectively, turns out to be incorrect when a closer look is taken at the meaning of Reichling’s and Austin’s terms.

Although both pairs of concepts embody a more concrete and a more abstract level at which language use is considered, they lay their boundaries at quite different points. Reichling’s term “*spreekhandeling*” refers to complexes of articulatory movements made by the speaker. In conformity with his phenomenological approach, these complexes are reconstructed in terms of experience and are divided into two types: the articulatory experience and the auditory experience of sound production. In Austin’s locutionary act, however, articulation constitutes only one of the three sub-actions which constitute the act, namely the phonetic act. The other two acts are the phatic act (the utterance of words, conforming to a grammar) and the rhetic act (the act of using the words with a certain sense and reference), respectively.

Reichling’s “speech acts” (“*spraakhandeling*”) and illocutionary acts are also entirely dissimilar. Reichling’s “speech acts” refer to the level of “acting thought” mentioned above. They concern the internal psychical occurrences, made possible by the action-character of the word. This action-character is seen as responsible for the very possibility of metaphor, for selective actuation of features (without mutual understanding being hindered), for change of meaning *and* constant meaning identity (cf. Reichling 1937).

Austin’s illocutionary acts relate to the possible communicative functions of locutionary acts: asking a question, making an appointment, announcing a verdict, etc. (Austin 1971 [1962]: 94-99). Their function in explaining facts is very different from Reichling’s goals in his emphasis on the distinction between “*spreekhandeling*” and “*spraakhandeling*”.

The contrast with “ordinary” speech acts could not be made more clear than by mentioning an example given by Reichling himself. According to him, if we say “beer”, the (internal) speech act is always the same, irrespective of whether we are factually ordering a beer or saying the word simply in order to make the listener think about beer. The evocation of the constant meaning is essential (Reichling 1937: 318). Confronted with such examples, a speech act theorist would, of course, sharply distinguish between these cases in terms of various speech acts, for example ordering versus suggesting.

5. *Conclusions*

Reichling was not ahead of his time: he was neither a cognitive semanticist nor a speech act-theorist *avant-la-lettre*. On the contrary, he was a typical child of his time – that is, of the 1920s and 1930s. The linguistic, philosophical and psychological approaches and themes of those days are essential to his main intellectual products. Nor does the content of Reichling’s views cover the main themes of cognitive semantics and speech act theory, or only to a very slight degree. Unlike the work of Gardiner and Bühler, Reichling’s work lacks a general orientation towards language use in the context of human interaction.⁴⁰ It is devoted to the internal psychical processes going on in the child acquiring language and in the speaker, aiming at establishing the essentially linguistic elements within them.

In view of this aim, Reichling was primarily a linguistic metatheorist. He looked at the foundations of language at the level of psychical, intentional acts, and tried to establish them, not by theorizing, but by scrupulously observing language in use. Distinctive features of Reichling’s contributions to the linguistic-metatheoretical discussions of his day are his energetic and consistent attempts to lay bare the very basic psychical experiences in which linguistic notions should be founded, according to his general phenomenological viewpoint.

The fact that in the course of this project Reichling could not fail to reveal “modern” insights into language and language use is not surprising if we take into account his shrewdness and his precise observation and grasping of what is going on in language acquisition and language use in various real-life situations, and his zeal and consistent, scholastically-inspired approach of clarification by precise definitions.

Although Reichling was an inspiring teacher and speaker, only few of his students could identify with his approach, and even those who could cannot be regarded as his students in a strict sense of adopting the same approach for themselves. As was observed above, an “impoverished” version of his definitions, especially of the notion ‘word’ reached a broader public of students and teachers of language, at least in the Netherlands.

With respect to syntax, Reichling’s views were elaborated and propagated by Uhlenbeck. The “linear method” became one of the currents of Dutch structuralism. Uhlenbeck became Reichling’s ambassador, not only as the one who made Reichling’s approach to syntax concrete, but also as the one who discussed their common general and metatheoretical views internationally⁴¹.

⁴⁰As mentioned above, Reichling’s general view of language is communicative and cooperative (cf. also Reichling 1952), and many passages of, especially, *Het woord* contain instructive and not infrequently amusing examples of this view. But the aim of his research is the psychological reconstruction of fundamental linguistic concepts, not the description of interaction through language. Reichling, unlike Bühler and Gardiner, does not elaborate on linguistic phenomena emphatically relating to communicative function, and situational or contextual embedding (e.g. deixis, information structure, modality).

⁴¹A historically interesting aspect of the “linear method” was its function as an object to demonstrate the defects of non-generative approaches in the first generative-syntactic dissertation in the

Reichling's later period manifests a regrettable lack of productivity. Although some of his ideas, especially those concerning various types of word meaning, were further elaborated, the fact that he never went further along the phenomenological road paved by *Het woord*, nor replaced this approach with a new and promising one, generated an image of his later work as a rearguard action.

Although the term "Nachwuchs" does not apply to Reichling, there certainly were linguists who were inspired in their linguistic career by reading Reichling's work, and especially by personal contacts with him. A clear example is, of course, Uhlenbeck; furthermore De Groot, and Reichling's circle at the University of Amsterdam, especially Tervoort and his successor Dik, who incorporated some of Reichling's ideas into his own approach to language (Dik 1968).

Linguistic theory and metatheory are evolving very rapidly. Reichling's phenomenological methodology has long been overtaken, in psychology as well as in linguistics.⁴² The naive psychologism of early transformational grammar, which was criticized by Reichling during his last years at the University of Amsterdam, met the same fate. Reichling's inclination to emphasize the autonomy of language as well as its foundations in human psychology is still present in various linguistic approaches. The problem of finding a new way of integrating these two tenets into a unified metatheory will be discussed for some time to come.

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Netherlands (Kraak 1966). More recently, attention was again paid to the "linear method" when Pardoën developed an approach of word order phenomena, partially based on it (Pardoën 1998).

⁴² This statement applies to phenomenology as a ready-made method to study language or human cognition, not to phenomenology as broad current in philosophy, which still exists. In Dutch psychology, the so-called "Utrecht School" maintained a phenomenological approach until the fifties, which was irrelevant to linguistics, however. Cf. Swart (1982, Ch.7) for a clear assessment of the phenomenological approach to psychology. Swart emphasizes the unfruitfulness of the phenomenological way of presenting theory-laden ideas as "evidences" thus making them invulnerable to criticism.

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‘Primitif’ ou ‘inférieur’ ? Une traduction « marriste » de L. Lévy-Bruhl en russe

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L’histoire des traductions pourrait revendiquer un statut de sous-branche particulière dans l’histoire des idées linguistiques. En effet, les livres traduits ne sont que très rarement comparés aux œuvres originales et, dans la plupart des cas, les lecteurs ont une confiance sans réserve aux traducteurs. Or une traduction peut parfois cacher des épisodes passionnants, de vrais drames intellectuels dans le domaine de l’histoire des idées.

Ainsi l’histoire de la traduction en russe dont il sera question dans cet article ressemble à un roman policier très (ou même trop) long où tous les protagonistes sont présents dès le début, mais dont le dénouement resta obscur pendant plus de soixante-dix ans.

1. Une traduction russe mystérieuse. *Cui prodest* ?

Déjà le titre [...] du livre “La mentalité primitive” de Lévy-Bruhl présente un intérêt particulier
(N.Ja. Marr)¹

En 1930, le premier livre en russe du sociologue et anthropologue français Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857-1939) parut en URSS². Traduit en russe³, ce livre avait pour titre *Pervobytnoe myšlenie* — ce qui théoriquement devait correspondre au titre français original *La mentalité primitive*⁴. Et pourtant, sous le titre *La mentalité primitive* [*Pervobytnoe myšlenie*], c’est un tout autre livre qu’on avait traduit en russe ...

En fait, l’auteur était le même – c’était bien un livre de Lévy-Bruhl qu’on avait traduit. De plus, plusieurs morceaux de *La mentalité primitive* avaient été inclus dans l’ouvrage traduit. Mais il s’agissait de la traduction d’un autre livre — *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*⁵, dont le titre aurait été traduit en russe tout à fait autrement: *Mental’nye (myslitel’nye) funkcii v obščestvax nizšego tipa*.

¹ Marr 1930, p. XV.

² Levi-Brjul’ (Lévy-Bruhl), 1930.

³ Le livre a été traduit du français « sous la rédaction » d’A.V. Kissin (sur lequel nous ne disposons d’aucune information) et V.K. Nikol’skij (1894-1953) : nous ne pouvons pas dire aujourd’hui s’ils étaient également les traducteurs. V. Nikol’skij a écrit la préface à la traduction du 2^{ème} livre de Lévy-Bruhl qui a paru en russe – *Sverx’‘estestvennoe v pervobytnom myšlenii* (Levi-Brjul’, 1937), traduction du *Surnaturel et la nature dans la mentalité primitive* (Lévy-Bruhl, 1931) et était bien connu en URSS par ses travaux sur l’histoire de la société dite primitive, par exemple Nikol’skij, 1934 ; 1936 ; 1939, etc.

⁴ Lévy-Bruhl, 1922.

⁵ Lévy-Bruhl, 1910.

L'éventualité d'une erreur du traducteur semble exclue: en fait, il est peu probable que quelqu'un soit distrait au point de traduire un livre en lui donnant le titre d'un autre. Au contraire, nous sommes ici en présence d'une tentative réussie de substitution qui a été légitimée par une maison d'édition soviétique très respectée ("Ateist") et par des commissions bureaucratiques nombreuses. Il s'agit bien d'une substitution, presque d'une fraude. Et nous voilà devant la question classique qui apparaît toujours dans semblable cas: *Cui prodest?* A qui profitait le fait de cacher le titre authentique du livre traduit?

Essayons de comparer les deux titres originaux, *La mentalité primitive* et *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*, pour comprendre pourquoi l'un des deux a été préféré à l'autre – au point que le traducteur « ait confondu » le titre du livre en russe. Dans ce contexte, les notions de *fonctions mentales* et *mentalité* semblent fonctionner de façon synonymique. Donc tout le problème est celui des adjectifs *primitif* et *inférieur*. Pourquoi a-t-on remplacé l'un par l'autre dans la traduction russe?

Dans la tradition russe, la traduction de certains détails d'ouvrages de sciences humaines ne dépend pas toujours du traducteur. Très souvent, les décisions définitives sont celles du « rédacteur » ou de la personne qui choisit le contenu du livre et, dans la plupart des cas, compose aussi l'avant-propos de l'ouvrage correspondant.

Dans notre cas, une partie de l'avant-propos a été composée par N.Ja. Marr (1864-1934), linguiste russo-soviétique dont la théorie a été adoptée par le pouvoir soviétique en tant que « doctrine officielle » de la linguistique soviétique en 1920-1930. A cette époque, Marr était parmi les personnes les plus influentes dans le domaine des sciences humaines en URSS. Tout cela signifie que même si ce n'était pas Marr en personne qui a changé le titre du livre traduit, il a dû cautionner cette substitution. Pourquoi l'a-t-il fait ?

2. Marr et Lévy-Bruhl : les points communs des deux théories

Le grand travail fait par Lévy-Bruhl [...] permettra aux jeunes chercheurs marxistes d'économiser pas mal de forces et d'énergie. [...] Ses travaux ont provoqué un grand intérêt en URSS.

(V.K. Nikol'skij)⁶

Pour répondre à cette question, présentons brièvement les théories de Marr et de Lévy-Bruhl dans le but de comprendre ce qui a pu intéresser Marr dans les conceptions de Lévy-Bruhl⁷. Pourquoi Marr, tellement occupé, président et membre d'innombrables comités et commissions, auteur d'un grand nombre d'articles, a-t-il activement participé à la traduction du livre de Lévy-Bruhl en russe ?

Malgré le fait que les théories marristes provoquent aujourd'hui de nombreuses discussions des historiens de la linguistique, malgré les livres entiers qui ont été consacrés au marrisme⁸,

⁶ Nikol'skij 1930, p. XI et XXIV.

⁷ Pour éviter ici le discours répandu sur la « folie » de Marr ou sur le caractère non-scientifique de ses théories (cf. par exemple Yaguello, 1984), précisons que nous nous appuyons dans ce travail sur le principe de *neutralité épistémologique* qui consiste à traiter avec le même respect intellectuel toutes les théories linguistiques (cf. Auroux, 1989) : l'historien de la linguistique doit plutôt savoir comprendre que savoir juger.

⁸ Cf. en particulier Thomas, 1957; L'Hermitte, 1987 ; Alpatov, 1991.

dans la plupart des travaux ce courant est analysé non pas à la lumière de l'histoire des idées, mais dans le contexte des événements politiques en URSS dans la première moitié du XX^{ème} siècle. De plus, le travail des historiens de la linguistique se complique par le fait que Marr, qui était toujours en train de changer quelque chose dans ses conceptions, n'a pas laissé de théorie linguistique qui soit achevée ou au moins non-contradictoire. Après avoir reçu en 1912 le titre d'académicien pour ses études orientales (archéologiques et philologiques), Marr s'est orienté dans les années 1920 vers la linguistique théorique. Ainsi est apparue sa « théorie japhétique » qui présupposait l'existence d'une famille particulière des langues – les langues dites japhétiques, dont en particulier le géorgien (la langue maternelle de Marr) et d'autres langues caucasiennes feraient partie. Cette hypothèse a suscité l'intérêt et l'approbation de certains linguistes renommés, parmi lesquels par exemple I.A. Baudouin de Courtenay (1845-1929)⁹. Pourtant vers 1923-1924 les conceptions linguistiques de Marr sont devenues encore plus radicales et sa théorie japhétique s'est transformée peu à peu en « nouvelle théorie du langage », dont les traits les plus caractéristiques sont :

- le renoncement à la notion même de *famille de langues* et son remplacement par celle de *stade* dans le développement langagier ;
- l'affirmation de l'unité du processus « glottogonique »¹⁰ (*glottogoničeskij process*) pour l'évolution de toutes les langues du monde et la dépendance de cette dernière à la vie économique et sociale de la société correspondante ;
- l'intérêt pour la « préhistoire » linguistique et, en particulier, la distinction des célèbres « quatre éléments primaires » (*sal — jon — ber — roš*), qui auraient été à l'origine de tous les mots de toutes les langues modernes ;
- l'affirmation du caractère hybride de toutes les langues ;
- les déclarations sur la priorité des recherches sémantiques sur toutes les autres, en particulier sur l'analyse dite formelle.

Le fait de la participation active de Marr dans la traduction de Lévy-Bruhl nous permet de supposer qu'il y avait quelque chose en commun dans les conceptions de Marr et de Lévy-Bruhl, et que n'ayant pas de soutien de la part des chercheurs — avant tout, des linguistes — occidentaux, Marr a choisi un anthropologue comme « allié »¹¹.

Un an avant la parution de la première traduction de Lévy-Bruhl en russe, Marr, en parlant des principes fondamentaux de sa « nouvelle théorie du langage » et en critiquant toujours les linguistes comparatistes, a dit qu'à sa grande surprise, il s'était trouvé soutenu, dans ses recherches, par les thèses d'autres spécialistes, en particulier celles de « l'ethnologue Lévy-Bruhl »¹². Et dans son avant-propos à la première traduction de Lévy-Bruhl en russe, Marr porte une très haute appréciation sur les théories du chercheur français :

Le travail de Lévy-Bruhl, qui est très modeste et en même temps révolutionnaire pour la pensée en France actuelle, est énorme et d'une grande actualité pour nous. [...] Cet ouvrage, instructif, indépendamment des intérêts linguistiques de

⁹ Cf. Boduën de Kurtenè (Baudouin de Courtenay), 1901 [1963, p. 17] ; 1904 [1963, p. 113].

¹⁰ Posant une loi générale et unique dans l'évolution de toutes les langues.

¹¹ Cf. la thèse suivante de l'anthropologue français F. Bertrand : « Dans la traduction russe de 1930 de l'ouvrage de L. Lévy-Bruhl *La mentalité primitive*, c'est N. Ja. Marr lui-même qui signe une partie de l'avant-propos. Le fait confirme l'importance que Marr accordait à l'œuvre de L. Lévy-Bruhl dans la fabrication et la légitimation de la japhétidologie » (Bertrand, 2002, p. 102).

¹² Marr, 1933-1937, vol. II, p. 364.

ses lecteurs, devrait devenir le livre de chevet de tous les linguistes professionnels, et avant tout, bien sûr, des japhétidologues¹³.

C'est ici que Marr parle de la reconnaissance de ses théories par Lévy-Bruhl, en refusant toujours, de façon brusque, d'y voir autre chose qu'un simple geste aimable de la part de l'anthropologue français :

Ce n'est pas le lieu de faire ici la révérence à l'auteur parce qu'il a dit lors d'une conversation privée que les idées de la théorie japhétique ne lui semblaient pas inacceptables¹⁴.

En élaborant la théorie de la pensée « primitive » ou « inférieure », Lévy-Bruhl affirmait que, pour l'essentiel, cette dernière se distinguait fondamentalement de la pensée dite moderne, ou rationnelle — une thèse contestant celles de l'Ecole anthropologique anglaise dont les représentants (E. Tylor (1832-1917), J. Frazer (1854-1941)) partageaient l'axiome que l'esprit humain est toujours et partout identique à lui-même. Selon Lévy-Bruhl, « les primitifs ne perçoivent rien comme nous »¹⁵.

Les différences principales de ces deux types de pensée étaient, selon Lévy-Bruhl, les suivantes:

1. Le « caractère mystique » de la mentalité primitive où chaque phénomène s'explique, à la fois, par des raisons visibles et non visibles, par des causes mystiques : « Dans les sociétés inférieures, rien n'est perçu sans qualités mystiques et sans propriétés occultes »¹⁶.

2. La non-sensibilité de la mentalité primitive aux contradictions (ce qui résulte logiquement de son « caractère mystique »): chaque objet peut être lui-même et — en même temps et à la fois — quelque chose de tout à fait différent :

L'homme superstitieux [...] croit à deux ordres de réalités, les unes visibles et tangibles, soumises aux lois nécessaires du mouvement, les autres invisibles, impalpables, “spirituelles”, formant comme une sphère mystique qui enveloppe les premières. Mais, pour la mentalité des sociétés inférieures, il n'y a pas ainsi deux mondes au contact l'un de l'autre, distincts et solidaires, se pénétrant plus ou moins l'un l'autre. Il n'y en a qu'un.¹⁷

Lévy-Bruhl plaçait ce type de pensée à l'échelle des propriétés humaines en général — il était important pour lui de le lier à un *type particulier de société* :

Je me propose [...] la détermination des lois les plus générales des représentations collectives (y compris leurs éléments affectifs et moteurs), dans les sociétés les plus basses qui nous soient connues¹⁸.

Marr ne pouvait pas ne pas prêter attention à la théorie de l'évolution de la pensée en plusieurs étapes, présente dans les travaux de Lévy-Bruhl : comme nous l'avons déjà dit, l'anthropologue français en distinguait deux (prélogique et logique) dans le développement de la pensée (et donc, du langage). Marr lui-même distinguait

¹³ Marr, 1930, p. XIV-XV.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. XV.

¹⁵ Lévy-Bruhl, 1910, p. 37.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

quatre étapes dans le processus glottogonique de l'évolution langagière, les langues correspondantes étant :

- les langues du premier stade (le chinois, certaines langues africaines);
- les langues du deuxième stade (le turc, le mongol, les langues finno-ougriennes);
- les langues du troisième stade – les langues dites japhétiques (certaines langues caucasiennes, ainsi que des langues dont l'origine restait encore inconnue à l'époque de Marr, comme par exemple le basque);
- les langues du quatrième stade – les langues indo-européennes qui, à la différence des langues appartenant aux trois groupes précédents, continuaient toujours de se développer¹⁹.

Chaque stade de l'évolution du langage était déterminé, selon Marr, par l'évolution sociale et économique de la société en question, par l'intermédiaire de la pensée²⁰, qui, comme chez Lévy-Bruhl, devrait passer par un certain nombre d'étapes dans son évolution. C'est pourquoi, disait Marr, « le problème de la pensée est un des plus grands, même peut-être le plus grand problème théorique », car il concerne « la transformation révolutionnaire d'une troupe d'animaux en société humaine »²¹.

Ainsi pour Marr, la « vraie linguistique » ne commençait qu'avec le problème des rapports entre la langue et la pensée²². D'où son intérêt pour la sémantique, ainsi que ses reproches à l'adresse du comparatisme qu'il considérait comme « une science bourgeoise », repliée sur elle-même :

Le fait que les linguistes soient éloignés des raisonnements sur la pensée est l'héritage de la linguistique bourgeoise européenne, qui pèse comme une malédiction sur toutes nos entreprises concernant l'organisation des recherches et de l'éducation, et pas seulement dans le domaine de la linguistique²³.

C'est pourquoi, dans sa recherche des cautions, des appuis dans les sciences annexes et dans d'autres domaines, il était si important pour Marr de se référer à Lévy-Bruhl. Déjà en ce qui concerne l'étude de la pensée, il était beaucoup plus facile pour Marr de se trouver des partisans occidentaux parmi les anthropologues (pour qui la pensée restait toujours l'un des objets principaux d'étude) que parmi les linguistes. Marr semblait particulièrement apprécier dans la théorie de Lévy-Bruhl l'idée des changements qualitatifs (l'évolution par stades) de la pensée humaine au cours de l'histoire, mais aussi l'établissement des liens entre la pensée et les faits linguistiques. Cela constituait pour l'anthropologue français l'objet d'un chapitre particulier de ses *Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*²⁴. Selon la conclusion de Lévy-Bruhl, « aux

¹⁹ Cf. Marr, 1933-1937, vol. II, p. 405 et aussi Čikobava, 1985, p. 16.

²⁰ «L'appartenance des différents systèmes morphologiques aux différentes périodes de la création langagière (*jazykotvorčestvo*) ne dépend pas directement d'un type particulier de technique, de structure économique et sociale, c'est la pensée qui sert d'intermédiaire» (Marr, 1933-1937, vol. III, p. 70).

²¹ Marr, 1933-1937, vol. III, p.104.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Lévy-Bruhl, 1910, p. 151-203.

mentalités de types²⁵ différents devraient [...] correspondre des langues de structures différentes »²⁶ – ce qui nous fait revenir à l’une des idées fondamentales de la théorie marriste.

3. Le mystère de la traduction russe

Lévy-Bruhl, qui n’est pas dialecticien [...] n’a pas pu tirer toutes les conclusions des faits précieux qu’il avait rassemblés. Vêtu d’une toge du positivisme, cet admirateur des faits [...] a refusé de généraliser en s’appuyant sur son hypothèse de travail concernant la “mentalité primitive”
(V.K.Nikol’skij)²⁷

Et pourtant, qu’est-ce qui a fait que Marr a changé le titre du livre traduit en russe en 1930, ou, au moins, accepté ce changement ? Que signifie ce jeu avec les mots *primitif* et *inférieur* ?

Selon le contexte, l’adjectif français *primitif* peut correspondre à plusieurs adjectifs russes: *pervobytnyj* ‘très ancien, préhistorique’ (c’est le sens principal de ce mot russe); *pervonačal’nyj*, *pervičnyj*, *isxodnyj* ‘originel, d’origine’ et, enfin, *primitivnyj* ‘très simple’, ‘démodé’ ou ‘inférieur’. Apparemment le traducteur (ou le rédacteur) du livre a essayé de se débarrasser de ce dernier sens dans la traduction russe du titre. Et pour réussir, il devait choisir un autre mot russe, *pervobytnyj*, dont le sens concernait avant tout des époques anciennes, préhistoriques – les époques auxquelles Marr consacrait l’essentiel de son attention. Ainsi la nécessité de remplacer un terme par un autre a exigé de remplacer un titre par un autre.

Marr se référait souvent aux travaux de Lévy-Bruhl, en particulier, pour parler du calcul chez les peuples primitifs ou encore pour « prouver » l’existence du langage gestuel dans les époques « pré-historiques »²⁸. Pourtant, selon Lévy-Bruhl, le langage gestuel existait encore à son époque : «D’après M. Boas, un langage de ce genre était encore très répandu, en 1890, à l’intérieur de la Colombie britannique »²⁹.

Cette remarque est importante pour illustrer les différences entre les théories de Marr et de Lévy-Bruhl. Marr lui-même n’aimait pas en parler. Il croyait que le point le plus fort de sa « nouvelle théorie du langage » était précisément la possibilité de discuter les états préhistoriques de l’évolution langagière. En même temps, il reprochait au comparatisme son « attachement au temps historique » et son incapacité totale à dire quoi que ce soit sur les langues et le langage humain à l’époque

²⁵ Si Marr parlait des *stades* (cf. « l’histoire de l’évolution par stades » (Marr, 1933-1937, vol. I, p. 264); « les langues des [différents] stades de développement » (*Ibid.*, vol. IV, p. 59), etc.) — Lévy-Bruhl préférait la notion de *type* (cf. « les types sociaux différents » (Lévy-Bruhl, 1910, p. 19); « les mentalités de types différents » (*Ibid.*, p. 151), etc.), qui est plus étroite que *stade* : chaque stade peut être un type, mais un type peut ne pas être un stade. Cela est certainement lié avec la thèse de Lévy-Bruhl sur la possibilité pour des « mentalités de types différents » de coexister. D’autre part, comme dans l’histoire de la société un type remplacerait graduellement un autre, sa notion de *type* s’approche de celle de *stade*.

²⁶ Lévy-Bruhl, 1910, p. 151

²⁷ Nikol’skij, 1930, p. XXIII.

²⁸ Sur la nature de ces « preuves » cf. Velmezova, 2003.

²⁹ Lévy-Bruhl, 1910, p. 178.

préhistorique. C'est pourquoi Marr ne reconnaissait qu'à contrecœur qu'«en réalité, chez Lévy-Bruhl il ne s'agit pas de la *vraie* pensée primitive»³⁰. Il est vrai que chez Lévy-Bruhl il ne s'agissait aucunement d'antiquités préhistoriques. L'anthropologue français décrivait les particularités d'un type spécifique de pensée qui était encore propre à certains de ses contemporains — les tribus des indigènes de l'Afrique, l'Australie, l'Océanie, etc. Cette situation était typique pour l'anthropologie du premiers tiers du XX^{ème} siècle, où les chercheurs se hâtaient de décrire un matériau qui semblait être en état de disparition³¹.

Lévy-Bruhl, qui devait se rendre compte des malentendus possibles, a écrit une petite préface à la traduction russe de son livre. Voici comment elle commence :

La "mentalité primitive" est une expression qu'on utilise très souvent depuis un certain temps. [...] Peut-être il ne serait pas inutile de rappeler ici en quelques mots ce que je sous-entends par "mentalité primitive". Le mot "primitif" n'est qu'un terme purement conventionnel. Nous traitons de primitifs les peuples comme les Australiens, les habitants des îles Fidji, les indigènes des îles Andaman etc. Quand les Blancs sont entrés en contact avec ces peuples, ils n'avaient pas encore de métaux et leur civilisation faisait penser à l'ordre social de l'âge de pierre. Ainsi il y avait devant les Européens des gens qui *semblaient* être plutôt les contemporains de nos ancêtres de l'âge néolithique ou même paléolithique, que les nôtres. D'où vient cette désignation des peuples primitifs. Pourtant leur primitivisme est très relatif. [...] Nous ne savons absolument rien sur l'homme primitif au sens propre du mot³².

Pourtant, cette mise en garde de deux pages contre l'interprétation erronée du mot *primitif* est précédée par les trente pages des trois avant-propos des chercheurs soviétiques renommés, chez qui ce mot avait des connotations préhistoriques patentes ...

Ainsi, si Marr traçait des frontières entre les différents types de langues (les « stades » langagiers) *dans le temps*, les frontières de Lévy-Bruhl entre deux différents types de pensée concernaient avant tout *l'espace* — bien qu'avec un présupposé quant à l'évolution de l'humanité de l'un des types de pensée (la pensée primitive appartiendrait à la « préhistoire, alors que l'exigence logique était à peine sentie »³³) vers l'autre³⁴.

Le choix d'objets d'investigation différents par les deux chercheurs (le temps, dans le cas de Marr / l'espace, dans le cas de Lévy-Bruhl) explique également la

³⁰ Marr, 1930, p. XIV, nous soulignons.

³¹ Cf. par exemple les préoccupations de B. Malinowski (1884-1942), exprimées tout au début et à la fin de son livre datant de 1922 (Malinowski, 1922 [1963]): « L'ethnologie se trouve dans une situation à la fois ridicule et déplorable, pour ne pas dire tragique, car à l'heure même où elle commence à s'organiser, à forger ses propres outils et à être en état d'accomplir la tâche qui est sienne, voilà que le matériau sur lequel porte son étude disparaît avec une rapidité désespérante » (p. 54) ; « [...] l'ethnologie doit faire vite, le temps lui est compté ; reconnaîtra-t-on son importance et sa véritable signification avant qu'il ne soit trop tard ? » (p. 590).

³² Lévi-Bruhl, 1930, p. 3, nous soulignons.

³³ Lévy-Bruhl, 1910, p. 453.

³⁴ Cf. en particulier la citation suivante : « En même temps que la mentalité des sociétés de type inférieur devient plus perméable à l'expérience, elle devient aussi plus sensible à la contradiction. Auparavant, elle y était presque entièrement indifférente » (Lévy-Bruhl, 1910, p. 443).

différence des méthodes qu'ils utilisaient. En décrivant les phénomènes du monde qui lui était contemporain, l'anthropologue français préférait plutôt décrire les faits concrets ou, en tout cas, construire ses théories en s'appuyant sur un matériau concret, qu'en tirer des conclusions difficiles à vérifier.

Marr, en revanche, s'en tenait très souvent à des généralisations, en utilisant des méthodes déductives, où les conclusions précédaient l'analyse des faits. Dans la plupart des cas, il n'expliquait aucunement comment il était arrivé à tel ou tel résultat. La question « Comment ? » (impliquant une grande précision des méthodes des recherches) lui paraissait certainement beaucoup moins importante que la question « Quoi ? » (les résultats concrets atteints). Voici son point de vue sur les méthodes de ses recherches linguistiques, si opposé à celui de Lévy-Bruhl :

Quant aux faits et aux phénomènes linguistiques, on y a atteint les *limites extrêmes*. C'est à l'échelle mondiale qu'on discute la nouvelle théorie du langage. Personne ne pourra éviter ce tournant en linguistique, pas un seul spécialiste de la parole sonore³⁵.

Cette différence dans les méthodes (inductive/déductive) utilisées par les deux scientifiques, ainsi que leurs façons différentes de tracer les frontières de leur objet d'étude (dans le temps ou dans l'espace), nous permet de constater la coexistence de deux approches différentes de la notion même d'évolutionnisme social et langagier au début du XX^{ème} siècle.

Voici ce qui apporte la réponse à la question de savoir pourquoi un titre a été remplacé par un autre. N'étant pas pris au sérieux par la plupart des linguistes indo-européistes d'Occident, contre les théories desquels il s'était élevé dès le début de sa carrière scientifique, Marr voulait probablement se trouver des alliés étrangers parmi les représentants d'autres disciplines. Lévy-Bruhl devait être l'un de ceux-là. Mais pour le présenter en tant qu'« allié » en URSS, il fallait au moins prétendre qu'il écrivait sur le même sujet que l'auteur de la « nouvelle théorie du langage ». C'est pourquoi, puisque « toute vérité n'était pas bonne à dire » sur les théories de Lévy-Bruhl en URSS, l'adjectif *inférieur* (qui ne fait pas allusion à la préhistoire marriste) a été remplacé par le mot *primitif* (où cette allusion est tout à fait claire) dans le titre russe – et donc un titre a été remplacé par un autre.

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The Puritan Apothecaries

Translation and education

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Much has been written about 17th-century literary translation and its importance to English culture. However, the skilled technical translation from that period is of equal cultural importance. In this paper I shall focus on the Puritan translator-apothecaries who worked in the East End of London in the 1650s and 60s. In defiance of the 1518 act which established the London College of Physicians and forbade apothecaries to “practise medicine”, they saw patients, often not charging for treatment, and regarded educating the patient as a necessary part of their work. They knew what they were about: they had all passed through a rigorous apprenticeship, several of them had been at a university, and some had medical training. Those who interest us here were practising alchemists, who combined their fundamentalist Christianity with the thorough-going mysticism of the adept, and with politics radical enough to worry even Cromwell.

“The Glory of God being my aim, and the Good of this Languishing Nation my End”, Nicholas Culpeper (1616-1654), a notorious apothecary, who had entered either Peterhouse or Queens’ College (Cambridge) in 1632 and left without a degree, set out to fight

[...] a Disease which now turned Epidemical and rages so extreemly that it sweeps away millions in a year, leaving many woful Widdows, and Fatherless Children to the protection of those whose mercies are cruelty, and that is *Ignorance in Physick* or want of Knowledg of what may do them good; the Cure of this Disease cannot be performed [...] but by the *real indeavours of a Publick Spirit* by the *Fear of God*, and *Love to Poor People*, by *labouring to discharge a good Conscience*, by *instructing People what belongs to their Health* [...] (Culpeper 1653: To the Reader).

In the eyes of Culpeper and his East End colleagues ignorance is the work of Antichrist, whose most dangerous agent in Britain was the medical profession, whose members maintained their power by “hiding medical knowledge from the people” behind foreign languages. However our apothecaries did grant that physicians were one step better than the “Empirick”, the barefoot doctor who combined traditional medical beliefs with a knowledge of folk remedies, some garbled medical knowledge and the gift of persuading the desperate. Their purpose in “Instructing People what belongs to their Health” was breaking the power of the London College of Physicians and countering the mischief wrought by the Empirick.

Whether they translated or not, apothecaries discharged their teaching responsibilities according to Comenius’s three-fold aim of knowing things, and understanding and using them. Like Charles Hoole (1610-1665), a well known Puritan schoolmaster, they argued that “to pack up many words in memory, of things not

conceived in the mind, is to fill the head with empty imaginings” (Hoole 1659: Preface), and did their best to instil the orderly way of learning found in Nature:

[...] first to exercise the Senses well, by presenting their objects to them, and then to fasten on the Intellect by impressing the first notions of things on it, and linking them one to another by a rational discourse (Hoole 1659: Preface).

Anti-establishment translations are then in the plainest of styles, though their prefaces are usually skilled pieces of rhetoric and polemic. Few of these translators had an articulated theory of language, but they did observe norms of language use, the most salient applying to vocabulary. The central issue was a Baconian idea of truth. In his 1640 translation of Bacon’s *The Dignity and Increase of Science* Gilbert Wats defines truth as “a congruent conformity of the Intellect to the Object, and of the different faculties thereof to Difference of Things”. Truth then, required “an unbroken chain between thing and word” (Slaughter 1982: 88): a properly assigned name reflects the nature of its referent, for a thing is named once one has apprehended it visually and knows its nature (Ong 1958: 129). While our translators agreed with this essentially medieval view, they also appealed to Genesis 2.19-20 where God paraded the animals before Adam “to see how he would call them; for howsoever the man named every living creature, so was the name thereof.”

Inevitably, the major formative influence on the apothecaries’ prose style was the Puritan sermon, a Ramist intellectual exercise which set out religious doctrine in plain words disposed in a logical order, gave a rational explanation of the doctrinal points at issue, and finally enjoined the listener to shape his life by it. In 1578 Lawrence Chaderton (1536?-1640), later the first Master of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, demanded a preacher “speake particularly, not in the excellencie of wordes, nor in the inticyng speach of mans wisdom, but in plaine evidence and demonstration of the trueth” (Fisch 1952: 231). Any Puritan would have related his promise to St Paul’s words in 1Cor. 2.1-4 and the marginal notes in the Geneva Bible of 1560, which I have put in square brackets:

And I, brethren, when I came to you, came not with the excellencies of wordes or of wisdom, shewing unto you the *testimonie of God [...] [*or misterie I.17] Neither stood my word, and my preaching in the enticing speach of mans wisdom, but in plaine evidence of *the Spirit [*or I thought nothing worthie to be known Acts. 18.1] and of power.

Given the kinship postulated between medical and religious translation, the preface of the Geneva Bible (1560) made an indisputable case for a literal translation:

Now as we have chiefly observed the sense, and laboured alwaies to restore it to all integritie, so we have most reverentlie kept the proprietie of the words, considering that the Apostles spake and wrote to the Gentiles in the Greek tonge, rather constrayned them to the lively Phrase of the Hebrew, then enterprised farre by modifying their language to Speake as the Gentiles.

Puritan translators had taken on board Paracelsus’s view that medicine was as sacred a discipline as theology, and demanded that these sacred disciplines be expounded in transparent and honest language. In practical terms, they recognised two levels in their task: finding English words which denoted the nature of things in the same way as the foreign word, and disposing them in a natural, logical discourse order.

If the intended readership's heads were not to be filled with the empty imaginings so feared by Hoole, their lack of sophistication demanded as simple a vocabulary as possible. The version of Sendivogius's alchemy by John French, MA, MD [New Hall, Oxford] (1616?-1657), who had served as a doctor in Cromwell's army, is typical in avoiding "elegancies" in favour of "uncouth words", because "the sense, to which I kept me alone, would not properly bear any other". As the author of a dictionary of alchemical terms as a guide to the mysteries sacred and profane of chemistry, he combined awareness of the need for technical terms to be univocal and almost isomorphous with the thing denoted with Paracelsus's ideas on the mystic relationships of words with created matter.

In theory, then, the source text controlled the vocabulary of the target text. Culpeper in the preface to his translation of Galen condemns the 1611 Authorised Version for "adding certain thousands of words, both in old and new Testament", "many words they have not translated at all", and finally "they translate one and the same word diverse waies, and when they have done so, they play the Anticks with it most notably". He answers the translators' explanation that these variations were needed to make sense in English with: "Blasphemous Wretches, did the Spirit of God when it penned the Scriptures, pen non-sense?" This piece of rhetoric leads to a discussion of the iniquity of translating the Greek *presbuteros* and *episkopos* by "Priest" and "Bishop" rather than by "Elder", and "Overseer" (the literal glosses favoured by the Puritans who rejected the whole principle of ecclesiastical hierarchy), and of the Roman Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist, which was still lurking in some Anglican circles.

To a man the apothecaries were concerned about the relationship between style, matter and reading public. The anonymous translator of Jean Pecquet

[...] having been very well satisfied in the Roughnesse at least, if not Crabbidness of the Stile, for a Publick Good could do no less than to adde what lay in my power to help those weaker persons, whose Hands are better than their Latine, to a Verity so demonstrable, so desired
(anonymous: 1653: To the Reader).

"Rhetoric" was despised, feared and avoided as something "added on", which impugned the natural order of language, obscured the nature of things, and concealed truth. As the alchemist Richard Russell (before 1640-between 1686 & 1697) remarked in his preface to Oswald Crollius's *Royal Chemistry* (1670), sound translations of medicine and its sister disciplines were "not gorgeously adorned with paintings of rhetoric, but plainly clothed in an English Habit". One's salvation was also at stake: William Cooper (ca 1639-1689), a bookseller and assiduous writer and translator of alchemical books, enjoined authors to write with "Laconick Brevity and Plainness [...]" so that our life might be improved in sound Knowledge and Virtue, and God receive all Praise and Honour, to whom it is eternally due" (Cooper 1673: Preface).

As far as grammar and structure were concerned, they seem to have accepted that, despite the obvious structural differences between languages, there was a natural logical order which languages had a distressing habit of deviating from. One of the few to mention grammar is Robert Turner of Holshott (1619/20-1664), an astrologer and botanist who had taken his BA from Christ's College, Cambridge, in 1639-40. His 1655 translation of Paracelsus's *Archidoxes of Magic*, is "rendered rather

Grammatically then Sententially, according to the Author's own Phrase", a potent selling-point, as both translator and reader remembered "grammaticall translation" from their schooldays.

Its greatest apostle was the Puritan schoolmaster, John Brinsley (1585-1665), who may have taught some of the London apothecaries. The first step in the classroom routine of translating a piece of Latin into English (or English into Latin) was the construe, (the "verbatim" or "literal translation") which entailed parsing each word, working out its functions, and rearranging them in the "natural order". A "grammatical translation" was made from the construe by "supplying all such words as are wanting, to make perfect sense and construction" and by giving every word "his due significance and proper signe, so farre as the sense will bear" (Brinsley 1612: 104). Finally, the pupil turned his grammatical translation into an "oratorical translation" by ornamenting the natural order with the graces of rhetoric, and incidentally reinforced the idea that rhetoric was something "added on" to language in its natural state.

The following passage from Brinsley's grammatical version of Cicero's *De Officiis* I.82 prepared for the use of his own classes gives a fair idea of what a grammatical translation entailed:

Ut enim sunt, quemadmodum supra dixi, qui urbanis rebus bellicas anteponant, sic reperies multos, quibus periculosa et calida consilia, quietis et cogitatis et splendidiora et maiora videantur. Numquam omnino periculi fuga committendum est, ut imbelles timidique videamur. Sed fugiendum enim illud, ne offeramus nos periculis sine causa, quo nihil potest esse stultius. Qua-propter in adeundis periculis consuetudo imitanda medicorum est, qui leviter aegrotantes leniter curant, gravioribus autem morbis periculosas curationes et ancipites adhibere coguntur.

Brinsley prints his grammatical translation in the central columns. The outside columns contain the original "verbatim" translations of Cicero's Latin idioms "where the Grammar order would not stand well with our tongue", and the columns on either side of the gutter outline the moral teaching to be drawn from the text. Brinsley references the verbatim translations to the more idiomatic versions in the central column with "q". The asterisks mark "variety of phrase, the better to expresse the Matter". The comments in the two inside columns have the same function as the marginal notes in the Geneva Bible. Everything else was left to class discussion.

Even schoolmasters had no metalanguage for translation theory or practice. In discussing Brinsley's version, I shall use the three basic concepts developed by Jean-Paul Vinay and Jean Darbelnet: "modulation" ("a variation in the message, arrived at by changing the point of view" (Vinay & Darbelnet 1958; §37)) which pertains to lexicon, and "transposition" ("replacing a source-language structure with a more idiomatic target language structure" (Vinay & Darbelnet 1958: §36)) which pertains to grammar and *démarche* (discourse shape).

In his grammatical translation Brinsley has recourse to both modulation and transposition. His simplest modulations change the colours of the words, as "crafty devices" for *calida consilia* [cunning plans]. Other modulations entail "supplying all such words as are wanting, to make perfect sense and construction": Cicero's nominalised adjective, *bellicas*, becomes "martiall prowess" by extrapolating the noun, *res* (things), from *urbanis rebus* (civill affaires) and interpreting it rather

Tullies Offices
very state.

Chap. 28.

*How perils are
to be q adventured
by a valiant man.*

q vnder taken of a
valiant man.

FOR as there are Tully, being her
some (as I said about to set downe
before) who pre- some other times
ferre q martiall of valour in waire,
prowesse before Ci- sheweth, that as
tle busineses; SO there be some such,
you shall find ma- as prefer martiall
ny, to whom * pro- prowesse before ci-
vilous and * po- ty busineses; so
ty q devices seeme there are many who
q gloriouiser & grea thinke subtle and
ter then quiet q co- dangerous plots,
sultations. more glorious than
quiet and safe con-
sultations.

I q Indeed wee
must neuer q so And heer teacheth.
carry our selues for i. That wee neuer
avoiding danger; so carrie our selues
that

- q martiall matters or affaires, to civill.
- * dangerous
- * subtle.
- q counsels.
- q more bright.
- q cogitations or counsels.
- q we must neuer at all, q commit for flight of perill.

translated Grammatically, &c. 1891

in war, as that for that wee should
avoiding dangers, seeme q towards q towards, and
we should seeme and q dastards; timorous,
towards & dastards. 2 q Yet q we must q but.

3. That we neuer take heed of that also is to be
to dangers with- us take heed of that.
our iust cause; for not our selues ir- q offer not our
that, that is, of all selues to.
other, most foolish. to dangers with-
our cause; then
which, nothing can
be more foolish.

3. That in dangers q attempting dan- q going into or ad-
we imitate the cour- gers, q wee are to q venturing.
ties of good Phys- imitate the courte guide of Physicians
cians, who vie but of Physicants
light cures in light is to be imitated.
dileases; whereas in
more grievous and q who vie light q dot lightly cures.
desperate dileases, cures to q them q men being sicke
they are enforced to who are lightly lightly.
vie more desperate diseased; but are
cures.

inforced q to mi- q to vie perillous &
nister dangerous doubtfull cures.
and doubtfull me-
dicines to * more * forr sicke messes.
grievous dileases.

The contrarie prac- q Therefore in a q wherefore to wish
tise hee sheweth to calme to wish a an adverse [or boy-
bee the part of a fore

liberally. More usually his modulations have a tinge of Culpeper's "playing the Anticks most notably: for instance "consultations" for *cogitatis* (glossed "cogitations or counsels" in the margin) and the heightened "thrust not ourselves into dangers" for *ne offeramus nos periculis* (lest we expose ourselves to dangers).

At times Brinsley's *q* in the margin draws attention to transpositions which produce more idiomatic English, such as "Indeed we must never ^qso carry ourselves for avoiding danger" for *Numquam omnino periculi fuga committendum est*, which he glosses excruciatingly accurately in the margin. He transposes the noun phrase, *periculi fuga*, into a participle with an object, and the gerund, *committendum est*, into a reflexive verb. The transpositions in this passage involve modulation. Cicero's coordinate adjectives, *quietis et cogitatis* (than peaceful and considered [plans]), become the noun phrase, (quiet consultations), which does have a slightly different meaning. *Sed fugiendum enim illud, ne offeramus nos periculis sine causa*, [...], rates three *qs*: the clumsy literality of the margin becomes, "Yet ^q we must also take heed of this, that we ^qthrust not ourselves into dangers without cause [...]" In so doing Brinsley changes the grammatical function of the subordinate clause, *ne offeramus nos periculis sine causa* (lest we expose ourselves to danger without cause). Cicero had written a purpose clause depending on the verb, *fugiendum*: Brinsley's version is a noun clause in apposition to "this", the complement of "take heed".

Grammar is at the service of *démarche*, "the exploitation of certain preferences in the presentation of the facts" (Vinay & Darblenet 1958: 201), which results in a discourse order and style peculiar to both language and writer, while varying according to the goal of communication. Vinay & Darblenet divide the sentence into *thème* and *propos*, the Prague School's "rheme", but here it seems more to the purpose to borrow the words, *début* (beginning) and *but* (goal) from the eighteenth-century rhetorician, Charles Batteux. All the sentences except that marked 2 in the Cicero passage are rising sentences, a characteristic of periodic and philosophical Latin. They terminate with the idea that the sentence is building to, which is not necessarily the principal clause. The sentence beginning *Numquam omnino* is a case in point: it moved towards a purpose clause. Likewise Brinsley consistently keeps Cicero's *démarche* while changing some grammatical relationships. Ironically, then, a "grammatical translation" as taught by schoolmasters like Brinsley is at one and the same time a lexicon-bound practice aimed at "most reverentlie keeping the proprietie of the words", and a practice which preserved target-language discourse priorities through sacrificing its grammatical structure.

In the light of this how does Culpeper – with his appeal to the literality of the Geneva Bible – fare? His preparation of almond oil from the *Pharmacopoeia londinensis* shows his strict principles had some latitude:

Take of sweet almonds/ not corrupted,/ as many as you will,/
cast the shells away,/ and blanch them,/ beat them in a stone Mortar,/ heat
them in a double vessel,/ and press out the Oyl/ without heat.

The College lays out the sequence of operations in a rising sentence: the construe in small type is mine:

R/ Amydalas dulces,/ nondum prae vetustate rancidas,/ quot volueris./ Fracto,
& abjecto cortice exteriori lignoso, & exuta interiori membrana,/ tritae in

mortario lapideo,/ calefiant in duplice vase,/ & prelo exprimatur oleum,/ sine vi caloris.

Take sweet almonds/ not yet rancid through age/ as many as you wish./ The woody outside shell having been broken and thrown away/ and the inside membrane stripped,/ once ground in a stone mortar/ let them be heated in a double vessel,/ and let the oil be squeezed out in a press,/ without the force of heat.

Though Culpeper has not added “certain thousands of words”, his use of modulation means that there are “many he has not translated at all”, for example *prae vetustate* (because of their age) and *exteriori lignoso* (exterior wooden). He does not have the space to “translate one and the same word diverse waies”, although a pedant could object to modulating *nondum* (not yet) to “not”, and *rancidas* (rancid) to “corrupted”. The botanically exact “woody outer shell” becomes simply “shells”, and “the interior membrane stripped” the normal term, “blanch”, and “squeezing out the oil with a press” simply “press”.

As with Brinsley, Culpeper’s structural priority is discourse, not grammar. He is bound by two things: the sequence and linkage of operations signalled by the Latin discourse order, and the English conventions of writing recipes. After the imperative, *R/ (Recipe [take])* the College sets out the operations involved and their order in a sequence of ablative absolutes *fracto* (broken), *abjecto* (thrown away), and *exuta* (stripped) followed by the nominalised past participle, *tritae* (ground) acting as the subject of the first main clause. The goal of the sentence is the two jussive subjunctives, *calefiant* (let them be heated) and *exprimatur* (let it be pressed out) with the tail, *sine vi caloris*. Culpeper transposes both ablative absolutes and jussive subjunctives into the imperatives normal in an English recipe book. The discourse priorities of the original demand he retain the link between shelling the almonds and blanching them. His parataxis is the only adequate way of dealing with something which the Latin sets out by elaborate grammatical subordination.

This is a grammatical translation meeting all Brinsley’s norms and amply satisfying Cooper’s requirement of “Laconick Brevity and Plainness”. Most important of all it is designed for its public, the small artisan of London’s East End.

Just as the sermon was intended to give a rule of life to its hearers, Culpeper gives advice on dosage and administration (which is not in the original), and for the readers’ delectation, he comments on the College of Physicians. The tone is that of the pugnacious marginalia from the Geneva Bible:

Culpeper *A*. It helps roughness of the throat and stomach, helps Pleuresies, increaseth seed, easeth coughs, and Hectick feavers; by injection it helps such whose water scalds them; ulcers in the bladder, reins and matrix. You may either take half an ounce of it by it self, or mix it with half an ounce of Syrup of Violets, and take a spoonful at a time, still shaking them together when you take them; only take notice of this. If you take it inwardly let it be new drawn, for it will be sown in three or four days.

A. In their new Moddel, they bid you heat them in a double vessel, and then press out the Oyl without the help of Heat; O Heavens! did ever the Sun shine upon such ridiculous creatures! who would think a whol Colledg of Physitians would dote so young!

The sense of mission loudly proclaimed by these apothecaries shaped their ideas on translation and guaranteed professional standards. However, it will not have escaped notice that their translation practice is no different from the technical writing of the much despised London College of Physicians and that promulgated by the Royal Society during the 1660s. Although they shared the three handy shibboleths of good style – clarity, brevity and purity – with the opposition, one hears very little from these apothecaries about Seneca or Petrus Ramus, influential though these two were at the time. The apothecaries seem to be alone in validating existing technical translation practice by borrowing grammatical translation from the schoolroom and making it the finished text rather than the second step in the development of a polished version. There were three interlinked factors in the transition of grammatical translation from school exercise to professional behaviour. The first was the ruling ideology of the isomorphism of word and thing, combined with the more mystical view of names from the Bible and the alchemical tradition. The second factor was the Roman distinction between high, middle and low styles, and their zeal for matching the style of a translation with its matter. As this principle played an essential part in seventeenth-century training in literary criticism and Latin composition, our translators knew that the Romans had used the low style for technical writing, and that the Greek and Latin Bibles violated the Classical concord between style and matter as they were written in a low style instead of a high. The low style inevitably entailed literalism, a lesson reinforced by the pugnacious preface of the English Geneva Bible, which by reason of its carefully publicised literalism was the archetypal grammatical translation. The third factor was the assumption that the sentence order of a grammatical translation was natural, because Nature itself is simple and orderly.

Even in that rigidly religious age the Puritan apothecaries stand out from other translators by the sheer force of their religious convictions and their sense of duty towards their fellow citizens. Without them the health of London's poor would have been a lot worse.

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Review

Graffi, G.

200 Years of Syntax. A Critical Survey.

Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2004. pp. xiii, 551. [Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and History of Linguistic Science. Series III – Studies in the History of the Language Sciences, 98]. 1 58811 052 4 US\$ 168.00, 90 272 4587 8 EUR 140.00.

Reviewed by: John Walmsley, Bielefeld.

From one point of view the story of western syntax is the story of how – Dependency having ruled over its empire for two thousand years – the usurper Constituency rose up to challenge it in the twentieth century. How, after a titanic struggle, Constituency prevailed and banished Dependency to the nether regions, and how Constituency's reign subsequently fell apart, until in the end Dependency had to be reinstated to reign jointly with Constituency.

This is not of course the story as Graffi tells it, nor even the story Graffi tells – though it is present in the narrative. Graffi takes up a different standpoint and, having laid out his plan, maps out his story extensively and in considerable depth. A welcome feature of Graffi's book is the author's decision to make his historiographical position explicit (Introduction, pp. 1-11). According to Graffi, the task of historians of linguistic thought is “that of determining, among other things, to what extent affinities [...] express real identities between theories worked out in different periods” (Graffi 2001:3) – an assumption worth discussing in more detail. Graffi takes issue on this with Chomsky, and Kneale and Kneale, who, he says, “aimed at bringing into light those doctrines of past ages which appeared consistent with a particular conception of linguistic science” (Graffi 2001: 2). But might not Chomsky claim that determining affinities between theories worked out in different periods was in fact just what he was doing in Chomsky (1966)? A different position is ascribed to professional historians of science, who, Graffi says, “aim at globally reconstructing the ‘scientific thought’ of a given age” (Graffi 2001: 2). But this is not the approach adopted here either. What Graffi does is to single out one thread in the history of linguistics and trace its development over two centuries. In view of the limitations on time and space, his decision to confine himself to an ‘internal’ history of the discipline is a wise one.

The author begins by distinguishing the history of linguistic *science* from the history of linguistic thought: Pedersen (1962) being an example of the former, Robins (1967) an instance of the latter. In the face of this dichotomy Graffi is, he tells us, going to provide “a history of linguistic science while at the same time adopting a perspective of history of linguistic thought: investigating how some ingenuous concepts have been dealt with in some theories” (Graffi 2001: 3). These “ingenuous concepts” are ‘subject’, ‘sentence’ and ‘word-group’. Graffi treats them as basic notions which “do not belong to a specific theory” but “can be redefined within a given theoretical framework. Such ingenuous concepts [...] represent the starting point for

any separate syntactic theory, which can obviously modify both their scope and their value, or even dispose of them, but it cannot avoid facing them” (Graffi 2001: 3).

In adopting this approach Graffi takes issue with Robins’ presumed assumption that nineteenth-century linguistics was essentially historical-comparative in orientation. Graffi does us a service by extending the scope of the history of nineteenth-century linguistics beyond the historical-comparative paradigm. He argues that the second main strand of linguistic history – namely, general grammar – was re-fashioned along psychological lines by Steintal.

Graffi thinks (in my view erroneously) that the ‘general grammar’ of the Port Royal tradition was based on logic. Once this strand lost its momentum, developments in syntax were characterized by its shifting relationship with psychology (Graffi 2001: 4). Graffi distinguishes three major phases in this relationship: (1) the decline of general grammar (with psychology taking over from ‘Geist’); (2) a phase in which psychologism is rejected, coinciding with the rise of Structuralism; and (3) a phase in which the two are reconnected, though in a different manner. These phases deliver the ground-plan of the book, giving it a pleasing symmetry.

The book is divided into three parts, and each part has three chapters devoted to it. Parts I and II each have an introductory chapter in which the main scholars and their views (on the “ingenuous concepts”) are presented, followed by two further chapters in which the author presents the major debates, illustrating selected problems with data and examples in some detail. Part I (chapters 2-4) covers the rise and fall of psychological syntax, and the analysis of the sentence and the word-group. Part II (chapters 5-7) is devoted to Structural linguistics, with chapters on the role of syntax, sentence analysis, and techniques of syntactic description. Part III (chapters 8-10) departs somewhat from the pattern of the two preceding parts. Since, according to Graffi, the majority of syntactic theories in the second half of the twentieth century could not avoid referring to Chomsky’s view of syntax, Part III offers three chapters on trends in syntactic research, theoretical principles, and empirical analyses seen from a predominantly Chomskyan perspective (much as Part II falls under the umbrella of de Saussure). The closing chapter of the section and the book takes the reader beyond the Minimalist Program to Kayne’s proposals, as a pointer perhaps to the future.

The nine major chapters are substantial (frequently 50-60 pages in length). Each follows a similar pattern, beginning with a brief introduction mapping out the subsequent argument. (Curiously, there is no balancing summary-conclusion, either at the end of the chapter or at the end of the volume). The book is rounded off with a full set of References and Indexes of Names and Subjects.

Graffi’s concentration on “ingenuous concepts” is on balance a happy decision: while excluding considerable areas of linguistic history it enables him to present his arguments with satisfying completeness in what nevertheless still remains a broad field. Making Chomsky a point of departure in the last part also permits him to build up a web of connections to related theories (among them Cognitive Grammar, Relational Grammar, Montague Grammar, GPSG, LFG, HPSG, Categorical Grammar, Word Grammar, Dik’s Functional Grammar, Hallidayan grammar, Generative Semantics and Valency Theory).

The biggest problem with this book is in my view Graffi’s characterization of Structuralism in Part II. Instead of exploring the difficult question of exactly what is

‘structural’ about Structuralism, Graffi defines as structural “any syntactic work [...] which explicitly refers to de Saussure’s work even if in a critical way” (Graffi 2001: 168). This approach blurs the fine distinctions between different strands of Structuralism – the analytic-synthetic opposition, for instance; its opposition to universalism; its preference for constituency (versus dependency); the emphasis on surface-structure distribution; and – particularly – the role played by meaning in a grammar.

Within Structuralism Graffi distinguishes two approaches, which he labels ‘non-procedural’ (dealing with the word and the word group – e.g. Tesnière, de Groot) and ‘procedural’ (based on distributional or formal criteria), respectively. The latter are then subdivided into ‘top-down’ (e.g. I.C.A.) and ‘bottom-up’ (e.g. Harris) schools. The traditional dependency approach tended to be synthetic (which is why it started with the parts-of-speech): “*x* combines with *y* to form *z*” (much as in Categorical Grammar). The analytical approach which prevails today, which takes the sentence as its starting point (as practised by Sonnenschein *et al.*, not mentioned in the book) seems to me to be of more recent provenance, but central to the Structuralist position. Graffi’s presentation makes Dependency Grammar a part of Structuralism, whereas there are reasons for thinking that it is in some ways in opposition to it (cf. Thrane 1980).

The critical issue of the role played by meaning in a grammar would seem to be central to the Structuralists’ rejection of psychologism in favour of formal (distributional) criteria and to Chomsky’s rejection of phrase-structure grammar. Nida (Structuralist) took Jespersen to task for treating:

the doctor’s arrival
and *the man’s house*

as essentially different structures: “Jespersen’s adherence to his basic assumption as to the fundamental logic within language [27/28] has led him into rather serious distortion [...] the setting up of “nexus” substantives, and dividing expression[s] such as *the doctor’s arrival* from *the man’s house*, because the first is equivalent in meaning to a “nexus” construction, *the doctor arrives*, is largely unwarranted” (Nida 1960: 27-28). Nida (1960) was in fact the published version of Nida’s doctoral thesis of 1943. When Chomsky’s transformational grammar appeared on the scene, Jespersen’s observations were re-evaluated – positively – and in the second edition of Nida’s *Synopsis* (1966) the passage concerned no longer appears.

It will surprise some that a number of important names appear to be missing from this book, even the names of persons who were explicitly in favour of or critical of de Saussure – among them Malinowski, Firth, Matthews, the Palmers (L.R., H.E., and F.). The omission of most of these, however, is explained by the orientation of the initial questions. To set against any dissatisfaction on this score is the fact that Graffi’s depth of coverage directs attention to the work of many other linguists, particularly in Europe, whose names do not often appear in mainstream histories.

Taken as a whole, Graffi’s book represents a mammoth task, well executed. The author marshals his material well and summarises the main lines of his argument clearly without allowing his familiarity with the material to cloud his judgement. He maintains a satisfying distance to his material, which allows him to comment critically when the need arises. In the main, he recapitulates the arguments reliably and he

explains the formalisms well – (one small point, though – on p. 406 McCawley’s analysis of ‘die’ should, surely, be ‘kill’ – McCawley 1973: 157).

The author modestly describes his work as a “necessarily limited” account (Graffi 2001: 427). It is, nevertheless, a work of formidable scope and learning. *200 Years of Syntax* is both an interesting and illuminating contribution to the history of linguistics.

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Henry Sweet Society for the History of Linguistic Ideas Treasurer's Report for the year ended December 31st, 2004

Income from subscriptions to the Society for 2004 was higher than in 2003 (at £1545, or £1671 including overpayments, compared to just £1273 in 2003). Many thanks to all our members, since subscriptions are the only regular source of income to finance the Bulletin and our other activities. For the first time, a few members paid by PayPal, and this trend is continuing in 2005. It is now possible to use your credit card to pay by PayPal, though we have to charge a higher rate (£16 as opposed to £15) to cover the percentage fee charged by PayPal for collecting credit card payments.

Our outgoings remain similar to those of previous years. Costs related to the Bulletin - printing and mailing - totalled £1465.06 in 2004, compared to £1296.81 in 2003, and this remains our biggest item of expenditure. Other regular expenses were for maintenance of the web-site (re-registering the name until July 2007), a payment to Oxford City Council for the maintenance of the grave of Henry Sweet, and the committee's expenses for meetings (£333.43 compared to £293.43 in 2003). We continue to try to keep these down by setting a cap of £40 for those in full-time employment, and by asking our home institutions to meet travel costs where possible.

This year the Society's Colloquium in Oxford was advertised via a flyer mailed out to members at a cost of £35.16, as noted under our outgoings. In fact, however, owing to a change of heart at Jesus College regarding the charging of VAT, the Colloquium concluded with an unexpected positive balance of £1489.64 (still to be transferred to the society's account). An important outgoing usually associated with the conference is the award of two Salmon-Verburg bursaries to assist younger scholars in meeting the costs of attending. This year we had several very deserving applications, and, exceptionally, at the instigation of Vivian Salmon, who originally established the fund in memory of Paul Salmon, *six* bursaries of £100 were offered, though one was returned. An additional donation by Vivian this year thus allowed us to assist five scholars, whilst leaving the balance of the Salmon-Verburg fund untouched - it therefore still stands at £2195.54.

An unusual expense this year was a subsidy to assist the publication of a very substantial two-volume *Festschrift* in honour of Professor John Flood, *Vir ingenio mirandus. Studies presented to John Flood*, ed. Bill Jones, Willy Kelly and Frank Shaw (Göppingen: Kümmerle, 2003). John Flood is a longstanding member of the society, my predecessor as Treasurer and still our Publications Secretary. Needless to say, however, the subsidy for this publication was approved by the committee in his absence and without his knowledge.

The latest volume in the society's own series of *Studies in the History of Linguistics* is *Flores Grammaticae. Essays in Memory of Vivien Law*, ed. Nicola McLelland and Andrew R. Linn (Münster: Nodus, 2004), launched at the Spring colloquium in Cambridge. The volume was completed late in 2004, which means that all expenses relating to it will appear in the 2005 accounts. The year 2004 also saw the first award of the Vivien Law Prize for an essay in the history of linguistics. The prize of £100 - in addition to a year's free membership of the Society and a copy of Vivien's book, *The History of Linguistics in Europe*, (Cambridge: CUP, 2003) - is funded by a

bequest of £5000 made by Vivien to the Society. The bequest itself - which I noted in the report for 2003 - has only just been finalized, and will, like the payment of the prize itself, appear in the 2005 accounts.

Finally, for those who have been frustrated by the lack of contact details for me in recent issues of the bulletin, it may be worth noting that after a peripatetic period, I have now landed at the University of Nottingham for good, and that my address will now re-appear in the Bulletin.

Dr Nicola McLelland (*Treasurer*)

HSS Accounts for the year ended Dec 31st, 2004

Alliance & Leicester current account	£
Opening balance Jan 1 2004	1512.06
Income	
Subscriptions	1545
Overpayments, donations, subscriptions in advance	<u>126</u>
Total income	1671
Outgoings	
Bulletin printing	1030.55
Bulletin mailing	434.51
Committee expenses for meetings	333.7
Web-page maintenace	52.76
Salmon-Verburg colloquium bursaries*	0
Henry Sweet grave maintenance	63
Flyers for Colloquium	35.16
Subsidy: Festschrift John Flood	<u>340.49</u>
Total outgoings	2290.17
Income	1671
Outgoings	<u>2290.17</u>
Income less outgoings = deficit	-619.17
Opening balance	1512.06
minus the deficit	<u>-619.17</u>
Closing balance Dec 31, 2004	892.89

Alliance and Leicester Savings Account

	£
Opening balance Jan 1, 2004	6740.31
Income (= interest, paid annually)	16.91
Closing balance Dec 31, 2004	6757.22

(of which £2195.54 = Salmon-Verburg fund)

Dutch Postbank account	euros
Opening balance Jan 1, 2004	2548.99
Income	176
Outgoings (bank charges)	-3.77
Income less outgoings = surplus	172.23
Opening balance	2548.99
Added to surplus	172.23
Closing balance Dec 31, 2004	<u>2721.22</u> euros

	£
Closing balance in pounds (approx.)	1893.77

Other credits	£
PayPal as at Dec 31, 2004 (subscriptions received)	48.88
Nodus Publikationen (2075.30 Euro)	1412.24
US account (\$514 as at August 2003)	436.78
Balance from 2004 Colloquium, still to be transferred	1489.64

Statement of assets	£
A & L current account	892.89
A & L savings account	6757.22
Postbank account	1893.77
Paypal	48.88
Credit with Nodus Publikationen	1412.24
US bank account	436.78
2004 Colloquium balance	1489.64
Total assets	<u>12931.42</u>
(Compare £11114.69 at the end of 2003)	

The Constitution of the Henry Sweet Society for the History of Linguistic Ideas

[revised and approved by AGM in March 2005]

1. The name of the Society shall be the *Henry Sweet Society for the History of Linguistic Ideas*.

2. The aims of the Society shall be to promote and encourage the study of the history of all branches of linguistic thought, theoretical and applied. Its fields of interest include the history both of the major subject areas of linguistics and also of more specialised topics, such as writing systems, literacy, rhetoric, and the application of linguistic ideas within professional and technical fields.

3. Membership of the Society is open to all persons with an interest in the aims of the Society.

4. The officers of the Society shall be: a President (with representative functions), up to four Vice-Presidents, Chair of the Executive Committee, Secretary of the Executive Committee, Publications Secretary, Editor of the Bulletin, Reviews Editor, Treasurer, Website Editor, Membership Secretary.

5. There shall be up to six ordinary members of the Executive Committee.

6. The officers of the Society, together with the ordinary members of the Executive Committee, shall have power to co-opt officers and ordinary members of the Executive Committee if posts have fallen vacant.

Any co-opted member shall stand for election in the normal way at the next Annual General Meeting.

7. Terms of office shall be: President: 3 years with eligibility for re-election for a further 3 years; Vice-Presidents: without limit while they remain members of the Society; all Executive Committee members (including the Officers): three years, with eligibility for re-election.

8. Elections: (a) The officers shall be elected by the Executive Committee from amongst its members; (b) The members of the Executive Committee shall be elected by the membership of the Society, as assembled in the Annual General Meeting. Vacancies on the Executive Committee, together with the names of committee members who are retiring or standing for re-election, shall be notified in a Bulletin appearing a month or more before the Annual General Meeting. Nominations shall be made in writing to the Secretary of the Executive Committee at least fifteen days before the Annual General Meeting, or by oral proposal to the meeting by the Chairman of the Executive Committee.

9. Applications for membership:

(a) Applications for membership should be made to the Membership Secretary, accompanied by a brief statement of interests and qualifications.

(b) Undergraduate students, and graduate students of not more than five years' standing from their admission as graduate students, shall be eligible for associate membership of the Society, subject to appropriate documentation of their status being supplied.

(c) The officers of the Society shall be empowered to admit applicants to membership, seeking advice from the full Committee at their discretion.

(d) The society may have up to six Corresponding Members, to be nominated by the Executive Committee and ratified by the Annual General Meeting. Corresponding Members should be colleagues distinguished in the field who are able to represent the society in countries outside the UK. Corresponding Members have their subscription fee waived. Their term is limited to four years but can be renewed for a further four years. They are not members of the Executive committee.

10. The Annual General Meeting shall normally be held in conjunction with a colloquium, a lecture, or a seminar. Invitations to the Annual General Meeting, including a draft of the agenda and, if pertinent, the text of an amendment of this constitution, must reach the members fifteen days previous to the meeting. During the meeting, the Treasurer shall present the Society's accounts, and the Executive Committee shall recommend, and the membership of the Society as assembled in the Annual General Meeting shall approve, the annual subscription to be paid on 1 January each year.

**HENRY SWEET SOCIETY
FOR THE HISTORY OF LINGUISTIC IDEAS**

ANNUAL COLLOQUIUM,
University of Sheffield
7-10 September 2006

First Announcement and Call for Papers

The 2006 Colloquium of the Henry Sweet Society for the History of Linguistic Ideas will be held from Thursday 7 September to Sunday 10 September 2006 at the University of Sheffield. The Leslie Seiffert Memorial Lecture will be delivered by Peter Burke, Professor of Cultural History at the University of Cambridge and author of *Language and Communities in Early Modern Europe*. The conference will overlap with a symposium on Linguistics and Social Theory in the USSR 1917-38, details of which will be forthcoming at <http://www.shef.ac.uk/uni/academic/A-C/bakh/sociolinguistics.html>. Those attending the HSS Colloquium will be welcome to enrol in this symposium and vice versa. (For more details on this project see: <http://www.shef.ac.uk/uni/academic/A-C/bakh/sociolinguistics.html>)

Sheffield University is the leading centre for the study of the history of linguistics in the United Kingdom, offering undergraduate, Master's level and PhD-level teaching in this area. The City of Sheffield is located centrally in the United Kingdom, and is very accessible by air, train or road. International airports in close proximity to Sheffield include Manchester, East Midlands, and Robin Hood Sheffield-Doncaster, and Sheffield is two hours north of London by train. Sheffield has witnessed a great deal of regeneration in recent years and is now a vibrant and attractive city, surrounded by some of the most stunning countryside in England.

Accommodation and meals will be provided at Ranmoor House, a hall of residence 15-minute walk or 5-minute bus journey from the main University site. There will also be the option of staying in nearby hotel accommodation, and all the options will be indicated on the booking form, which will be available, along with further information about the conference, on the Society website by the end of 2005.

Call for Papers

Papers (30 minutes, including discussion) are invited on any aspect of the history of linguistic thought or practice. Ideas for themed sessions or panel discussions are also very welcome. All proposals, including title and abstract (max. 250 words) should be sent to Fiona Marshall at the e-mail address below by 31 January 2006. Notification of acceptance of proposals will be made by 15 March 2006.

Andrew Linn, Richard Steadman-Jones, Fiona Marshall
Department of English Language and Linguistics
University of Sheffield
Sheffield S10 2TN
f.c.marshall@shef.ac.uk

Call for Papers
***Historiography of Linguistics in the 21st Century:
 Challenges and Perspectives***

XVIIIth International Colloquium of the SGdS
 28-30 June 2006, Leiden University (Leiden, The Netherlands)

The XVIIIth International Colloquium of the 'Studienkreis Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft (SGdS)' will take place at the University of Leiden from 28 to 30 June 2006 and will be organized by Els Elffers (Amsterdam), Jan Noordegraaf (Amsterdam), Peter Schmitter (Seoul / Muenster), and Marijke van der Wal (Leiden).

Papers on "Historiography of Linguistics in the 21st Century: Challenges and Perspectives", the main subject of our conference, are particularly welcome, but contributions focussing on other topics within the framework of the history of linguistics are also much appreciated.

Presentations will last 30 minutes, followed by 15 minutes of discussion. The conference languages are English and German. The conference fee will be 30 Euro, payable during the conference.

Participants who would like to give a paper are kindly asked to submit an abstract of 250-350 words by **15 January 2006**, using the template below which can be copied and returned as a Word- or rtf-file to dr. Marijke van der Wal (m.j.van.der.wal@let.leidenuniv.nl) *as well as* to professor Peter Schmitter (schmipe@uni-muenster.de).

For further information, please contact the local organizer
 Marijke van der Wal
 Universiteit Leiden
 Department of Dutch/LUCL
 P.N. van Eyckhof 1
 Postbus 9515
 NL-2300 RA Leiden
 The Netherlands
 email: m.j.van.der.wal@let.leidenuniv.nl

or
 Peter Schmitter
 Graduate School of Interpretation and Translation
 Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
 270 Imun-2-dong, Dongdaemun-gu
 Seoul, 130-791 Korea (South)
 schmipe@uni-muenster.de

**18th International Colloquium of the Studienkreis Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft
(SGdS2006)**

Name of author:

ABSTRACT

[Text 250-350 words]

Author – details of contact:

First name:

Last name:

Title:

Organisation:

Street adress:

Town:

Post/Zip code:

Country:

Telephone:

E-mail:

Perspectives on Prescriptivism

University of Catania
Ragusa 20-22 April 2006

Three years ago the University of Sheffield hosted *The First International Colloquium on Histories of Prescriptivism: Alternative approaches to the study of English 1700-1900* (July 2003) organised by Joan Beal. At that time, papers were invited on any 18th or 19th-century author whose work, or biography, marked them as outside the mainstream in this way, by virtue of being 'radical' in political attitudes, dissenting in religion, female, geographically distant from London (either within, or outside the British Isles), or in any other way. At the end of the three-day session it was decided that the Sicilian, baroque town of Ragusa would be a good place to host the second meeting on eighteenth century prescriptivism.

This time the organisers wish to widen the different perspectives from which to look at linguistic prescriptivism. To what extent is the idea and/or concept of prescriptivism to be considered as a typical product of the eighteenth century? What is the attitude of twenty-first century scholars and language guardians? How is the ELT world and industry reacting to the globalisation of the English language? What are the norms to follow? To what extent were books more prescriptive – rather than descriptive – in Lowth's era? These are the questions we would like to be answered. For this reason papers on the following topics are more than welcome:

- Grammars and grammarians
- Lexicography and lexicographers
- Phonology and phoneticians
- Old and new language guardians

Abstracts (maximum 400 words) should be submitted in c/c to msturial@unict.it and j.c.beal@shef.ac.uk by 15th January 2006. It is expected that a selection of papers will be published.

**10th International Conference on the History of the Language
Sciences (ICHoLS X)**
Conference Report

Anders Ahlqvist
Helsingfors, Finland

Our triennial conference goes from strength to strength. The latest one, the tenth of them, took place at the University of Illinois. It was very efficiently organised by Douglas Kibbee and a large team of colleagues and students of his. It was a great pleasure to witness how well they all worked together and how much they obviously enjoyed what they were doing.

Also, it was made very clear that the conference had the full support of all relevant university authorities, including the Chancellor, Dr. Richard Herman, who formally opened the conference on Thursday morning, 1 September. His speech contained far more than the usual platitudes uttered on such occasions by many of his colleagues. Indeed, it came as rather a surprise to me anyway, to hear of his very strong and patently honest support for the humanities.

Given the perhaps unnecessarily short time available for the conference, it had to be divided into some rather few plenary sessions and many parallel ones. In a few cases, I at any rate felt that certain parallel session papers might have deserved plenary status, particularly Andrew Linn's important paper on research ethics in our discipline and David Cram's timely one on the thorny subject of shelf-life and time-horizons.

The first plenary was given jointly by Bernard Colombat and Douglas Kibbee himself. It provided a very welcome introduction to the use of electronic resources in the history of linguistics. The next two plenary lectures, by Michael Silverstein and John Joseph, respectively, proved interestingly controversial, so much so that a much fuller account is to be found elsewhere in this issue of the Bulletin. All I need comment upon, therefore, is the very lively and (especially in Joseph's case) rather humorous delivery of both papers. The last plenary, by Sylvain Auroux and Francine Mazière, brought some very important new light to bear on the prehistory of the *Grammaire générale et raisonnée*, setting it convincingly—perhaps for the first time since it became the subject of modern scholarly study—in its right historical context.

Among the parallel session papers, I can only comment on some of those I actually heard. Thus, Joseph Subbiondo contributed a very powerful study of the dispute between George Dalgarno and John Wilkins. Odile Leclercq gave a very interesting account of how proverbs had been collected in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Gijsbert Rutten demonstrated the importance of German philosophy for all nineteenth-century European linguistics; he concentrated, naturally enough, on its influence in the Netherlands. Camiel Hamans provided an entertaining talk about the minority language debate around Yiddish in the Dutch language landscape. One might, however, add that his paper would have been equally welcome at a conference of sociolinguists.

The classical languages were not neglected, and the contributions of Brian Joseph, Malcolm Hyman and Mark Amsler on some important aspects of the history of Greek and Latin Studies were well attended, giving rise to lively discussions, as did those, given together in another session, presented by Anneli Luhtala, Daniel Taylor, and Pierre Swiggers together with Alfons Wouters. I also heard some very interesting comments on modern Chinese linguistics from Edward McDonald, on the important journal *Language* and its role in the history of American linguistics, from Hope Dawson. But I must stop listing individual speakers at this point. What I have mentioned ought to be sufficient to demonstrate to my readers what a fine conference this was.

To finish up, a few notes on the social side of things will not come amiss. The printed programme had little to say about it, but it turned out to be just as well organised as everything else, starting with a university reception on Thursday evening 1 September, featuring some startlingly polychrome cheeses, which still tasted rather good. The next evening we were treated to a bus tour to Allerton, where a splendid dinner was served. The Saturday night conference dinner as such took place at the university and was just as enjoyable as the previous night's. The following day, the traditional full-day excursion took us to Chicago, where there were many stupendous sights to marvel at, as we travelled through the waterways of the city.

The conference ended on Monday 5 September, with the usual business meeting. On this occasion, it was unanimously agreed that the next conference in the series will take place in Potsdam, from 28 August to 2 September 2008. The organiser, Professor Gerda Haßler will, as the American saying goes, have a hard act to follow. However, following her highly competent description of all that will be available to help us in Potsdam, I feel confident that ICHoLs XI remains in hands as good as those that looked after us so well in Urbana.

Contact details: ahlqvist@mac.com

News of Members

NEW MEMBERS

Alderik Blom is working towards a Ph.D. at the University of Cambridge, in the Dept. of Anglo-Saxon, Norse, and Celtic under supervision of Dr Paul Russell on textual reflexes of Gaulish-Latin bilingualism. His general interests are historical linguistics, especially language contact; comparative linguistics especially of the Germanic and Celtic languages; history of linguistic scholarship (especially 15th/16th century; early 19th century); and philology, textual transmission and its implications for the study of language.

Dr Craig Brandist is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Russian and Slavonic Studies at the University of Sheffield and director of the project *The Rise of Sociological Linguistics in the Soviet Union 1917-1938: Institutions, Ideas and Agendas*. His research interests include Russian literature, and early Soviet intellectual history, Bakhtinian and Marxist cultural theory.

Dr Ekaterina Chown (Department of Russian & Slavonic Studies, University of Sheffield) is working on the project devoted to the history of the early Soviet linguistics, entitled *The rise of sociological linguistics in the Soviet Union, 1917-1938: Institutions, Ideas, Agendas*; it is directed by Dr Craig Brandist and is funded by the A.H.R.B. Trust.

Dra. Claudia Teresa Mársico (Universidad de Buenos Aires (Puan 480, Buenos Aires), Universidad Nacional de Gral. San Martín.). Her interests are the Philosophy of language in ancient Greece and theories about syntax in ancient Greece

OTHER NEWS

Dr Ekaterina Velmezova (University of Lausanne – Russian Academy of Sciences) has won a prize of the philological faculty of the University of Lausanne (Switzerland) for her *second* (yes, really) PhD “La linguistique soviétique à l’époque stalinienne: la sémantique marriste”, upheld in January 2005. Warm congratulations!

Arne Juul (1935-2005): a worthy contribution to the historiography of Scandinavian linguistics

Beverley Collins and Inger M. Mees

Leiden University Centre for Linguistics

Faculty of Language, Communication & Cultural Studies, Copenhagen Business School

Arne Juul, who died in March of this year shortly before his seventieth birthday, was an HSS member of long standing. Apart from his work as an Anglicist and educationalist, he was pre-eminently an enthusiastic historiographer and is especially notable for his publications in the field of Scandinavian linguistics of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

He was born in Copenhagen in 1935, the son of a manager in the motor trade, and received his pre-university education at Metropolitanskolen, Copenhagen, where he specialised in modern languages. He originally opted for a teaching diploma, and subsequently embarked on a period as a lecturer in a teacher training college. Arne went on to take a degree in English at the University of Copenhagen, graduating in 1966. In 1969 he was appointed as a lecturer at the Royal Danish School of Educational Studies (now the Danish University of Education), a career post from which he retired in 1993. He obtained a Danish doctorate in 1974 for a dissertation involving a detailed study on concord of number in English. Later he turned from grammar as his main preoccupation to develop his interest in articulatory phonetics. From this wider background it was a short step to historiography of the modern period, and in particular to researching the lives and work of two great Scandinavian linguists, Otto Jespersen (1860-1943) and Johan Storm (1836-1920). Arne was also a pioneer in the use of audiovisual teaching materials, and spent much time searching in the BBC archives for suitable recordings to use for teaching purposes. He was a great believer in using authentic radio and TV material, defining 'authentic' as recordings which had been produced by native speakers who were at the time unaware of any subsequent pedagogic application.

Although Arne Juul was capable of producing excellent work on his own account, he enjoyed co-operating with other scholars, and much of his output was the result of collaborative efforts. His friend and colleague Hans Frede Nielsen (of the University of Southern Denmark) was his most consistent co-author, and in 1985 they brought out *Our Changing Speech* (consisting of a short book and four accompanying cassettes). This contained transcripts of a number of broadcast talks given by Daniel Jones (1881-1967) in 1948, the recordings having been rescued by Arne from the obscurity of the BBC sound archives, and so made once again available to a wide audience. Together with Nielsen and Knud Sørensen (University of Aarhus), Juul edited *Degeneration on the Air?* (1988). This was another publication with accompanying BBC audio material, this time concerned with the pronunciation of radio announcers from the early beginnings of the BBC in 1926 up till the date of publication. Characteristic pronunciation features of a 1949 BBC news broadcast were

compared with the speech of three 1980s newsreaders who were asked to read the same texts as their predecessors.

In 1989, Juul and Nielsen brought out *Otto Jespersen: Facets of his Life and Work* – a compilation of articles on Jespersen's pioneering efforts in the field of English language and linguistics. In the same year, they also produced an audiovisual publication comprising four recordings concerning Jespersen. The earliest of these is a recording dating from 1913 by Jespersen himself, in which he discusses the differences between spoken and written language; the next is a 1941 broadcast, in which Jespersen is interviewed about child language acquisition; the two remaining recordings, dating from the 1980s, are of the well-known linguist Paul Christophersen (1911-99), who had collaborated with Jespersen in the thirties, and was able to give personal impressions of the legendary Danish scholar.

Once again together with Hans Frede Nielsen, and now joined also by Jørgen Erik Nielsen (University of Copenhagen), Juul edited the work for which he will perhaps be best remembered, *A Linguist's Life* (1995); it provided for the first time an English translation of Otto Jespersen's autobiography. Jespersen's book is an historiographical feast, replete with fascinating biographical details of the career of its author, and also providing interesting sidelights on the personalities of numerous other eminent contemporary linguists such as Daniel Jones, Paul Passy (1859-1940), Alexander Ellis (1814-90), Frederick Furnivall (1825-1910), Wilhelm Viëtor (1850-1918), to cite just a few. The Danish original had appeared in 1938 (entitled *En Sprogmands Levned*) but, naturally enough, its readership had been confined to the relatively small population of the Scandinavian countries. Juul and his colleagues edited an admirable translation (by David Stoner), which was bundled together with an introduction by Christophersen, a splendid collection of photographs and a definitive Jespersen bibliography. The book can be considered a landmark in the historiography of modern Scandinavian linguistics.

Throughout his life Arne Juul was a dedicated anglophile. He spent a complete year at Clare Hall, Cambridge, from 1978 to 1979, and returned to the college later on many occasions for shorter stays. These connections with Cambridge provided him with some of the happiest periods of his later career, and he continued even when retired to go back to Clare Hall. Arne's love of England was matched only by his affection for Norway. His years in retirement from teaching were profitably devoted to biographical research on Johan Storm (1836-1920), Professor of Romance languages and English philology at the University of Christiania (now Oslo). In Juul (2004), after describing Storm's background and his preoccupation with the teaching of the English language at home and abroad, Juul reveals Storm's remarkable practical language skills, and provides summaries of his absorbingly interesting correspondence with Henry Sweet (1845-1912), Vilhelm Thomsen (1842-1927) and Otto Jespersen. The work includes an extensive collection of illustrative photographic material – always a feature of Arne Juul's historiographical volumes. It is indeed unfortunate that this book has been published only in Danish – the more so since it seems that no English translation is ever likely to appear. This is a point made by Andrew Linn (2002: 38), in an otherwise enthusiastic review, when he expresses his regret 'that this fine book is not available to a wider readership'. On the other hand, it can be considered that Juul's book has provided inspiration and input for Linn's own notable recent study of Storm

(Linn, 2004). Juul's final – non-historiographical – contribution was the reference work he co-authored with W. Glyn Jones and Jens Axelsen in 2001 entitled *Institutionsnavne: dansk-engelsk*. It is a short but invaluable reference work devoted entirely to Danish-English translations of the names of institutions and organisations.

Aside from his achievements as a scholar, it needs also to be said that Arne was a truly generous and kindly individual in all aspects of his personal life. He eschewed any form of academic jealousy or backbiting – refusing to engage in gossip about his colleagues or friends. He was modest to the point of being self-effacing and willingly and frequently shared information he had discovered with his fellow-scholars. Although in later life, as a consequence of a fall, he was plagued by back pain, he never complained of his lot and was indeed most reluctant ever to mention his illnesses or his personal discomfort. He was fortunate in having a long happy marriage to his wife, Kirsten, and had two sons and four grandchildren. Arne's pleasures were simple: he was perhaps most content either when browsing in libraries and archives, or when seated in a concert hall. He was especially devoted to the music of the eighteenth century, and particularly to the works of Haydn and Handel, and Arne was himself an able pianist who played every day for his own enjoyment. Another of his enthusiasms was photography, and his interest in visual art is evident from the numerous well-chosen photographic images which illustrated many of his books.

In his academic work as an historiographer, Arne Juul was a model for all who practise our trade; he never cut corners and always checked and double-checked his facts and sources of information. He aimed to write in plain straightforward language and would have had no truck with those who deliberately cloak their ideas in impenetrable verbiage. It is worth noting that Arne's personal standard in both spoken and written English was astonishingly high; it was quite impossible to detect that he was a non-native. He was an excellent proofreader, both in Danish and English, and we, the writers of this piece, were much in debt to Arne's meticulous eye for detail when he generously offered to proofread large portions of our book *The Real Professor Higgins* (Collins and Mees, 1999). In these matters, as in much else, he was a true perfectionist.

Arne Juul had limited aims and worked on a small canvas. He made no claims to being a theoretician, and when an aspect of linguistics was outside his area of expertise he would readily acknowledge the fact. Nevertheless, his contribution to historiography may well be remembered long after much present-day linguistic theorising is overturned and forgotten. With his death, we have lost an assiduous colleague and a valued friend.

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